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Ruttan  I'd like to introduce Ed Schuh, who is the Dean of the Hubert H. Humphrey
Institute  of Public Affairs,  and is our host.  He has  such nice facilities  over
here  that he rents them out.  I invite  him to welcome  us and he gives  us a
discount  on the rent.  As you know,  Ed has  had  a long career  at  both the
national  and  international  levels.  He  has  served  as  Deputy  Assistant
Secretary in the U.S. Department of Agriculture;  and with the World Bank;
with  the  Ford  Foundation  in Brazil.  This is  his second incarnation  at  the
University  of Minnesota.  He was  head  of the Department  of Agricultural
and Applied Economics  here before going to the World Bank.
Schuh  It's nice to have you here.  The Humphrey  Institute recently  opened what's
called  the  Humphrey  Forum,  which  is  an  exhibit  forum,  commemorating
Hubert Humphrey.  It's  not a museum.  It's on the ground floor and when
you have a break, go down and take a look at it.  It's really a very interesting
educational medium because it uses interactive  computers and VCR's to tell
the Humphrey story.  And if you get a chance to browse around the building,
there  are  also  some  other  very  interesting  facilities.  We  host  a  lot  of conferences such as this to try to provide intellectual leadership on important
public issues such as the issue that you will be addressing.  I will not take any
more  of your time.  We are glad to have you with us.
Ruttan  Let me  say just a  little bit about  the background  to today and  tomorrow's
discussion.  A  little  over  a  year  ago,  Bob  Herdt  of  the  Rockefeller
Foundation  suggested, in a phone conversation,  "Don't you think it's  about
time to start thinking about the issues that are going to confront agricultural
development  as  we  move  into  the  first  or  second  decades  of  the  next
century?"  We both had a feeling  that most of us are spending  a lot of our
time working on the immediate problems.  Very little attention is being given to  the  issues  that  will  confront  us  as  we  move  into  the  next  century.  I
suggested  that  rather  than  organizing  a  big  conference,  we  hold  several
consultations" among small groups of knowledgeable people.  We would use
the consultations to sort out the issues and then decide if there is a basis for
a more formal conference.
The first of the consultations  was on biological and technical  constraints on
crop and animal productivity.  We were concerned with the fact that, in spite2
of what we are told  about  the promise  of biotechnology,  the timing of any
substantial impact on agricultural  production seems  to be receding.
We also were  concerned with what appears to be the slowing of yield gains.
For example, yields in rice maximum yield experiments at the International
Rice Research Institute (IRRI) have not risen for about 20 years.  And while
maize yields  in the United  States continue  to rise at about one bushel per
acre per year, that is a much smaller percentage  increase than 20 years ago.
We will be sending a copy of the report on the first consultation to you in a
few weeks.
For the second topic, the one that we will be talking about today, we agreed
that it is important to ask about the implications of a series of environmental
changes, including what an economist would term the macro-environmental
changes,  such as global  climate  change,  as well as the micro-environmental
changes arising from intensification of agricultural production such as erosion,
salinization,  and groundwater  contamination.  What are the implications  of
such changes  for  agricultural  research  priorities?  How  should  one change
the agricultural research portfolio given what we think we know, or ought to
know,  about  these  environmental  changes.  These  are  the issues  for  this
dialogue.
The next consultation will deal with the prospects  of a health crisis in rural
areas--particularly  in developing  countries.  When one  considers a series of
events like malaria resurgence, failure to make progress in parasitic disease,
the health effects of environmental  changes, and AIDS, it is not too difficult
to  envisage  a world in which  there will be a lot of sick people in villages  a
generation  from  now--possibly  enough  sick  people  to  affect  agricultural
production.  Such  a scenario  may not  be  too  far-fetched.  One  can  find
villages like that today in Uganda.  We are also thinking of a final conference
dealing  more  with  institutional  issues  related  to  agricultural  and  rural
development.
In  order  to  structure  this  consultation,  I  will  attempt  to  organize  the
discussion in about four blocks.  The first block will center  around what we
really  know about  global climate change.  What  can we  really  say that we
know  as compared  to what we think or hope?  In that group,  I have Dean
Abrahamson,  Norman Rosenberg,  William  Clark,  and Steve  Sonka.  I'll be
asking Dean to start off the discussion.
The second block will center around the impact of global climate changes on
agriculture  and natural resources.  I'll ask Steve Rawlins  to be the transition
between  the  first  and the  second  group.  Then we  have  Paul  Waggoner,
Margaret Davis, Robert Chen, Zbigniew Bochniarz,  and Pierre  Crosson.  I
visualize Pierre's  presentation serving as  a transition  to the issues  of micro-
environmental  change.3
Pierre  has  been concerned  not only with  some  of the  implications  of the macro changes,  but he has also done a great deal of very excellent  work on soil erosion.  I will then ask Pedro  Sanchez to discuss some of the problems
associated  with  tropical  soils  and  tropical  ecologies  and  Bill  Larson  and
H. H. Cheng to discuss temperate  region soil problems.  Richard Jones will be concerned  with pests  and pathogens  that arise from both global  climate
change  and  some  of  the  micro-environmental  change.  Bob  Munson  will reflect  on some of his  concerns  about  soil fertility.
Finally,  we'll move toward  a discussion  of the  implications  for agricultural
research.  I  have  asked  Gene  Allen  to  do  some  thinking  about  research implications  from  a  state  perspective.  Steve  Rayner  is  concerned  about decision making under the kinds of uncertainty  arising from the changes we will  be  discussion.  I've  asked  Steve  Rawlins  to  reflect  on  the  research implications  from a federal perspective.
GLOBAL CLIMATE  CHANGE
Greenhouse  Gases  and Climate Change
Ruttan  Dean, the baton is in your hand.
Abrahamson  At current growth rates in the emissions of greenhouse gases, we can expect increases  in concentrations  equivalent  to a  doubling  of the pre-industrial
concentration  of CO2 (carbon  dioxide)  by early  in the  next  century  --  by about 2030.  Most of the  general circulation  models show an  equilibrium
heating  -- an increase of annual average global temperature  -- of someplace
in the neighborhood  of 3°-5°  Celsius for a doubling  of CO2 concentration.
Because  of the large heat  capacity  of the  oceans,  and the  time  to transfer heat into the oceans,  there  is an ocean thermal delay  generally represented
as  20-40 years.  That  is  the  reason  for  the  lag  between  the  atmospheric
concentration of greenhouse gases and the observed increase in atmospheric
temperature.
There are a number of biogeochemical feedbacks that are not incorporated
into the general  circulation  models.  Those are not well understood.  One estimate published last year by Lashoff (1989)  suggested that when you take these feedbacks into account,  that could lead to a global heating equivalent
to that shown  by the general  circulation  models themselves.  If that should be the  case,  then if we permit  emission rates  to  continue  at their present levels,  we  could  well  be  committed  to  a warming  of 6-80  within  the  next three or four decades.  Some of these feedbacks have a long-time  constant. Some of them don't.The global heating, the concentration  of greenhouse  gases and the resultant
climate change is, for practical purposes, irreversible.  It's not irreversible,  of
course,  in  geologic  time  frames.  But  in  time  of  social  or  economic  or
political relevance  it can be considered irreversible.  The issue differs  from
most  conventional  environmental  issues  in  that  there  are,  for  practical
purposes,  no  scrubbers  --  there is  no simple technical  fix.  There  are some
exceptions  with  chlorofluorocarbons  and  some  of  the  other  industrial
chemicals.  This means  that in order  to reduce emission  rates the level  of
activities that are producing  these gases must be reduced.
Finally, I find it hard to convince  myself that we aren't already committed to
a  warming  of 3-5° Celsius  as  an  equilibrium  warming  because  of  gases
already in the atmosphere, plus those certain to be released while we debate
policy response and implement  it.
What about uncertainty?  The basic physics of the greenhouse  effect is very
well  known.  That  is  that  there  will  be  climatic  change  resulting  from
greenhouse  gas emissions  is  a certainty.  How much and when is not at all
certain.
Now  I want to refer to the tables  that I handed  out (Tables  1 and 2).  We
started last spring to put together  a faculty  seminar here  at the University
that will consider implications of climatic change for Minnesota.  This is the
first draft  of a scenario  for  climatic  change  for  Minnesota.  It has not yet
been reviewed.  It was done  a couple  of years ago by a colleague  of mine,
Peter  Ciborowski.
We were deliberately conservative  -- we didn't take the high end of the scale
in terms of temperature  or precipitation.  The base case suggests an average
temperature  increase  of one  degree  by the turn  of the  century and three
degrees  by  2030;  additional  frost-free  days  by  2030;  a  decline  in  degree
heating  days;  an increase in the degree  cooling  days; a two or three weeks
earlier  snow melt;  10 or 20 additional  July days  over  90°F;  a reduction  in
summer soil  moisture  of 25 percent;  and  increased  drought  frequency  and
decreased  runoff.  My  own view is  that it's apt to be  much more extreme
than this, but I tend to be a little more pessimistic  than some.
In 1987, there was a conference  in Villach, Austria sponsored by the World
Meteorological Organization and UNEP and a couple of other organizations.
Several  of you were there.  That group put together a scenario.  I won't go
through it in detail, but they projected larger temperature  increases at high
latitudes  than at  low,  and  more  in  winter  than in summer.  Precipitation
changes  are also indicated (Table 3).
In a  review  published  in  1987  by  the National  Academy  of  Sciences,  the
question  of  likelihood  was  addressed.  Large  stratospheric  cooling  was
regarded as virtually certain and global mean surface warming very probable.5
They suggested  a range  for an equivalent  doubling of CO2 as  1-1/2"  to  4-
1/20  Celsius.  Global  mean  precipitation  increase  is  very  probable.
Reduction  of sea ice  is very  probable.  Polar winter  surface  warming very
probable.  Summer continental  dryness and warming are likely in the  long-
term.  And rise in sea level  is probable.
The  impacts  of  climatic  change  are  probably  non-linear.  Some  of  the
physical  impacts,  sea  level  rise,  for example,  may be  a linear  function  of
average warming  over some range, but the impacts of the sea level rise will
be  highly  non-linear.  I can't  think of any impact  that  scales  linearly with
temperature.
The  policy  situation  is  evolving  very  rapidly.  You  don't  hear  any  talk
anymore about winners and losers or adapting.  You did a few years ago, but
that talk pretty much disappeared  as soon as the impacts associated with the
rates  of climatic  change were understood.
We  clearly  know  enough  to  know that the  emissions  of greenhouse  gases
have to be reduced and have to be reduced substantially.  Various estimates
have  been made  of the  reductions  in emissions  of greenhouse  gases  that
would be necessary  to stabilize  their atmospheric  concentrations.  The  one
that  the  EPA published  not  quite  a year  ago  is  typical.  They  suggest  a
reduction  in  CO2 emissions  of  between  50-80 percent;  a  10-20 percent
reduction  in methane;  elimination of the  long life  CFC's and reduction  of
nitrous  oxide  of,  as  I  recall,  85 percent.  Thus  very,  very  substantial
reductions  in these gases  are  required  to stabilize  atmospheric  greenhouse
gas concentrations.
There are bills pending before the Congress and in other legislative bodies
that range all the way from stabilizing  emissions to reductions of 20 percent
or so by the end of the century.  About 60 percent of the greenhouse gases
appear to come from fossil fuels.  The rest are distributed over a number of
other sources.
We also know  that we  must cope with the substantial  unavoidable  climatic
change  at  the  same  time.  At  the  same  time  that  we  will  be  trying  to
restructure  energy production and use to reduce emissions it will be necessary
to try to cope with unavoidable  climatic change.  Both of these activities are
potentially disruptive --  socially, economically,  politically,  ecologically.  And
both are very  expensive.
Crosson  The draft report that Martin Parry put together for the IPCC does talk about
winners and losers so far as agriculture is concerned.  The argument  is that
after reviewing  all the material there would be no reason to assume much
effect  on global  agricultural  capacity  with an  equivalent  doubling  of CO2.
Although  there clearly would be some regions  that would lose, there would6
be others that would benefit.  There was this kind of standoff so far as global
agricultural capacity was  concerned.
Abrahamson  If  you  consider  local  effects  only,  everybody  won't  come  out  equally.
Minnesota won't fare the same as Kansas, for example.  I'd also suggest that
if  you  postulate  some  new  equilibrium  climate  and  we  move  into  that
equilibrium slowly, then I think you can conjure up credible winner scenarios.
If the rates of climatic change are as high as they now appear, then I find it
difficult  to imagine  that the disruption  associated  with these  high rates  of
change would be anything but serious.
Crosson  I was only responding to your statement that the notion of winners and losers
is no longer a part of the discussion.
Rayner  I  clearly  move  in different  circles  from Dean  because  I hear  the  issue  of
winners and losers discussed  quite extensively.  I think it's an issue which  is
seldom thought  through adequately.  Certainly,  as Dean says,  in the short-
term  it looks  like there will  be winners  and  losers.  There  is  considerable
uncertainty  about when the doubling  equivalent  would be  reached.  Dean
mentioned 2030.  I've heard  dates that put it much further back in the next
century.  And of course there's also uncertainty attached to the ocean water
buffering  effect.  What  is meant  by short-term  and  long-term  varies.  But
more  to  the  point,  we  should  stop  thinking  about  winners  and  losers  in
absolute terms.  It may well be that there are no absolute winners  over the
present situation, but some people  are going to lose more  than others.
Furthermore, we have to bear in mind that there are going to be winners and
losers for preventive policies as well as from adaptive  strategies.  The cost of
prevention may prove to be extremely high.  EPA's estimates  for protection
of the United  States coast line from sea level rise, for example, is  quite an
impressive  figure.  But it is quite moderate by comparison with the costs of
completely reconfiguring the U.S.  energy system.  So there are going to be
winners and losers in the sense that there are going to be large transfers of
wealth involved in whatever response we make to climate change  -- whether
it's essentially a preventive  or adaptive  strategy.  It's worth bearing in mind
as we have these discussions  that some are going to be, in net terms, better
off and some worse  off whatever  we do.
Rawlins  In  both  the  Global  Change  Working  Group  of the  Committee  on  Earth
Sciences and in the Impacts Assessment Panel of the IPCC, where I've been
serving as a USDA representative,  there is debate about winners  and losers.
But there is considerably more debate about the credibility of the projections
for global warming.  The report  Scientific Perspectives  on the Greenhouse7
Problem,1 just published by the George C. Marshall Institute of Washington, D.C.  is  one  example  of the  critical  look  now  being  taken  at  the  scientific underpinning for these projections.  The earth is a very complex system.  The simplistic models of this system on which global warming projections are now being  made  are  not  capable  of  taking  into  account  all  of  the  complex interactions  that could influence  the results.
We  know  with  certainty  that  the  atmospheric  concentrations  of  carbon dioxide,  methane and nitrous  oxides have increased, and that they will, most likely, continue to increase for some time to come.  What the consequences of these increases  will be is  less certain.  Our simplistic models predict that the  physical  consequence  of  these  increased  concentrations  acting  alone should be global  warming.  The question  is,  are they acting alone?
To illustrate just how little we know about the complex earth system, consider the  carbon  cycle.  We've  lost  about  130  teragrams  of carbon  from  fossil reserves  and  from  cement  manufacture.  We've  lost  another  150  to  160 teragrams  from land use changes,  including  deforestation.  The atmosphere has gained  only 60 teragrams.  The remainder went somewhere.  Obviously the  ocean  is  a  big  sink.  The  only  other  sink is  the biosphere.  Recently, oceanographers  have  decreased  their estimates  of the sink capacity  of the ocean,  leaving  a large quantity  of carbon unaccounted  for.  Could it be that the  25%  increase  in  atmospheric  carbon  dioxide  concentration  we  have already  experienced  could  have  increased  the  biosphere  capacity  to  fix carbon?  We  simply  do  not  know.  Both the  ocean's  and  the  biosphere's capacity  to  fix  carbon  are  dependent  upon  complex  processes  that  are affected by temperature  and carbon  dioxide concentration.  The amount  of carbon that ends up in the atmosphere is a small residual left over from some very large and  dynamic  processes  that we're  only beginning  to understand. The error in estimating this residual could be  huge.
Contrary to Abraham's comment  that there is no debate about winners and losers,  I hear a lot more  debate  about this,  and about uncertainties  of our projections  now than I did six months or a year ago.
Ruttan  How  strongly  does  the  rate  of change  that  Dean  emphasized  affect  the conclusions  that we draw?
Rawlins  Of course  the less the rate of change  the easier it will be to adapt  to.  We should not, however,  assume that all changes will have negative impacts.  The direct effect  of carbon  dioxide  concentration  increase  on crop production, taken by itself, could be positive.  Martin Parry's  draft report referred  to by Crosson takes this into account.  [The proceedings of the Coolfont workshop
Scientific  Persectives  on  the  Grenhouse  Problem  (Washington,  DC:  George  C. Marshall Institute)  (to  be completed).8
were  used  by Parry.  The  Coolfont  report  is  as yet  unpublished.  Parry's
report is a better reference.]
Ravner  For both forestry and agriculture?
Rawlins  They considered  only agriculture.
Ravner  But that's highly uncertain because all of the experiments that are being done
in CO2 fertilization and we've done a lot at Oak Ridge, are being done under
very  artificial circumstances.
Rawlins  Some experiments being conducted by ARS in cooperation  with DOE now
use a free air release of carbon dioxide in an open field.
Ravner  Well, they haven't all been completely enclosed, but they've been small plots
about the size  of this room.  They're  quite  artificial,  particularly  from  the
point of view of the effects  of pests.
Rawlins  Of course, I certainly agree with that.
Rayner  The importance  of the impact  of pests on CO2-fertilized  plants is that the
pests must eat a lot more plants to get the same  amount of nutrition.  The
whole  thing is very up in the air as  to whether there would be any benefit.
We just don't know.
Rawlins  I agree.  We don't know.  Pest interactions need to be taken into account.
We're studying pest effects whether we want to or not in the FACE (Free Air
Carbon  Exchange)  experiment  being  conducted  by  DOE,  Brookhaven
National  Laboratory,  ARS  and  the  University  of  Arizona  at  Maricopa,
Arizona.  To  overcome  the  problems  of  chamber  walls  carbon  dioxide  is
released  from  standpipes  encircling  20-meter-diameter  plots.  But  leaf
temperatures  of  the  high  carbon  dioxide  plots  run  higher  than  the
surrounding plants, which  selectively attracts insects.
Ruttan  We're  going  to  come  back  to  this  issue  again.  Dean,  do  you  have  any
comment before  I move to Norm Rosenberg?
Abrahamson  Just a couple of things.  One is that future emissions are under our control.
We can't continue present trends.  The other thing, is the time perspective.
I consider short-term a few hundred years.  And I certainly am not impressed
with arguments  about time periods shorter  than a couple decades.
Ravner  The  problem  is  though,  Dean,  that  the  policy  decisions  are  made  by
institutions today that don't have time frames of several hundred years.  We
are stuck with their time frames as far as decision making  is concerned  on
those issues.9
Abrahamson  I appreciate  that fully.  Even though I'm in the School of Public Affairs and
supposed to understand  how these institutions work, I try to forget from time
to time.
Chen  Your  base  case  is  for  a  changed  climate.  Is  there  a  base  case  for  an
unchanged  climate?
Abrahamson  I don't think it's very likely.  We must do everything we  can to reduce the
rate of emissions.  We have to move away from the fossil fuels as rapidly as
possible.  I don't care what the cost is, the cost of not doing anything is in my
view so large that we simply don't have that option.  We're going to have to
cope with whatever climatic changes  are already in the mill.  If we're  lucky
and if all uncertainties  come  out at the low end and we're vigorous in terms
of reducing emissions, we might limit the change  to a couple  of degrees.
Davis  I want to respond to Dr. Chen's questions about a continuation of the present
climate.  The  present  climate  is  variable.  We  don't  know  whether  the
changes  we've  seen  since  the  beginning  of  the  century  are  actually  an
incipient greenhouse  effect or whether they're  a natural  trend.  But there is
something  to be learned from the past record.  The  rate of warming  from
1900  to  1950  was rather  similar to  the lowest rate  of possible  response  to
increased  CO2. We only need to look at the response  of agriculture to the
series of droughts during the  1930s,  1940s, and  1950s to give us some idea of
the best possible  case  scenario.
Skepticism  About Climate Models
Rosenberg  That leads in very nicely  to what I  thought I would  salvage  from  my little
presentation  because Steve  Rawlins covered  much of what I wanted to  say.
Let me begin  in response to some of Dean's comments.  I agree  that if the
current rate of emissions of greenhouse  gases continues, that there will be a
significant  impact on the  global climate  system.  I'm that  convinced  of the
physics of the process.  But  I don't have much faith  in much  of the detail
that's available to us right now.  I'm very  skeptical of the kinds of numbers
that Dean used in his scenario.
They  say  there  are  two  things that  you  shouldn't have  to watch  being
made  --  laws  and sausages.  I would add global  climate models  as  a third.
The modeling effort is intellectually stimulating, but very, very flawed.  The
kinds of numbers  that are being quoted  are very  shaky.  For example,  the
GFDL  model  which  predicts  the  extreme  heat  and  dryness  in  the  mid-
continent of North America produces radically different results than does the
NCAR  climate  model,  largely  because  of  the  way  the  two  models
parameterize soil moisture in the spring. Just a simple thing like whether the
soil is full of water or not creates a tremendous  difference in the outcome of
the models.10
Laschoff's analysis indicates that if all of the feedbacks are positive, then the
greenhouse  effect  will be much  more severe than even  the GCM modelers
predict.  But, on the other hand, some negative  feedbacks are possible, too,
and we just don't know which ones  are going to play out.
The models need to be improved and those who are working on the models
understand  this full well.  It's the people, often  on the  policy side,  on the
advocacy  side, and  in the media, who grab  the worst case  and  run with  it.
After  all, it's much  more interesting  to know  that the Midwest  is going  to
turn  into  a permanent  desert  than  it  is  to  speculate  about  half a  degree
increase  or decrease  in temperature.  The scientific basis on which so many
of these projections  are being  made is still very weak.  We have to be very
skeptical and remain skeptical.
Clearly  one  of the  few things  we  know  for sure  is that plants  respond  to
elevated levels of carbon dioxide.  There is a greater rate of photosynthesis
and there is an effect on the stomatal functioning  that causes plants  to use
less water.  You're right, of course, Steve (Rayner), that most of the studies
have been done  in laboratories  and growth chambers.  What will happen at
a field level outdoors is uncertain, but something will happen.  The point that
Steve  Rawlins  made  --  that  only  60 gigatons  have  accumulated  in  the
atmosphere while 300 have been emitted -- is relevant.  The oceanographers
are now becoming convinced that the capacity of the oceans to absorb carbon
dioxide is much more limited than they had originally thought.  That tells me
that, since the CO2 is not going to outer space, it's going into the terrestrial
biosphere.  But we don't know whether it's into forests or tundra or peat bogs
or into that one percent per annum yield  increase  that the  plant breeders
take credit for.  I suspect that the CO2 "fertilization effect"  is built into that
yield increase that we've seen over the last 50 or 60 years.
Another important point is the rate of change.  Surely if that rate of change
is very  rapid, we're  going  to have  more  problems than if it is  slow.  That
would  be  true  for  agriculture.  And  it would  be  true  for  forests,  water
resources,  and  everything  else  that worries  us.  The  temperature  records
produced by the group at East Anglia (Jones, Raper, et. al  1986)  and at the
Goddard Institute for Space Studies  (Hansen and Lebedeff 1987)  show that
there  has  been a net change in  mean global  temperature  of slightly more
than half a degree  Celsius over the last  100 years  (Figure  1).  A portion  of
that is probably due to the urban "heat island effect,"  so the real number is
probably smaller.
This temperature  rise  could be the result  of normal climate variability.  It
could be an indication of a greenhouse  effect.  I find it rather upsetting when
scientists grab hold of one side of an issue and quote only that which seems
to support their argument.  Lawyers are paid to be advocates and they do the
best they can to make sure that information supporting their case is the only11
information  to  reach  the judge  and  the jury.  However,  what  is  laudable
behavior  in an  advocate  is not necessarily  laudable  in  a scientist.  Now  I
believe the temperature record is essentially correct.  I believe that there has
been a global warming  trend over the last 100 years.  But when we see  that
data for the continental United States shows no change in temperature  over
exactly the same period of time, it should cause some doubt.  The continental
United  States  has  the  best  geographical  distribution  of temperature  and
precipitation  measurement  stations  anywhere  in  the world.  That  record
shows  no change  in temperature  and no change in precipitation.
The counter-argument is that the U.S. is only one small portion of the world.
But it is  one portion  of the earth's  surface  where  "greenhouse warming"  is
predicted, by some GCM's, to be most apparent.  And yet we don't find it.
We find cooling in many places in the world where we expected warming and
we find the greatest warming in the tropics where no warming was expected.
My point is that the state of the science  is really far too weak to support the
kinds of major policy decisions  that are being proposed right  now by many
advocates.
A number of analysts at RFF are now engaged in a study, with support of the
Department  of  Energy,  which  is  intended  to  overcome  some  of  the
methodological  limitations  that characterize  most prior studies  of possible
"greenhouse"  impacts  on  agriculture  and  other  industries.  One  of  these
limitations  stem from  reliance  on GCM  scenarios.  The  recent  EPA study
used two GCM scenarios  and came out with a number of projections  about
changing crop yields, changing water resources, energy requirements,  and so
on.  Since the scenarios themselves are so uncertain, particularly with respect
to regional detail, those who wish to diminish the significance of such studies
can wave them away by arguing,  "Well, the scenario  is unreliable."  There is
no perfect way to generate  climate  change  scenarios.  In our study we take
a different approach; we analyze how a particular region of the U.S. -- in this
case  the  four-state  region  of Missouri,  Iowa,  Nebraska,  Kansas  --  would
respond  to a replay of the  1930s  exactly as it occurred.
I don't want to take up a lot of time going into more details, but in order to
overcome  the reliance  on GCM's,  we  use a real  climate  analog.  In most
impact  studies  the  climate  expected  to  occur  50 or  70 years  from now is
imposed  on the world of today.  We  call  that the "dumb farmer scenario."
The  results  assume  a  passive  response  --  no  adaptation,  no  change  in
technology  or  management.  However,  we  know  full  well that  people  are
going to adapt.  It's  ridiculous  to think  that if climate  is  changing,  people
would  not be  searching  for  ways to  adjust  and adapt.  So  we're  trying  to
establish a base description of this region and how it functions.  We will also
try at first to see what happens to the "dumb farmer."  We will compare that
model with one in which we put in the adaptations  and adjustments  that can
be  done  with today's technology  and today's  knowledge  base.  That is  the
"smart farmer scenario."  Finally, when this is  accomplished,  we're going  to12
try  to  anticipate  what  the  agriculture,  forestry,  water  resources,  and  the
energy demands in this region will be like 20 to 40 years from now by which
time, presumably,  a significant climate change will have  happened.  Again,
we will apply a serious climate change -- that of the 1930s decade.  The 1930s
were very severe.  The GCM's are sufficiently credible in indicating warming
and  drying in this region so that we cannot ignore the possibility.  We feel
that if people can adapt to this worst case, there is some reason for optimism.
Finally, I would like to refer to some work reported in a book, Greenhouse
Warming:  Abatement  and Adaptation (Sedjo  and Solomon 1989)  based on
a symposium that RFF organized about 1-1/2 years ago.  Many of us believe
that, no matter what attempts are made to control greenhouse  emissions, the
reasonable  and  pragmatic  thing to  be  doing  now  is to  prepare  for  some
(hopefully moderate) climate change.  If, indeed, the climate does not change
beyond  its current normal oscillations and variability,  we will, at least, have
learned how to deal better with that variability.  Droughts, floods, and cold
spells are happening now.  We don't have to invoke the greenhouse  effect to
justify  concern  about the  sensitivity  of the world  food  system  to  climatic
stresses.
Let me respond in two ways.  Growth chamber and greenhouse research with
carbon dioxide fertilization has also shown that CO2 moderates  the effect of
drought stress, salinity stress, and to some extent, phosphorus deficiency.  The
case for nitrogen is less clear.  Under these stresses plants don't do so badly
if they're fertilized with CO2 as they do if they are not.  So there is a kind of
natural  feedback  by which  elevated  CO2 concentrations  might reduce  the
impacts  of certain environmental  stresses.
Some  time  ago  I  wrote  (Rosenberg  1982)  that  if  the  atmospheric  CO2
concentrations were to increase, there should be a rapid response in the rate
of photosynthesis  which would  lead  to greater  biomass  and, ultimately,  to
deeper  and  better  root  systems.  Isn't it  possible  that with  deeper,  more
vigorous  root  systems  soil  formation  and  mineralization  would  be
accelerated?  I speculated that a C02 increase, all other things equal, would
have the effect of improving the condition of forests, especially by increasing
soil organic matter content  and water-holding  capacity.
Sanchez  I don't think there's any question that plants respond to CO2, and that they're
more  drought  and  cold  tolerant.  But  that  additional  growth  requires
additional nutrients.  In the liberally fertilized  fertile  soils of the U.S., that
may be  sufficient to account  for additional  yield  increases.  But  in natural
systems there might be a limit to how much plants can respond to additional
CO2 if you don't have additional nitrogen and phosphorus and other mineral
nutrients coming  into the system.13
Rosenberg  Let me respond in two ways.  The growth chamber greenhouse research with
carbon dioxide fertilization has also shown that CO2 moderates the effect of
drought  stress,  salinity stress,  and  to some  extent,  phosphorus  deficiency.
Nitrogen is less clear.  The plants, under these stresses,  don't do as badly if
they're fertilized with CO2 as they do if they don't have that CO2. So there
is a kind of natural feedback that could perhaps  answer your concern.
Another thought that occurred to me some time ago is that if the CO2 level
were  to increase,  I would  assume  that there would be  a rapid response  in
terms of biomass.  There would be an increase in photosynthesis which might
lead eventually to a deeper and better root system.  Plants would get bigger.
If their root systems  are more vigorous,  isn't it possible that soil  formation
and mineralization would be accelerated?  I speculate that a CO2 pulse, all
other things equal, would have the effect of improving the condition of the
forest  -- more organic matter, more soil, and more water-holding  capacity.
Davis  I don't think it's clear that that would be the effect because the change in the
CN ratio in the litter might  affect mineralization  rates  on the forest floor.
But exactly how it would affect it is unclear.  Many of these forests are more
strongly nutrient limited than moisture  limited.
Ruttan  Do  we  know  anything  about  the  behavior  and  impact  of  soil  micro-
organisms?  I haven't read all the literature, but it seems to be rather empty.
Davis  I don't think anyone's done any experiments with enhanced CO2 in an intact
forest  soil.  The  only  comparable  experiments  that  I know  of are  in  the
tundra.  There  the  overall  productivity  has  not  gone  up,  but  the  species
composition  has changed.  In the forest you might expect species to respond
differentially.  But it's not clear what will happen.
Munson  Is there  any long-term  evidence that as you increase  the organic  matter in
high  fertility  fields  that you  do enhance  yields  by raising the level of CO,.
I don't believe there is any solid evidence.
Abrahamson  Norm, I  didn't understand  what you said  when you were  talking about  the
carbon  cycle.  Are you suggesting  that there has been an increased amount
of carbon  sequestered  in the biota?  What's the evidence for that?
Rosenberg  None that is yet reliable.  But we know that half the carbon emitted by man's
activity into the atmosphere does not remain there.
Abrahamson  Of course, it's going someplace.  That's true.  But the rate of carbon uptake
and  the amount  of carbon sequestered  are quite  different  things.  I'm not
aware  of any  evidence  whatsoever  that there  have  been additional  carbon
sequestered  in the biota or soil.14
Rosenberg  I don't think there is any direct evidence.  It's one of the most difficult things
to establish whether yields are increasing due to higher levels of CO2 given
all the natural variability in yields.  I agree that I don't know of any evidence
that  this  is  happening.  But I  do  know arithmetic.  And  it's  either  in the
oceans  or  it's  on  the  land.  And the  oceanographers  have  reduced  their
estimates  of the oceanic  uptake  of carbon  dioxide  quite  considerably  from
what it was  10 years ago.
Rawlins  I think that is a very important point.  No comprehensive  inventory  of soil
carbon  storage  exists,  particularly  including  carbon below  the plow  depth.
We know, however, that even in forests half of the carbon is in the soil.  It's
just not as visible and as easily counted as that in the trees.  In one instance
where deep  cores were  take  from rangeland  on Blackland  soil  at Temple,
Texas,  15  times as much  carbon was stored  in a hectare  of soil as exists  in
the  atmospheric  column  above  it.  Although  not  all  soils  are  this  high  in
carbon, these data illustrate  that soil carbon storage  can be large.  A small
percentage change in soil carbon storage of this magnitude would have a big
impact  on  the atmospheric  concentrations.  We are aware  of the fact that
surface  soil carbon is lost when soils are plowed.  But what happens to deep
soil carbon storage?  If in response to the 25 percent increase in atmospheric
carbon dioxide that has occurred  since pre-industrial times, plant roots grow
deeper and are more prolific,  isn't it possible that the soil carbon  reservoir
is being filled, not depleted?
Crosson  Is soils science sufficiently well-developed  so that you could theoretically  say
that it's possible for the soils to absorb  these greater amounts of carbon?
Sanchez  I could try that.  Stan Buol and I were  asked to make an estimate  of what
would happen to soils  assuming a three-degree temperature  increase.  First
the  three-degree  increase  is  no  big  deal  in  terms  of releasing  additional
nutrients.  Second, there would  be a net loss  of carbon to the  atmosphere
because  of additional  temperature.  But we  estimated  that the  amount of
additional litter that would be needed to counteract that loss would be on the
order of about 500 kilograms per hectare per year.  The question is whether
the CO2 fertilization  effect would be sufficient to counteract that.
Cheng  Let  me  respond  on  some  of the  soil  carbon  issues.  One  of  the  major
deficiencies  when we look  at the biosphere  is that we only  considered  the
plant part and do not look at the micro-organisms.  That's one of the areas
where I've seldom  seen any good data or even estimates.  But what we do
have  certainly  suggests  that  they  may  account  for  a  large  component  of
carbon  even when compared  to plants.  One of the things we need to look
at is the seasonal effect of the micro-organisms.  It could be that they might
absorb  more carbon  because  of the activity  in the  summertime.  So  there
could be seasonal variations.  We need to look at the seasonal  effect rather
than just constant accumulated  effect.15
Larson  The rule of thumb here in the Midwest is that we've lost a third to a half of
our carbon in our cultivated soils.  That may be a hundred tons of carbon per
hectare.  That's a lot of carbon.  Our studies pretty well agree that, under a
given management system,  the carbon level in the soil is in equilibrium with
what  is put back.  If you plow  back  two  tons per  acre,  you  get  a certain
equilibrium  level;  if  you  plow  back  four  tons,  you  got  another  level.
Experiments that I did in Iowa 20 years ago clearly show that.  With moder
tillage practices and modern residue practices, there's a good chance that we
can increase the carbon content of the soil.  There's some evidence that that's
happening.  It is a research issue that we need to look at, not only what these
carbon levels are, but try to develop management practices that will increase
it.
Cheng  I wanted  to  raise  another  question.  Norm,  you were  talking  about  plant
response  to  CO2. The  CO2 fertilization  effect  is  probably  slowing  the
atmosphere accumulation  of CO2 below what it would otherwise  be.  From
an agricultural  production point of view, we know that the effect will be an
increase  in  biomass.  But  will  that  necessarily  translate  into  crop  yield
increase?
Rosenberg  Yes,  I  think  so.  Everything I've seen indicates that for the economic crops
--  corn,  soybeans,  and  millet  --  the  C 4 plants  --  there  is  an increase  of 5-
15 percent in harvestable product; in the case of C 3 plants -- soybeans, wheat,
barley, potatoes, etc. -- the increases range from 30-80 percent with doubled
CO2 concentration.
Cheng  In yield?
Rosenberg  In yield!  The only thing that would stop the biomass increase from turning
into a yield increase would be a blocking of translocation, perhaps by starch
accumulation  --  i.e.,  the  lack  of a sink  for the photosynthate.  And  there
seems to be some evidence that this does not really happen.  I saw a paper
recently that suggests that kind of blocking mechanism is not interfering with
the conversion of photosynthate  into harvestable  yield.
Global  Climate  Change and Agricultural Production
Ruttan  I originally  scheduled  Bill Clark as the second  discussant.  But I think the
accident of his late arrival  is working out better than my original agenda.
Clark  What Vern and I negotiated  about two months  ago was  to take a step back
from the initial focus on global climate change and try to sketch a framework
of resource  and environment constraints  that might  impinge on agriculture
production and  agricultural  policy over the long run.  This may violate  the
first  precept  of  agricultural  policy  analysis,  which  is don't go  long and16
large  -- focus at the farm level.  What I will try to do is sketch a framework
within which  I trust anything we  say and most of what we don't today and
tomorrow might fit.  It's put forward  as an effort to provide  some sort of a
counter force to the pressure to focus too heavily on the very important issue
of climate  change.  The  issue  is  not  so  much whether  immediate  climate
change effects are going to be large or small, but rather to say large or small
relative  to  what?  That  is,  when  and  where  might  climate-mediated
constraints  come to the top of that list even though they may rank relatively
low at other places  and times.
My basic point of departure is a historical perspective:  agricultural activities,
broadly  conceived,  have  been  the  primary  transformer  of  the  global
environment  for all of human civilization until very recently.  One  can still
argue  today  that,  at  a  global  level  and  averaged  over  more  than  10  or
12 years, it is still basic land use transformation activities that have been, if
you had to rank them, the single largest transformer.  Obviously,  fossil fuel
emissions, climate change issues, and ozone depletions give one pause.  But
if  one  tallies  across  lots  of environments,  it's  a  statement  that  could  be
argued.
An  equally  defensible  contention  is  that  agriculture  has  been  the  sector
primarily affected by environmental  change  around the world  over the last
several  centuries.  There  may  be  impacts  elsewhere  --  on  transport,  on
habitation, on human health --  but the place that so many of these changes
come  to  roost  first  is,  not  unexpectedly,  on  human  activities  related  to
agriculture and natural resources.  Now, what that means is that the coupling
between agriculture and environment, over large scales and the long-term, is
a two-directional  issue.
As  we  go  to  the  notion  of constraints  around  which  this  consultation  is
organized,  it becomes  important then to look  at agricultural  activities  as  a
source  of many of the resource  and environmental  changes  and in turn the
impact of these  changes back on agriculture.  Agricultural  activities  can be
impacted in two ways that involve the environment and resource base.  One
is  directly  --  climate  changes,  and  crops  grow  differently.  The  other  is
indirectly  as  society  becomes  concerned  about  environmental  degradation
caused by agricultural  or other natural resource  exploitation  activities and
adopts policies with multiple impacts.
An  old example  but a useful  one  is the banning  of DDT several  decades
back.  It was not that there were  such bad impacts of DDT directly  on the
agricultural sector.  Rather society, at least in North America, decided  that
there were other environmental  consequences  of the use of this chemical in
agriculture  and in health.  Decisions were made which  then had potentially
severe impacts  on the agricultural sector.  I do think we've got to be careful
as  we  consider  this  second  class  of constraints  where  policies  initiated  to17
protect  or  regenerate  a  component  of the  environment  have  immediate
negative  impacts on agricultural production.
As I tried to figure  out what Vern was doing with this workshop, it seemed
to  me  that  it  is  the  notion  of  constraints  --  translated  into  an  effort  to
understand  when and where  we might  expect  environmental  constraints  to
become  important  enough  to  change  agricultural  production  or  policies
affecting  agriculture.
Somewhere in the course of Vern's writing up the results, if not in our talking
about them,  one  has  to think  about taxonomy.  First we  have  to  end up,
implicitly at least, with a list of which constraints  belong on the list.  What
kind of constraints  should we be check-listing  to see whether  these will end
up having a big or a little impact on agricultural  production and policies in
given places.  Second, we have  to identify the kinds of human activities and
natural processes that might be  changing  the nature of these  constraints  --
increasing them, decreasing  them, or mitigating them.  Third, we also need
to  say  something  about  the  rates  of  change  of those  constraints  and  the
activities that generate or remove them.  We need to get a feeling for which
of them  are  changing  very  quickly  and  which  of them  are  changing  very
slowly.  Those that are changing  relatively rapidly may be expected  to pose
greater challenges to production and policy than those that are moving slowly
enough that we can adapt our practices and policies  as we go.  Finally, we
have to  ask what  these possible constraints  mean  in particular  agricultural
production settings -- to particular farmers, researchers, extension agents, and
national  policy bodies.  An effort  should  be  made to  do  some  first-order
guessing  as  to  which  kinds  of places  on  earth  might  be  expected  to  be
incurring  the same  kinds of constraints at the same time.
Let me  say a couple words  on each of those  categories.  I'll say very little
about what's  forcing  them.  Rather,  I will talk  about  how we  might try  to
think about the rates of change  in those constraints and their sorting out in
different parts of the world.  As part of some other work that I and others
are doing, I have come out with a list -- which anyone is free to steal, savage,
or amend --  of eight different categories of broad constraints on agricultural
production  and policy  in the large and  over  fairly long periods.  They  are
grouped by order but they are not priority ranked.  In all of these categories  -
- which  will  be  obvious  things  like  land, water,  and  energy  --  it turns  out
useful  to talk separately  about the  quality and quantity aspects.
Land  can  clearly  be  a  constraint.  The  area  available  for  agriculture  is
limited.  This is reflected in the arguments about slowing deforestation  and
in the notions  that habitation  is encroaching  on the most productive  land.
The area available is the quantity dimension.  The quality dimension is where
all the issues of soil productivity or fertility come in and the various ways in
which  the  location  properties  of land  can be  assessed  --  the  erosion,  the18
salinization, acidification, compaction, and another class of things that we talk
about when we talk about soil degradation.
The second, fairly obviously, is water.  In quantity terms -- how much can we
get.  The answer to how much can we get must be viewed  in terms  of some
sort of a supply function -- that is, how much could we get if we were willing
to pay a certain something  for  it, broadly  conceived  in terms  of trade-offs
against other  things society wants?  Simply put, the quantity  competition  is
for irrigation water, for groundwater,  and other uses.  Quite independent  of
the issue of climate change, the constraints on quantities of water for running
agriculture is likely to be one of the dominant constraints faced in many parts
of the world at certain periods  over the  next century.  (Not all parts of the
world and not all periods.)  There's also a quality issue involved  here.  We
know that there are places where the quantity of water available is perfectly
sufficient but is  quality,  in terms of salinity or the toxicants  it carries or in
some cases the human pathogens that live in it, represents  a real constraint
on agricultural  production.
Third on my list is energy.  The quantity issues include how much is going to
be available to the agricultural sector and at what prices.  The quality issues
include what  kinds  of  energy  will  be  available  --  low  head  hydroelectric,
liquid fuels, high grade or low grade solid fuels, or others.  For some regions,
some  of these  seem to  sit very  low  on the list  of present  or likely  future
constraints.  For  others  it  is  one  of the  dominant  impediments  to  doing
certain kinds  of things in  agricultural  production  that you would  like to be
able to do, but you can't because  of quality or quantity  shortfalls in energy.
The fourth is fertilizers or generic nutrient additives.  The quantity issue is,
again, how much can you get at what price.  A quality issue, which we usually
don't tend  to think of enough,  is what fraction  of it is lost?  What fraction
ends up being a potential pollutant rather than an incorporated  nutrient  in
the plant?  This is far enough from my own area of work  that I don't even
know  the  proper  literature.  But  there  is  a  lot  of work  being  done  on
capturable  forms  of nutrient  additives  versus  forms that when  you  plop  it
down  most of it goes into the air or into the groundwater.  There  are also
some other quality issues.  The one Europe  may be facing now  is the trace
metal pollutants in fertilizers which end up as a residual in the soil slowly or
incorporated  in plant  tissue.  That's surely a quality  issue  that we need  to
be looking at over the long run.  On European country recently decided that
within this century it will be facing a situation where  it must stop eating  its
own foods because the heavy metal content in them exceeds safety standards.
Alternatively, the country can revise its environmental regulations to raise the
limit on heavy  metals.  Either way  is  going  to  be  desperate  news  for  the
policy-making  apparatus  of the  country.  When you  have  once  imposed  X
parts per trillion of cadmium  as a health limit, it's going to be real difficult
to come  back later  and  say,  "We  fooled  you.  That was an arbitrary  limit.19
It should  have been twice  as  high.  We  can go on with business  as usual."
That is not a popular way to win an election.
Fifth  is the biocides  issue.  Again,  the quantity  dimension is how much  can
we get at what price.  Obviously use can be constrained, as in the DDT case,
for reasons other than direct negative impacts on agriculture.  On the quality
side, we need to be thinking about things like to what  extent  is this biocide
something  that  kills  absolutely  only  the beast  you  wanted  to  kill versus  a
broad-based one.  To what extent is it one to which pests have built up a lot
of resistance  and therefore  has  lots of spill-over  effects.  Again,  those  sorts
of issues, talked about specifically in policies about pesticides,  don't tend to
come into the broader discussions  of the sort that we're  dealing with here.
They probably need  to be.
Climate  is  sixth.  The quantity dimension  must be things like  temperature,
precipitation,  and  evapotranspiration.  The  quality,  and  this  is  where  the
categories  begin  to be strained,  includes  seasonality  --  the difference,  in  a
sense, between X centimeters  of rain distributed  evenly over the year and it
coming  in  utterly  useless  and  indeed  counterproductive  spurts  which,  as
you've heard this morning,  is one of the concerns that comes up in this issue
of climate change.
The seventh is biodiversity.  And this is an area where there's been a lot of
special pleading that I don't think has been particularly useful.  Biodiversity
has been reaffirmed  as  a good  in itself  --  it is  a cornucopia  that we  can't
afford to spend one unit out of.  But if the quantity is the number of species,
the quality  issues  are  things  like  supply  of natural  predators  on the pests
we're after.  Do we still have them or have we lost them?  What about future
cultivars  --  the genetic  base  from which  the  new  crops  of the future  will
come?  There  is the old argument  about  possible pharmaceutical  supplies.
But there is also a quality issue in biodiversity.  One of our challenges  is to
move  from the broad brush prescription to never  deplete  biodiversity to a
quantifiable  notion  of which  aspect,  which  kinds  of biodiversity,  are  most
important.  This list will contain certain sorts of predatory insects and certain
first, second, or third cousins of things we know are cultivatable.  We should
begin  focusing  very  tightly  on  those  because  we're  going  to  be  no  more
successful in preserving biodiversity for itself than we are in preserving land
or anything else for itself.  We've got to be more specific -- and the specificity
must  come from the  agricultural  production sciences  rather  than the other
groups  flailing around  about doing something in this area.
Finally, though it bewilders me, agricultural output often gets left off lists like
this.  On the quantity side there is the same old issue of how much can you
supply at what costs  given  all the other constraints  society has  loaded onto
the system.  There  are  also a set of quality issues,  some of which  are the
obvious ones  that all agricultural  production people worry  about --  what is
the  value  added  in  a  market  sense  by  its  attractiveness,  its  taste,  and  its20
nutritional value.  We might  also want to be a little more concerned  about
the  portion  of the  crop,  and  its  basic  carbon  and  energy  values,  that  are
wasted, both in the field, and  in the process  of moving it to the table.  We
might also want to look at toxicity.  I think more and more we are going to
be faced with notions of different qualities of agricultural produce simply in
the sense of whether a case  can be made that it's pure:  whether it's natural,
a popular notion right now, or whether it is in fact loaded with some at least
noteworthy quantities of trace metals,  organic compounds,  biocide residues
and the like.  These  issues are talked  about in very  narrow circles.  They
don't tend to get raised in general discussions of the sort that we're trying to
have here.
That's the list.  Obviously,  there can be subdivisions within each.  But I do
think it would be a mistake, at least for the larger Rockefeller  consultation
exercise, if we were to become preoccupied with any one of these areas, even
where there's a window of opportunity to move rapidly in one of these areas
like climate change.  Rather, we need to be looking at something like this list
as  a way  of trying to  specify for particular  regions  and  times the  changing
hierarchy  of constraints.
As  one  moves  to  the  notion  of what  belongs  high  on  a  list  of potential
constraints, at least until you find a reason to drop it off, I would emphasize
things like energy use, fertilizer use, and biocides use.  These are growing at
extraordinarily high rates relative  to  anything  we've  had,  say, over a 30-,
40-, or 50-year period in the past and are plausibly accelerating.  Changes in
things like  land area and quality and  even water  availability  are happening
at rates that are significantly  slower.
Finally, I argue that some sort of a taxonomic  effort might provide  us with
a smallish number of groups in which we might expect, should we ever begin
to assemble the data, that the rankings would tend to be more similar within
than between groups.  One such taxonomy comes from some of Pierre's work
that I find useful -- this very simple notion of taking a two-dimensional  matrix
in which  population  density is plotted on one axis and wealth per capita  or
per square kilometer or level of technological  development is plotted on the
other.  If you had a third axis, which we both agreed we wouldn't  try to do,
you  would  probably  want  something  about  the  nature  of the  landscape.
Agroclimatic  zones  as indicators  of  basic  biological  productivity  potential
actually works pretty  well  as  a sorter.  But even just taking those four grids
--  high  and  low on the  population  density  and wealth  density  --  tends  to
produce a nice basis for ordering different  countries or regions.
The research my students and I are beginning to do now, looking forward  at
some plausible trajectories into the future, suggests that those categories hold
up well under various versions  of the scenarios  that might  develop.  Even
when they break down we're finding it a better guide than nothing in efforts21
to look  ahead  to  the  kinds  of policy  problems  that might  be  confronting
clusters of regions 20 or 30 years into the future.
Rayner  Bill, I think your list is  an interesting  one.  Taxonomies are a useful way to
begin looking at problems, but I have  a concern  about the lists that you've
given us in that it seems to  me that the categories you've  created there  are
very much dominated by a kind of supply-side view of the agricultural system.
Do you  not  think  that it  would  be  important  in looking  at  constraints  on
production to consider not just the numbers of people, but the age ranges  of
people  and  the kind of different  nutritional  demands that  they're  going  to
have?
And secondly, given what we know from the intervention in markets in terms
of subsidies  and taxes,  including price support  systems, forced delivery  and
biased  exchange  rates,  the  actual structure  of markets,  transportation,  and
trading arrangements  also  represent very real  constraints  upon agricultural
output.  It seems to me that to supplement your list, we need to look more
carefully  at the demand side  of the agricultural  system.
Clark  I  couldn't  agree  more  that  somebody  should  do  that.  I  took  Vern's
instructions  to  address  the  resource  and  environmental  constraints  on
agriculture in this session, and to ignore some other things he's addressing in
other  sections.  Besides,  I  knew you would be here so that there  wasn't  a
chance that I wouldn't be reminded properly and articulately that too often
sessions like this have started and ended by saying, "Well, of course we know
that the social, institutional, and human dimensions are important, but for a
moment let's just concentrate  on the technical  resource ones," and so on.
Rayner  I'm wondering  how,  given  Steve's  concerns  there,  to  what  extent  we  as  a
group  feel comfortable  narrowing it in that way.
Clark  Perfectly  legitimate.  I merely reply, if the brief had been broader,  I would
have had  a very different  list of things.
Rayner  You  went  to  the  trouble  to  find  out  from  Vern  in  more  detail  what  his
agenda was?
Ruttan  We are thinking  of a fourth meeting that will address institutional issues in
more depth.  But we wanted  to make  sure we  had the environmental  and
technical  issues as background for that meeting.
Crosson  Well, I didn't hear Bill limiting his comments to institutional  issues.  Steve,
if I  heard  him  correctly,  he  is  saying  there  are  things  happening  on  the
demand side that have an important bearing on the emergence of the various
environmental  constraints  on  agricultural  production.  If we  believe  that
global  demand for  food, for example,  will grow, by 1-2 percent  a year  over22
the next 50 to 70 years, the implications  of that for emerging constraints  in
agriculture  is vastly different than of demand growing by 2-4 percent.
Ruttan  If population  growth  rates  in  Africa  south  of the  Sahara  were  closer  to
one percent  than  four percent,  it  would  have  a  dramatic  impact  on  our
perception  of how to achieve  sustainable growth in agricultural  production.
Clark  In my notes for this I had two columns, to the second of which I only briefly
alluded.  One was the resource/environmental  constraints  -- the list of eight
that  I just  read.  The  second  was  the  determinants  of changes  in  those
constraints.  That is  exactly where  I have put in the notions  about whether
you need a lot or a little;  ability to pay a lot or a little; the structure  of the
labor force,  and these  sorts of issues.  So, I  see it at least  as a compatible
direction for the discussion to go.
Munson  I presume when you're talking about nutrients  and the need, you're talking
about worldwide,  and you said they are increasing.  And the reason I raise
that question or point is that in the U.S., for example, phosphate use actually
peaked in  1977.  Nitrogen  and  potash  use peaked  in  1981  and have  been
declining  since.  And I suspect the same holds for the pesticide total usage.
Clark  Well, you know, it may well be that the trends you note will hold both in this
country  and  elsewhere.  A couple  of years  back  effort  was  made  by  the
natural sciences community to try to say something usable about what kinds
of chemical inputs into the environment that might be occurring over the next
100 years.  We  got  the  scenarios  worked  out  pretty  well  for  things  like
greenhouse  emissions,  but very  poorly  for things  like  the  pesticide  use  or
nutrient  releases.
We  went  through  an  exercise,  Vern  got  partially  involved  in  it  as  a
correspondent, trying to say for the various scenarios that are out there from
official and  unofficial  organizations,  what  can  they tell us  about the  likely
rates  of  change?  For  whatever  it's  worth,  when  that  stuff was  worked
through  the  meat  grinder,  the  1975  to  2075  vision  for  North  American
fertilizer use implied a 1-1/2 fold increase.  Most of the increase occurs over
the next decade or two.  This is a lot smaller than the increases of four and
five and eight times that are foreseen for other continents.
Ruttan  A friend  of mine  recently  did  a  comparison  for  Minnesota  and  Saxony
(Germany).  Fertilizer  inputs per hectare  in Saxony  are  about four  times
higher than in Minnesota.  Given the changes in population densities around
the  world,  agriculture  in terms  of  input  use,  will  look  more  like  that  in
Saxony, Japan, or the Netherlands than in Minnesota 50 years  from now.
Clark  When  we  completed  that  exercise,  even  though  the  numbers  are  poorly
grounded, nobody could erect for us a continent scale scenario for fertilizer
that brought levels of fertilizer application on a kilograms  per hectare basis23
100 years from now up to present European lands.  This is quite interesting
given the problems Europe  is confronting today with its groundwater and its
heavy  metal  toxin build-ups.  It  is important  that we  discover where  they
come from.  One  can generally  subtract  for fossil fuel, industrial  material,
and  come  out with a residual.  The point is that such  a study hasn't been
done.  It's hard to find anyone who really wants to do it.  It is something that
isn't getting written up in the literature.  This is a kind of report you get from
skulking around the health bureaus and asking lots of questions.  But it's the
kind of study that just seems to me to be enormously important.
Larson  Well,  the  cadmium  story  in my  opinion  has been  overdone.  But  I'm not
saying that it isn't a problem in Denmark or in Europe.  It is!  But I think it's
probably been overdone.
Rawlins  Are they using sewage sludge?
Clark  Yes.  Of course in Denmark.
Sanchez  That's a source  of cadmium.
Clark  But nobody has sorted out the relative  importance of the several sources.  I
raise it only to say that, whatever its scientific foundations, it is typical of the
kind of issue that is going to jump right out of the science arena and into the
policy arena.  It will then be thrown back to the scientists as a mess that has
to be disentangled  --  probably with an inadequate  data base and too much
pressure for instant results.  Given the predictability  that it will become  an
issue, it's the sort of thing that one might want to put in place as a relatively
low key research  program  that would  provide  the data  needed  to tell  the
story right rather than merely responding because the Greens party this year
says that the phosphate merchants are poisoning us.
Sonka  I  don't  know  if labor  should  be  considered  a resource  constraint  in  this
context,  but in the  United  States,  and  the  other  developed  countries,  the
1990s  will be a period of labor scarcity.
Clark  There is  a strong historical  precedent  in this argument  because  one  of the
constraints we will face is not only the numbers, but the quality issue.  This
includes  education  and  training,  health,  and  others.  These  are  obviously
constraints in some parts of the World.  If I'd have been smarter, they would
have been in there the first time.
Sanchez  As population  increases  more, more  of the world's agriculture  is  going  to
look like  that in Japan,  the Netherlands,  and  Saxony.  What about  places
where population is already extremely high such as China and Bangladesh?
Do we  expect them to go  to  an even more  intensive,  high  input system  of
agriculture?24
Clark  This  is  one  of the  big  questions.  We  have  examples  of countries  which
starting out under high population  density and very low input intensity have
made  a  transition  to  what  may  be  ecologically  sustainable  forms  of
agriculture.  They have done  that by going the intensification  route.  I have
tried to work through as an intellectual exercise,  routes of development,  and
especially  rural  development,  for our  high  population  density  low income
density  areas  that  don't  involve  radical  intensification  in  input  use  and
increases  in the  value added  capacity  of the agricultural  prediction  in the
rural areas and, for the life of me, I can't see one that works.  Even solution
of the  food  problem  may  not  solve  the labor  absorption  and  the  income
generation problems.  When one thinks  about the environmental  problems
associated with agriculture likely to confront areas like that over the next 20,
30, 40 years, you just have to work within the constraint of finding alternative
ways  of producing  a lot  more  value  on the  same  land.  Hopefully,  these
economies will develop in a manner that will enable them to get some of the
people off the land so that they don't get caught in this horrible partitioning
of units of production down below usable scale.  But that's tricky.  When you
then start looking  at the levels of inputs that would be required  under the
systems we know about to produce the levels of output or value added we're
talking  about,  they  include  extraordinarily  high  densities  of  fertilization,
biocides, and in some cases energy application that will have some really very
serious regional scale environmental  implications.
Sanchez  So alternative agriculture,  as we understand  in this country, doesn't seem to
have much of a future in your scenarios.
Clark  Well, you know,  so much  comes under alternative  agriculture.  But  I don't
see it solving the income generation problem for enough people.
Ruttan  We'll  move  on  to  the  agricultural  issues  in  a  minute.  But  I  have  two
questions that I'd like to get Dean and Norm and/or Bill to respond to.  The
first concerns  the investments  that would be required  either to reduce  the
sources of global temperature  change or to respond to temperature change.
We have now brought up the issue of the kinds of investments  it would take
just  to sustain present  per  capita  income  levels,  or to  raise them  at some
acceptable  rate, in most of the world.  If we honestly attempt to face  these
issues  we  must  be  talking  about levels  of saving  and  investment that  our
societies are not yet prepared  to achieve.
The second question may not appear sensible to the people on the physical
science  side, but I've  often wondered --  economists  often think in terms  of
optimum  --  is  there  an optimum  level  of CO2 and associated  greenhouse
gases?  It strikes  me that we often  start out by asserting  that there was  a
golden age, between  1850 and 1900, when the CO2 level was about right.  If
we had been doing an experiment, we would have designed it to answer the
question of whether  we would  be better off by reducing  or enhancing  the
CO2 level.25
Jones  To  answer  that question  you  have  to  ask, "better  for whom  or  for what."
From a biologist's standpoint you  assume that all animals  and plants  have
evolved with a certain level of CO2. That suggests that the optimum is what
it is at a given time in evolution.
Ruttan  But apparently  it came down from some higher level in the distant past.
Abrahamson  It was higher.
Rosenberg  That's a tough question.  But let me take a crack at the second point.  In an
adjoining state you have a well-known climatologist,  Reed Bryson, who 10 or
15 years  ago  was  telling  us that we were  heading  into the  next ice  age.  I
don't think there's anyone who can dispute that argument because we know
we're in an interglacial period right now.  When the fact that the climate was
not getting colder was thrown at Bryson, he answered  (in essence), "Well, it's
probably the CO2 that's masking  the cooling  effect."  Whether he's  right or
wrong doesn't matter at this point, but clearly, climate does change.  Suppose
we decide that we like the climate the way it is and suppose we're farsighted
enough and our models are good enough to show us how to stabilize climate
the  way  we  like  it.  Then  we  might  even be  advised  to  pump  still  more
carbon dioxide into the atmosphere to give us a little extra greenhouse  effect.
Unfortunately,  we  don't know just how to fine-tune  the system.  But if we
were confident that more CO2 would not produce significant climate change,
I would  say let's pump the stuff into  the atmosphere.  I can't see where  it
would  do us  any great harm.  We  are existing in a room  now with a CO2
level  considerably  above  the  ambient,  and  I  don't  see  that  it's  hurting
anybody.
Just to finish this thought.  The concentration today of 350 parts per million
is not threatening  and does not appear to be threatening.  It's conceivable
that we could go to 400 or 450 parts per million without running into any real
threat  in terms of the biology or the agricultural  effects.  However,  if the
concentrations rose toward 600-800 parts per million, there could, indeed, be
certain species or subspecies  that experience  significant negative  effects.
Just to finish this thought.  The concentration today of 350 parts per million
is not  threatening  and does not appear to be threatening.  It's conceivable
that we  could  go to 400 or 450 parts per million without,  when judged  in
terms of the biology or the agricultural effects,  running into any real threat.
However, if the concentrations  rose toward 600-800 parts per million, there
may be indeed some subspecies that begin to experience significant negative
effects.
Abrahamson  The  first  question  is  about  the  increasing  demands  for  investment  and
savings.  I  would  guess  that we're  talking about  diverting  about  the same
amount of resources  that we're  now spending on defense.  To the optimal26
level of CO2 question, I would respond again by stressing the rate issues.  If
rates of change are such that significant climatic change occurs in a time less
than the lifetime of people  or trees, there will be trouble.  I don't think the
issue of optimum is an interesting  question.  Much more interesting  is what
rates  are  tolerable  or  what  are  the  costs  associated  with  adapting  to  or
mitigating the various rates.
Chen  In response to that, it does depend whether you're moving to something good
or bad.  If you're  moving quickly  to  a better  world,  some people  may  be
harmed, but perhaps there will be fewer objections.  It does matter whether
the transition involves a positive or negative change.  I don't think it's valid
to say you should only look at rates.
Abrahamson  I don't say  only look at rates.  There  may be  other things.  There  may be
threshold phenomena that you need to be concerned  about.  I'm worried that
you're beginning to sound a little bit like Budyko, the Russian climatologist,
who  argues  that the next  century  or  so  is  going  to be  pretty bad.  But in
another 100 years, if we keep on growing fast and if we keep on warming fast
enough, things are going to get better.  We should just accept the transition
and get through it as quickly  as we can.  That argument is just silly!
Ruttan  Let  me  turn  to  Steve  Rawlins  now  to  discuss  some  of  the  agricultural
implications.
Rawlins  We've already discussed  a number of issues that I think are important.  I'd
like to add three points.
First of all, the comment Bill just made is important.  Not only is agriculture
responsible for some of the constituents that are capable of changing global
environment, it is could be seriously impacted by these changes.  Uncertainty
about  future  environmental  factors  that  could  affect  food  security  is
frequently used as a primary justification for the U.S. global change research
program.  But the resources available  for direct study of food security issues
are small.  In the past USDA has  not  assumed  primary  responsibility  for
assessing either agriculture's  contributions  to global environmental  change,
or  the  effects  of  these  changes  on  agriculture.  But  the  atmosphere  is
changing.
I  returned  to  the  ARS  National  Program  Staff  a year  ago  at  a  time  of
awakening  to global change issues.  Dr. Orville Bentley (Assistant Secretary
of Agriculture for  Science and Education)  had just learned that USDA was
not represented at the organization meeting of IPCC at Geneva,  and wanted
to know why.  He informed  the Department of State  in no uncertain terms
that USDA would be represented in the future, and he appointed some staff
members to do the representing.  Up until then, Dr. Norton Strommen, Chief
Meteorologist with the World Agricultural Outlook Board, an agency serving
under  the  Assistant  Secretary  for  Economics,  was  being  called  upon  to27
represent the Department on nearly all issues related to agricultural weather
and climate.  The midwest was just emerging from a devastating drought, and
you  can imagine that Norton could  not cover  everything.  Dr. Gary  Evans,
ARS  Deputy Administrator,  was  given the  responsibility  for  developing  a
USDA  Strategic  Plan  for  Global  Change  Research  and  for  coordinating
USDA representation  on national and international  planning groups.  As a
member of Gary's  staff, I was asked  to chair the plan development process.
Until then, without the needed people to cover all of the bases, USDA had
taken a back seat, basically monitoring what was going on in CES and other
groups.  Since  then,  Dr.  Evans  has been given  the  assignment  as  Special
Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Global Change  Issues, and  chairs a
very active working group  from all USDA agencies to make certain USDA
carries its share of responsibility for global change research.
Allen  Steve, I'd like to know who came to the conclusion that agriculture shouldn't
be involved.
Rawlins  I  don't  think  anyone  really  made  a  decision  that  USDA  should  not  be
involved,  I think it was just a matter of too many issues and too few people.
Norton  Strommen  had  traditionally  represented  the  Department  on
agricultural  weather  and  climate  issues,  and  when  new  issues  related  to
climate came over the Secretary's  desk they were routed his way.  He chaired
the  USDA Climate  Coordinating  Committee,  which  includes  Science  and
Education  Agencies,  but this was  insufficient  to  handle  all of the  rapidly
emerging  issues.
Ruttan  Has the Department yet developed  an agenda for research that will enable
it to deal with this nexus between climate change and  agriculture?
Rawlins  Yes, the USDA Strategic Plan is nearly complete  and makes a good start in
this direction.  But we have a long way to go.  It's my personal opinion that
we have some substantial barriers to overcome.
The second point I'd like to make is this.  Although USDA at one time was
the elite research agency in government,  research is now only a small part of
the USDA agenda  -- representing something on the order of two percent of
the budget.  We have to be realistic.  If you were the CEO of an enterprise
having a division that represented only two percent of the action,  how much
attention would  it get  from you?  I  think it's  going  to  be very  difficult  to
generate  the budget required from within USDA to adequately address the
global change issues without  some strong support  from outside.  Each year
every agency within USDA competes for budget.  For the last few years there
has been strong pressure  to keep the departmental budget constant.  It will
be very difficult for a small program to obtain a substantial increase if it has
to come at the expense  of other programs within the Department.  Our best
hope  is  to  build  strong  cooperative  linkages  with  other  members  of  the
science  community,  obtaining  their support for our budget.  Perhaps this  is28
an issue that should be addressed as an institutional problem in a subsequent
dialogue.
Rosenberg  I think in fairness one should point out that a lot of the research that's been
done  over the  last  10  or  15  years  on the  direct  carbon dioxide  effects  on
plants has been done  by USDA.  But it has been done with DOE  money.
This tells you something about the level of importance attributed to this work
by the USDA establishment.
Rawlins  This is a problem.  USDA scientists are sought out by others because of their
scientific credentials  for dealing with the environmental issues we're facing.
USDA  has  not  been successful  in  obtaining  funds  to  pursue  these  issues
directly.  Other agencies are successful in obtaining the funds, but they often
lack the  scientific  expertise  needed  to solve  the problems.  USDA  is  not
viewed by  everyone  as being  unbiased in addressing  environmental  issues.
Some  perceive  agriculture  as  being  part  of  the  problem,  not  part  of the
solution.  That's  an  image  we  need to  do  something  about.  I  don't think
agricultural scientists  deserve this image, but again, we are only a small part
of a very  large  Department  that  has  constituencies  who  take  adversarial
positions on environmental  issues.  The constituency for agricultural science
must be extended beyond those who live on farms.  A substantial part of the
scientific  expertise  capable  of  dealing  with  environmental  issues  in  the
managed ecosystem are within the agricultural  science community.
Ruttan  I have  a couple  questions, but I'd like to direct one to Gene Allen because
you're  been  sitting  on the NAS/NRC  Board  on Agriculture.  The  Board
came  out  with  this  dramatic  proposal  for  a  $500 million  increase  for
agricultural  research.  This is a relatively large increase for agriculture.  Did
the set of issues we are  discussing enter into  that proposal?
Allen  It's one  of the  six  categories  that has  been targeted  for increased  support.
It's even broader because many of the things that are targeted, such as plant
systems, are related to these issues.
Rawlins  The Board  on Agriculture  report  has been  helpful.  It has helped  to  gain
attention and visibility  for agricultural research.
The third point I'd like to make is that food security is the real issue we need
to be concerned with.  It's related to the question of who is our constituency.
We  need  to  ask  ourselves  some  tough  questions.  What  is  our  central
concern?  Is it FOOD or is it FARMERS?  If it is food, we may design a very
different  production  system  than  if  it  is  farmers.  When  we  talk  about
environmental and technical constraints on sustainable growth in agricultural
production we  need  to  know what  kind  of an  agricultural  system  we  are
talking about.  How far are we willing to allow ourselves to depart from the
traditional system, with food production being carried  out by farmers?  Are29
we willing to consider alternative systems that might completely redefine the
role of farmers?
In an article entitled "Food Security: A Technological Alternative" published
in  BioScience  in  1988,  Martin  Rogoff  and  I  tried  to  take  a  look at  the
fundamental constraints  limiting food availability in the future.  We argued
that  one  of the  biggest  limitations  is  that  the  productive  capacity  of  our
present system varies dramatically from year to year in response to weather.
Our present system is based primarily on the seeds of annual crops.  Storage
of the perishable products  from farms is  expensive,  so the carrying capacity
of the system tends to be controlled more by years of minimum production
than by average  production.  It's pretty much  a hand  to mouth  system.  If
weather  fluctuates  even  more  in  the  future,  the  carrying  capacity  of our
present food system could decrease.  Furthermore,  annual crops are not well
adapted  to  most  ecosystems,  so  fertilizers,  pesticides  and  irrigation  are
required  to create  a hospitable environment.
Ruttan  Nature abhors  agriculture!
Rawlins  I agree!  As we look down the road  100 years or more, the inputs needed  to
provide  the environment needed by annual crops will become limiting.  The
stark fact is, we do not have a food system that can outlive our fossil fuel and
fertilizer  supplies.  Farmers in developed countries use more calories  in the
form of inputs from fossil reserves  than they produce  in the form of food.
As an alternative to producing the whole crop in the field, we considered  the
possibility of using the field only to capture the sunlight energy and store  it
as carbohydrates or lignocellulose  in perennial crops, including trees.  These
products would  be harvested  as needed to produce  sugar syrup,  from which
food products  would be produced  biotechnological  off the farm.  The  raw
food products would be stored as a living reserve  of standing biomass.  The
plants could be chosen on the basis of their adaptation to the ecosystem to
reduce inputs.  Since nearly all of the energy captured could be converted  to
food,  rather  than  just  the  seeds,  the  capacity  of  the  system  could  be
substantially increased over existing systems.  A first step would be to convert
lignocellulose  to animal feed.  This alone would release  a large  amount  of
land  for  other  purposes.  Other  products  for  direct  human  consumption
would follow as the market demanded.
The  point  I'm making  is  that in  considering  environmental  and  technical
constraints  to  agricultural  production  in  the  future  we  need  to  consider
possible designs  for new production  systems as well  as resource  limitations
for  our  current  production  system.  Certainly  we  would  not  want  to  be
accused of considering  only the dumb food producers scenario.
Ruttan  You've  outlined  an alternative  agriculture  that the adherents  or promoters
of "alternative  agriculture"  would not embrace.30
Rawlins  You are probably right.
Ruttan  I notice Bill scowling.  Do you have a question?
Clark  I  want  to  come  back  to your  statement  about  USDA  and  its  role  in the
climate change  research.
Munson  I think you referred  to the amounts  of energy  that are used  in agriculture.
In the concern about  CO2, energy  is the overriding issue.  It seems to me if
we're really interested in reducing CO2 emissions, we should spend money on
nuclear fusion research rather than on putting a space station up and going
to Mars.  They're talking about $400 billion to be spent in the 1990s on that
effort.
Abrahamson  I've followed the fusion program since I was in graduate school and the story
has always been that if we spent more money the problem will be solved in
five years.  It clearly  is decades away from realization in any practical  sense.
We  don't  have  those  decades  to  wait.  Fusion  is  irrelevant  to  present
concerns.  It is an interesting research question, but it has nothing to do with
choices  that are  going to have to be made  over the next few decades.  The
other  issue  is  the  matter  of biomass  as  an  energy  crop.  That  is  where
agriculture  and forestry both meet.  We should be looking very seriously  in
that direction.
Munson  And we put half of our corn crop back into the soil.  There's a harvest index
of roughly 50 percent.  So for every bushel you take off there's an equivalent
amount of dry matter produced that's going back into the system that could
be harvested and used.
Ruttan  When Rogoff first mentioned to me over the phone the work you were doing
on biomass, my first reaction was "That's really great.  We're going to move
agricultural  production  from  the  temperate  regions  to  the  tropics."  His
reaction was, "Don't tell anybody at USDA!"
Clark  I can't resist a challenge  to Dean.  He  and I will  have this fight eventually
anyway so why put if off.  Dean, you can't have it both ways.  Fusion may be
a silly place  to invest for even more  reasons than the space  station.  Or it
may not.  But if you were to tell me that an affordable investment  regime
would indeed  give  me  fusion as  a successful  acceptable  affordable  energy
source  50 years  from now,  there is no way that I would not go  for it.
Abrahamson  Don't misunderstand,  I don't  argue  against  R&D money  going into fusion.
I don't argue against that at all.  But, it's not available now and it's not going
to be available  for  the next two or three decades when we've  got to make
some  very  tough  decisions  having  to  do  with  energy.  I  like  the  fusion
program.  It keeps  a lot of bright people from doing mischief.31
Allen  Dean, are you saying that resources are not the constraint in speeding up the
time  frame for fusion?
Abrahamson  At the moment feasibility  has yet to be demonstrated  --  that is, the machine
that produces  as much  energy as it takes to run  it.  Even if that were  done
this afternoon,  it would be  decades  before it became  a commercial  reality.
It violates  no  physical  principles,  but who  knows  when  feasibility  will  be
demonstrated.  But the amount of R&D money involved is trivial compared
with a lot of other things.
Clark  My point  is that  50 years out  for many of the  issues we're  talking about  is
quite  a realistic  time horizon.  The  only thing I  was  objecting  to was  the
cavalier  dismissal of fusion because  it has a 50-year time horizon.
Rayner  Let's stop the talk about fusion.
Chen  Steve, you mentioned that USDA is getting into the global change program.
I would assume that USDA's interest is primarily on the impacts and policies
side?  Is USDA going to actually jump  in with more  research?
Rawlins  Our  main  new  thrust  is  research  in  support  of the  CES  Global  Change
Research  Program.  We will  also  be  involved  in impacts  assessment  and
development  of response  and policy strategies.
Chen  That's my question.  I have watched these things for  10 years.  The research
on inputs and climate tend to suck up all of the money.  There's a lot of lip
service  to the impacts  and  policy but  in the end no one  actually  does  any
work.
Bochniarz  I'd like to get into another question.  Fusion is an interesting prospect.  But
what about other alternative sources of energy?  It is possible that if we had
kept expenditures  for solar energy  at the level of the middle '70s we would
have, in the middle of the  '80s, economically viable sources of solar energy.
All big companies  have completely cut out the research on solar energy.
Rayner  I'm sorry, but at least as far as the United States is concerned,  the question
of alternative  energy  technologies  isn't  anything  near as interesting  as  the
issue of energy conservation  through  efficiency.  The current  actual United
States  emissions  averaged  about  1-1/2  gigatons  for  1988.  The  Edmunds-
Reilly base case projection to the year 2020 suggests an increase to something
over  two  gigatons  CO2 emissions  for  2020.  The  best  saving  that  we  can
predict at the moment  with nuclear,  solar,  and biomass energy, would  still
bring us down to something just over 1-1/2 gigatons  of carbon emissions for
2020.  On the other hand, energy efficiency improvements alone would bring
about a real cut from our present emissions level by about one-third, and to
a halving of the predicted emissions level from the Edmunds Reilly base case.32
If we then add the alternative  technologies onto that for the year 2020, we
can cut down to about a third of the present emissions levels.  It's not really
until  you're  getting  into  the 50-year  time scenario  that  the availability  of
improved  or  non-emitting  energy  technology  really  is  going  to  have  an
important impact on U.S. fossil fuel CO2 emissions.  In the United  States as
far as getting an immediate big bang for the buck is concerned, we should be
talking about efficiency,  not talking  about  alternative  energy  technologies.
Now, that situation is  quite different for the developing countries.
Allen  Steve, please give me some examples  for the high  efficiency scenario.
Rayner  Examples include increased efficiency in electric motors, in commercial and
domestic  applications,  improved  generating  capacity,  and  improved
transmission.
Waggoner  Are  all  your  assumed  increases  in  efficiency,  Steve,  within  the  range  of
present  knowledge  or technology that  is on the shelf?
Rayner  Absolutely.  Those are things we can technically do tomorrow.
Crosson  Who is paying attention  to the economics  of conservation?
Rayner  The economics  are a different problem  and the situation in the  developing
countries  is different  than in  the United  States.  We expect the developing
country emissions  to exceed those of the United  States by about 2000, and
we're  expecting that on the assumption that developing countries will use a
lot of fossil fuels (Figure 2).  This  is what I wanted to raise with Steve.  You
were  talking  about  moving  to  a  perennial  cropping  system  based  on
lignocellulose  for  food  security.  One  of  the  things  that  we've  been
considering at Oak Ridge is that if you're going to stop developing countries
from moving into fossil fuels, what kind of alternative generation technologies
can be provided for them?  We are not going to realize the same efficiency
benefits  in developing  countries  as  in  the  developed  world because  those
benefits rely on an inelasticity of demand for energy services.  In developing
countries energy  demand is very elastic, particularly in China.  We've been
very interested in looking at the whole issue of biomass for energy in which
the biomass  is gasified  and the gas is run through  a high efficiency turbine.
Bob  Williams  of Princeton2 has made some  estimates  which  show, in fact,
that  it  is  a  cost  effective  technology.  From  the  point  of view  of  CO2
emissions, it has the benefit  of closing the fuel cycle because you are fixing
the same amount of carbon in fuel as you're producing.  Presumably what we
would do is woody biomass; things like fast growing sycamores in plantations.
It wouldn't appeal to the environmentalists  from an aesthetic perspective  --
you wouldn't have nice parks and forest out there to feed this energy system.
2To be completed.33
And  I  suspect  that  if  you  were  using  a  similar  technology  for  your
lignocellulose production, it also would not really be the parks out that would
be producing the biomass.
The question is what is the capacity of the agricultural  system really to make
a transition towards  growing these kind of woody biomass crops.  Also, what would be the social  acceptance of such an approach?
Allen  Vern, I can add an example to support Steve's point.  We estimate that at the
University of Minnesota we could decrease  energy use  by about 30 percent
with  some  very  simple  changes  that  relate  to  high  efficiency  light  bulbs,
improved efficiency air conditioners, and  others.
Rawlins  I  suspect  the  total  annual  biomass  production  rate  of perennial  plants  is
about  the  same  as  good  annual  crops.  But  our scenario  would  convert  a
larger  fraction  of it  to  food  than  our  present  system  does.  The  reason
biomass energy  production requires high biomass production rates per unit
area is hauling cost for the raw input product.  This, in turn, is related  to the
economy of scale of the conversion plant.  Energy conversion plants need to
be  large.  I  don't  know  how  large  plants  would  have  to  be  to  convert
lignocellulose  to sugar  syrup, but hopefully  they could  be smaller,  or  even
portable so that more extensively grown biomass  could be harvested.
Abrahamson  You said something to the effect that the economics are another matter, and
I don't want to leave that.  I've been involved for 15 years, I guess, with these
energy  analyses,  particularly  in Sweden,  and it's clear that even  though the
unit price  of energy may  go  up,  the  cost for energy  services  can  go down. Reduction  of emissions  in the range you suggested  can be accompanied  by
net savings in total cost of delivered  energy  service.
Eayner  Absolutely.  And you could even reduce  the price of the electricity  as well.
But the economics are more in terms of the rate of capital turnover.  It's not so much what  is the cost per kilowatt  hour delivered.
Abrahamson  Would  the  user  pay  less  for  energy  services  under  the  low  emissions
scenario?
Rayner  Yes.
Sanchez  This  lignocellulose  scenario  is  very  exciting  to  me  because  I  work  in the
tropics.  Obviously the place to produce it is in the tropics.
Rayner  And where  labor is relatively inexpensive.
Sanchez  In the tropics we can grow biomass in two to three years that would take 40 years to grow in Minnesota.  There are clearly some geopolitical implications here.  But I want to make an additional point.  Oil palm can produce  about34
five tons  of oil per hectare  per year.  During the Second  World War,  the
French, using a simple filter, used the oil palm as fuel in their diesel engines.
However,  oil  palm  use  for  food  is  going  to  decrease  because  of  the
cholesterol  issue.  We should look at these and other similar tropical plants
to produce oil directly.
Forest Response  to Climate Changes
Ruttan  Let  me turn to  Margaret  Davis.  As we  were walking  to lunch,  Margaret
commented that there was an unusual  amount of complacency  around  the
table.  I expect this reflects the fact that in her research  she has been looking
backwards over very long periods, whereas in our projections we take 50 or
100 years as the long term.
Davis  It might be a function of the lifespan of the organisms I'm working with.  The
long life span of trees makes their response  to climate very  different  from
agricultural  crops.  Let me  summarize what I think will be the response  of
forest to climate changes  in the future.
We have calculated the shifts in geographical range that you might expect to
find in the northern  hardwood forests of the northern  United States, given
two  different  climate  scenarios  projected  by different  General  Circulation
Models  (GCM's) for a doubling of atmospheric  greenhouse  gases (2x CO2).
The shifts of geographical range for the trees we worked with -- sugar maple,
yellow birch, hemlock, and beech -- are very large.  The northern limit would
move  northward between  500 and  1000  kilometers, and the western range
limit  would  retreat  eastward.  If you  use  GCM  output  that  projects both
rising temperature and an increase in rainfall, the range shift is about 500 km
northward.  There  is a slight retreat from the western range limit, because
the  temperature  increases  are  large  enough  to  create  moisture  stress  for
trees.  With a GCM scenario that predicts a large temperature  increase  and
a large deficit of soil moisture in the central part of the continent, the range
shift is much more extreme:  the new potential range hardly overlaps with the
old range except far to the east in northern New England and Nova Scotia.
The conclusion to be drawn from this exercise  is that changes in forests will
be very near species' range limits.  What happens in the center of the species'
range  depends on the degree  of ecotypic specialization  in the species.  The
question  is,  can  a beech tree  that grows  now  in Nova  Scotia tolerate  the
climate of George  where beech trees  grow today?  Or are the beech  trees
that grow in Nova Scotia specifically  adapted to the Nova Scotia climate?
This kind of information  is in short supply for many tree species.  More  is
known about trees that are planted in commercial plantations:  some species
have  a broad tolerance  range and others do not.  But for trees that grow in35
unmanaged  forests,  even valuable  forest trees  such  as  sugar  maple,  which
grows so abundantly that nobody ever bothers to plant it, there has been very
little research  on which to base relevant models.
The  long life  span  of  trees  creates  problems  for forestry  that  differ  from
agriculture.  A forester needs a precise prediction of what's going to happen
50 years from now because the turnover time for many forest plantations is
about 50 years.  Some trees can be cut after 40 years, but the rotation time
for others, such as oak, is in the 90-year range.  Who  can tell a forester the
appropriate  tree  to plant,  given that  it will  not be  harvested  for  50 to  90
years?
Pessimism  has  been expressed  about  the  accuracy  of the GCM's.  It is my
impression  that  most  GCM modelers  are trying  to give  us  a general  idea
about the trajectory that climate  might take.  They might be rather alarmed
to see me taking their data so literally and trying to project a range shift.  We
need  to keep in mind,  as well,  that doubling of CO2 is not an equilibrium
condition,  nor  even  an  upper  limit.  Greenhouse  gases  will  continue  to
increase  until  we  run  out  of  fossil  fuel.  Temperature  thresholds  will  be
reached  eventually,  although the predicted timing varies with the particular
model.  For these  reasons,  it is  more  useful  to think  in terms  of rates  of
change than to project equilibrium conditions  with doubled  CO2. Certainly
for trees  it is more useful, because the effects  on trees  are different with  a
slow change than with a fast change.  If there is a slow rate of change,  then
the  trees  themselves  will  not  experience  a  climate  change  during  their
lifetimes  that is large enough to actually  kill them in situ.
Historical  experience  tells us what  to  expect.  During  the  droughts  of the
1930s,  hemlock  trees  growing  near  their  southwestern  range  limit  in
Wisconsin died from drought stress.  The first year of drought they lost more
than 80 percent of their root capacity,  and in the second year of drought they
died  from  insect  damage.  It  is  surprising,  however,  how  little  hard
information there is in the literature about direct physiological stress to trees
caused by climatic events.  Information on growth response is available from
tree-ring studies, but there are few documented  cases of trees being killed by
a climate extreme.  This  is why we know so little about climatic thresholds
for adult trees.  Much more information  is available about the sensitivity of
seedling  stages,  although  even  here  the  information  is  sketchy  for  most
species.  Flowering, fruiting, and seed germination and establishment appear
to be most sensitive to climate.  For this reason the first effect one would see
in  a  forest  would  be  the  failure  of reproduction  of  canopy  species  and
invasion  of the stand by new species from outside the forest.  We have seen
major  turnovers  of  species  composition  of  forests  over  the  last  century
because  of  our  own  activities  in  logging  the  forest.  In  this  part  of the
country, most of the landscape supports  early successional tree species  such
as birch and aspen.  To have another major turnover in species composition36
of the forest might not be more surprising.  I think humans would  cope with
it.
If, however,  the climate  changes very rapidly,  then the effects on forests will
be  different.  Trees will  experience  problems  in dispersing  into new areas
where  they  can  grow.  The  distances  are  much  larger  than trees  disperse
normally  over  the  course  of  a  few  decades  or  even  several  centuries.
Furthermore, the climatic changes could be so large during the lifetime of a
single  tree  that  from  the  standpoint  of  a  forest  manager,  it  becomes  a
question whether there is  any tree species for which the  climate is  suitable
both at the time the tree is planted and at the time the tree matures and is
ready for harvest.  This would be true  even at rates of change less extreme
than those quoted by Dr. Abrahamson.  A climate change  of, say 5 C over
the course  of 200 or 300 years would  exceed the tolerance  of an individual
tree.
Now, let me turn to the direct effects of CO2. It is difficult even to speculate
about the direct effects of CO2 on forest ecosystems, considering soil as well
as  trees.  It is  much  harder  to  do  field  experiments  with  such  a complex
system.  The fossil record indicates that trees lag behind other organisms in
their  response  to  climatic  change.  The  lags  were  due  either  to  limited
dispersal of seeds or to slow development  of suitable soils.  This is so, even
though the  climatic changes in the past were at least an order of magnitude
slower  than  the  changes  we  are  projecting  for  the  coming  century.  The
generalizations  I  am  making  about  response  to  a  rapid  or  slow  climatic
change,  which are  based on a conceptual model of what might happen, are
supported  by results  in the fossil record,  which  show  trees  lagging  behind
decades  or  even  centuries  in  their  response  to  climate,  relative  to  other
components  of the ecological  system.
Waggoner  Does  that mean the tree is surviving  into the unsatisfactory  climate?
Davis  Most  of the  rapid  climatic  changes  that we know  in detail from the fossil
record  involve rapid warmings.  The lag is seen as  a failure  of the trees  to
establish  when  the  climate  is  warm  enough  for  trees  according  to  other
aspects  of  the  climate  record.  The  beginning  of the  present  interglacial
shows  these effects  most strikingly.  The original explanation was that seed
dispersal was the limiting factor.  Now soil development is identified as the
fact slowing the establishment of forest.  Here I think we should be aware of
the  fact that  the CO2 concentration  in the  atmosphere  was  lower  than  at
present,  although  rising  steeply.  There  is  also  evidence  for  lags  in  tree
establishment  later,  around  10,000 years  ago,  when  CO2 was  near  the
preindustrial  level.  In northern  Europe there was a rapid,  1000-year  long-
cool  interval  between  11,000  and  10,000 years  ago.  During  this  interval
subarctic  forest  was  replaced,  without  a  lag,  by  tundra vegetation.  The
absence  of a lag suggests that trees were killed outright by the change, which
must have  exceeded a critical threshold  for trees.37
Waggoner  What was on the ground?  Something  must have been there.
Davis  In north America, spruce was replaced by temperate trees  10,000 years ago.
These  systems  have  not  been studied  in enough  detail  to  learn what  was
competing  with the spruce,  and whether  the trees were  dying in situ, being
destroyed by fires,  or whether they were being replaced gradually through a
process akin to biological succession.  Past rapid climate changes were often
accompanied  by  natural  disturbances  that  speeded  up  the  response  of
vegetation.  In a model  you  can show that  the lag in response  of a forest
community to a rapid warming or a rapid cooling might last about a century.
But  if you  simulate  disturbances,  the resident  trees  are removed  from  the
simulation  and the change  occurs  much more rapidly.
Waggoner  From  your  knowledge,  could  you  predict  what  might  happen  here  in
Minnesota?  Would you get the present trees persisting well into the latter
part of the next  century while populations  of other trees  slowly expanded?
Would there be a forest or would there be no forest for a while?
Davis  It depends on how rapidly the climate changes and what the threshold  is to
actually kill a tree.  Without that knowledge,  I couldn't even apply a model
to simulate what would happen.  If there is a slow climate change, a tree can
continue  to occupy territory, while its seedlings  fail to persist and seedlings
of more southern species  get established  underneath  the  canopy,  assuming
that the  seeds  are  available.  An alternative  scenario  is  that  disturbances
(storms  or fires)  take  care of the problem.  There  is evidence  in  the fossil
record  that disturbance  rates  are very closely  tied to climate.  So we  might
expect  to see  disturbance  rates  changing.  Here  in the  Midwest you  might
expect to see a disturbance  regime dominated by either wind storms or fire.
Crosson  Does anyone know even roughly what percentage of the world's forests today
are managed  from the  standpoint of the  economic  gain.  I'm setting  aside
deforestation, which is not forest management, but rather cutting of trees in
order to do something else.  I'm asking about managing the forest  in order
to maximize the economic gains.  Do we know anything about that?  Would
you guess it to be large or small like  10 percent or 80 percent?
Davis  In North America I would  think the percentage  would be  small.  In other
parts of the world, certainly in Europe, the figure would be quite high.
Crosson  The  reason  I  ask is that  if people  who  are interested  in managing  forests
come to accept the implications of climate change for forestry that you have
outlined, it seems to me that it would give managers  an incentive to start to
increase  the  cutting  of old  growth  and  to  replace  it  with  shorter,  faster
growing varieties.  It would increase  the economic  premium on shorter-life
species.  If a shift of that sort occurred, this could  actually improve  the CO2
problem because these faster growing new trees are absorbing  CO2.38
Rawlins  Depending on what you do with the old growth.
Davis  That's right.  And replacing the old trees might affect the fertility of the site.
Release of CO2 from the forest floor could be larger than absorption of CO2
by new regrowth.
The scenario you describe might occur as soon as property owners perceived
that the trees were not putting on wood rapidly.  They would log the forests
and  replace  them  with  a different  forest  species.  The  question  is,  what
species should they replace them with?  And I suppose they would be looking
for species that have broad adaptability, like aspen, which grows everywhere.
An early successional  species such as aspen has well-dispersed  seed, as well.
Clark  I  think it's  useful  to  point  out  in  the  trees  discussion  that  a  lot  of what
Margaret  says, if I've learned  my lesson right, is going to apply primarily to
mid-latitude  forests.  In the  tropical  forest  case,  we  expect  the  rates  of
climate change to be slower and the rate of forest growth to be faster.  There
would be at least some a priori  reason for saying that the impact might  be
less drastic.
Davis  I should agree.  But the land use impact  might be larger.
Clark  Right.  And  the  point  I  wanted  to  get  to  is  that  one  has  got  to  start
differentiating places in order to figure out, if one' concern is forests, whether
the  direct  effects  of land  use transformation such  as arable  expansion  and
rangeland expansion, or the second order effects of climate change are going
to  dominate.  Those  balances  would  be  radically  different  depending  on
which century you took and depending on whether you took northern forests
or southern  forests.  Even for  the tropical  forests  there  is  some  basis  for
expecting that, should the climate equilibrate, you might not have an increase
in the extent of tropical forests, even deducting the amount removed for land
use clearing because  of the wider climatic  zones created.  In contrast in the
northern  ranges,  a modest increase  of land in agriculture  might really put
some  squeezes  on the boreal  forests  and  some  of the northern  temperate
forests.
Davis  I agree  with what you're saying.  You can't discuss it without a time frame.
Vast  areas  of  tundra  might  become  climatrically  suitable  for  forests.
Whether the substrate would be such that trees could grow is another matter.
And whether the trees could establish themselves rapidly over such vast areas
is another matter, too.
Sanchez  One hears  a lot in the press about planting  trees  to offset  the greenhouse
effect.  Is  it correct that we may need to plant  an area  equal  to France  or
something in that order to offset the CO2 effects?39
Rayner  Yes, every year.
Davis  In many  parts  of the world, we're  cutting  more  rapidly  than  foresters  are
replanting.  Even if we replanted to keep up with the amount we're cutting,
I think that would be an improvement.  But as Pierre Crosson was pointing
out, the incentive  to  cut and  replace  would  become  large  if the  trees  are
perceived to be growing slowly because of maladaptation to changed climate.
That means many forests would  be harvested.  The probability that people
would continue to cut faster than they would replant would be quite serious
unless  it  is  countered  by  replanting  for  the  purpose  of restoring  carbon
balance.
Rosenberg  A France  each year might  not be  enough.  Roger  Sedjo at RFF did some
calculations (Sedjo  and Solomon 1989).  There  are three gigatons of carbon
remaining in the atmosphere or incrementing into the atmosphere each year.
He calculated  how much new plantation would be required  to extract  that
three gigatons  of carbon  annually.  Using fairly conservative  annual growth
accumulations,  something  like  three-tenths  of  a  kilogram  of  carbon  per
square meter per  annum,  an area  about two-thirds  the  size  of the  United
States would have to be planted to fast-growing trees.  And if you could plant
all of that at once, it would work for about 40 years.  For 40 years you would
take out three gigatons a year, but then your trees will stop extracting carbon.
They will reach their maturity, and you have  to cut the trees and replant.
Waggoner  And you have to store the carbon.
Rawlins  Or replace  fossil fuel.
Clark  But there is also recent really disturbing new data out concerning the carbon
that has been assumed to be going into the oceans.  It doesn't seem to be in
the oceans.  It seems to be tied up in biosphere.  So I think that a lot of bets
are off  right  now regarding  what  fiddling  around  with  the  planet's  forest
cover and soil will do with this carbon cycle balancing.  And at least the folks
I talk to right now  say that we know less  than we  thought we knew a year
ago.
Rosenberg  Okay.  But no more, or not much more than three gigatons is accumulating
in  the  atmosphere.  If  I  understand  Bill  correctly,  he  is  saying  that  the
terrestrial biosphere  has probably been soaking up even more carbon than
we thought over the years because the oceans apparently have been soaking
up less.  I think there's a misapprehension that the rate of CO2 accumulation
in the atmosphere is increasing.  It did for a couple of years  around the last
big El Nifio event.  But it's now down to about the same rate as it has been
over the last decade or so.
Abrahamson  Between one  and two million square kilometers per year of new forest will
take out a gigaton a year.40
Rayner  Is that for normal commercial  forest or for high intensity biomass?
Abrahamson  That's  normal  commercial  forest.  And,  of course,  as you  say,  that  is  on
average  until  it  reaches  its  40  years  or  whatever  it  is  before  it  reaches
maturity.  But there's something a little disturbing  in that.  Perhaps  some of
you know why the  CO2 concentrations  in the  atmosphere  did not respond
appropriately  to the reductions  in fossil fuel use that took place  in the late
1970's and continued  into the  1980's.  Either the sink is being poisoned  or
there's a source that's not been taken into account.  And that source may be
increased rate of respiration with the temperature.
Rosenberg  I don't know  how much you want to  explore the carbon  cycle, but the one
other  very  interesting  item  of data  bearing  on  this  argument  is  that  the
amplitude  of  the  annual  carbon  dioxide  cycle  at  Mauna  Loa  has  been
increasing.  This  is  reasonably  well  established.  There  are  a  number  of
explanations  or contributory  mechanisms,  but one that cannot be ruled  out
is an increase in biomass in the temperate  regions.  This doesn't mean that
the tropics are not being deforested, but the tropics exert little control  over
the annual  Northern Hemisphere  cycles  of photosynthesis  and respiration.
In the tropics photosynthetic activity varies very little with season.  But in the
temperate  zones, of course, we  have  the large  annual  amplitude  that gets
larger  in  the  high  latitudes.  This  increase  in  the  amplitude  of the  CO2
concentration  wave  must  signal  an  increasing  terrestrial  biomass  --  more
photosynthesis, more respiration -- occurring outside of the tropics.  This fact,
together with some of the other things we've been hearing, tends to suggest
that the CO2 fertilization effect, even though we can't prove it and we can't
measure it directly, is, indeed, occurring.
Davis  I would  emphasize  again that  in considering  forest  responses,  the  rate  of
change  is  much  more  important  than  how  much  change  would  occur  at
doubling or tripling CO2. The same kind of reasoning applies  to looking at
agricultural  responses.  It's  really how fast these  changes  occur that affect
how  well  we  can  adapt  to  them.  It  seemed  to  me  in  looking  at  forest
responses, that even given the uncertainties of the GCM's and the uncertainty
about what's going to happen to CO2 in the atmosphere, there's a lot to be
learned by looking at a rapid rate of change and seeing what that would do,
and  looking  at a slow  rate of change  and  seeing what that would  do  and
coming out with some alternative  scenarios.  I wonder  if this  is  not also  a
useful way to approach the agricultural  scene.
Waggoner  I just want to go back to a point that I tried to make  and I didn't make very
well, I guess, and that is that there's nothing wrong with cutting trees so far
as carbon dioxide is concerned,  and nothing right about planting trees itself.
The important  thing  is to have  rapidly growing forest rather  than stagnant
mature  ones or bare ground.  That thing  seems to drop  out  of sight  every
once  in a while.  It isn't how many acres  we plant, it's  how many acres  we41
have growing  rapidly.  The second  issue is what we do with the wood  after
it's produced that matters.
Clark  Paul, wait a minute, if you take  a hectare  of mature forest and cut it down
and  burn  it  up,  you've  just  lost  a  hectare  worth  of  carbon  into  the
atmosphere.  Replacing that with trees growing really fast to simply recapture
the carbon you just released,  doesn't gain you very much.
Waggoner  If you burn those trees and replace fossil fuel, or if you take those trees and
build  a  house,  you  probably  have  gained.  That's  what  I  want  you  to
understand.  Be sure you don't just think that cutting trees is bad or planting
them is good.  Think through  the whole thing.  What you want  is a rapidly
growing  forest.  And  what  you  want  to  do  is  either  burn  the  product  to
replace fossil fuel or build a house.  That's the whole story.
Rosenberg  Just one more point to round out the argument.  You also have to think in
terms  of afforesting  areas  that are  out  of forest  now.  Badlands  in many
portions  of the world,  particularly  the tropics,  may be  hospitable  to trees.
So there appears to be many thousands of hectares into which trees might be
planted.  This  could only be a net benefit in terms of stabilizing CO2 levels.
Afforestation,  if promptly initiated,  could  have some  impact in controlling
CO2 accumulation  in the atmosphere  --  even within the next 20 years.
Waggoner  If they grow rapidly.
Ravner  You would want them to feed the  food  technology  that Steve Rawlins was
talking about or to feed the kind of biomass program that is appropriate for
the developing countries that I was talking about.
Stipulations. Conventional  Wisdom,  and Real  Issues
Ruttan  We will now turn to Paul, who's been giving thought for a number of years
to the issue  of impact on global climate  change on agriculture.
Waggoner  First,  I  will  make  some  statements  about  climate  change  that  I  believe
deserve  to  be  promoted  from  hypotheses  to  stipulation.  And  then  I'll
mention  some  conventional  wisdom  about  climate  change  that  I  believe
merits demotion to hypotheses.  And finally, I want to talk about some issues
that I think hang over the whole matter of climate change and agriculture.
Stipulations, of course,  are the agreements between  attorneys before a trial
starts that they make  in order to get the things that everyone  agrees on out
of the way.
My first suggestion for  a stipulation  is both a cooler  climate and  a warmer
climate  with  the  same  water  resources  is  unlikely.  This  allows  us  to42
concentrate on three future situations for any locality; (a) same climate, same
water; (b) warmer climate, less water; (c) warmer climate, more water.  Now,
that  doesn't  seem like  much  of an  advance  given  all  the calculations  that
have been made over the past  10 years.  But when you  think about  it, we
have  eliminated  from  this  list  of  three,  something  that  preoccupied  us
tremendously  back  in  the  days  of  the  supersonic  transport;  namely,  the
possibility of a cooler climate.  And I must say that I recently presented these
three alternatives, and a contrarian immediately contradicted me.  But I think
that we could stipulate those as the three possibilities.
The second  stipulation I would  suggest is that a progressive  two centigrade
warming  and  10 percent  drying  or wetting  during a half century  represent
reasonable  scenarios.  Now, a scenario isn't a forecast.  It's merely a plausible
view of the future  that is at least internally consistent.
My third stipulation is that reliable probabilities  for these three futures will
be  slow in coming --  leaving us uncertain for a long time.
In the AAAS study that Norm and I participated  in, we made up a table of
climate change projections.  In the last column is "estimated time for research
that leads to consensus."  For  global  temperature  it was  5  years.  I'm sure
Steve Schneider would now lengthen that.  For almost everything else, it was
10 to 50 years.  The recent halving of the calculated warming by the British
modelers  was  due to some changes  of cloud  parameters.  This has  thrown
everything  into  such  uncertainty  that  even  10  to  50  years  is  probably
optimistic.  So  I've  stipulated  that reliable  probabilities  about these  three
scenarios are  going to be a long time coming.
My fourth stipulation is that the hardest blow from climate change on human
affairs will be due  to  changes  in water resources.  From the Northwestern
hills to the shore of my little state of Connecticut, there is a three centigrade
degree  difference  in average  temperature.  And that  doesn't  really matter
very  much.  But, they  grow lettuce  in  the desert  in California  and  in the
suburbs of Boston,  and those  are quite  different  temperatures.  It  doesn't
really  matter.  But if  there's  a difference  in water,  it  makes  a whale  of a
difference.  Precipitation is the climatic hammer that's going to strike human
affairs if climate changes.
Compared to the global scope of climate change, changes in water resources
are fairly local.  Local actions will be possible, even profitable.  There are 21
water resource  regions in the U.S.  You can act on a regional basis, but even
in  little  Connecticut  there  are  towns  that  run  out of water  every  time  it
doesn't rain for two or three weeks.  There are other towns that think it's just
great  --  they  can  sell  water.  Localities  can  do  something  about  water
resources,  although I can't think of much they can do about climate change.43
The  diversity  of climates  where  plants, animals  and men  survive  and  even
prosper, indicates that we can adapt to change in climate given time.  I'll go
back to my lettuce  example.  Of course, you can grow lettuce in Boston and
you  can  grow  it in  suburbs  of San Diego.  But it  took a while  to put the
infrastructure  in place  to make it possible  and profitable.
The fifth stipulation is that we can adapt to water  resource differences,  but
it  takes time.  There  are parts  of the New  York City water system in use
today  that  are  over  a  century  old.  I  don't  know  how  long  TVA  was  in
conceptualization  or preconstruction, but probably it was something like 20
years.  Then it took another  20 years to complete  the system.
My sixth stipulation is that extremes of frost and drought have more impact
on affairs  than  averages.  The  amplitude  and  timing  of annual  cycles  of
temperature,  moisture  and  runoff  have  more  severe  consequences  than
differences  of annual total precipitation or average  temperature.  Amenities
like  recreations,  scenery  and  wildlife,  and  especially  anxiety about  health,
compete  with  surprising  strength  against  bread  and  butter  issues.  I'm
accustomed  to limitations  on fertilizers  and pesticides.  Nevertheless  I  was
surprised to hear from a Russian last winter that environmental  concerns in
Russia were quite capable of stopping development long before they ever had
Peristroika.  It's  really  remarkable  that  in  a  country  like  that  an
environmental issue  can stop a large  development project.  And wonder of
wonders,  I  think the most  extraordinary  thing I  read this  week  is  that the
environmentalists have presumed to stop the Israeli Air Force from using a
piece  of the  desert for  bombing  practice.  Now,  if that  doesn't  show  the
strength of environmental  issues, I don't know what could.  It's good, but it
also justifies  a statement that I heard  by a person who  said he feared more
irresponsible acts to prevent climate change than he feared  climate change.
My seventh and last stipulation is that an act, in the end, always costs.  Think
of policy actions as investments  -- I have a favorite question that I like to ask.
How would you invest your own money to make 10 percent or more per year
on your insider's knowledge  about climate change?
Well, now, those are some things I would like elevated to stipulations.  Now
what  about  conventional  wisdom  that  I  think  might  be  reduced  to
hypotheses?  These,  like  my stipulations,  are  questions  for research.  One
piece of conventional  wisdom is that waiting will only drive up costs.  That
is  true,  only  if you  don't have  to  pay  any  interest  and  if we  have  dumb
farmers.  Otherwise it may not be true.
'There are only losers from climate  change" is a second bit of conventional
wisdom.  I  don't  need  to  talk  about  that.  We've  agreed  that  piece  of
conventional  wisdom won't stand up.44
A  third  conventional  generalization  is  that  the  anticipated  changes  are
unprecedented.  In  fact,  during  a  recent  30  years,  the  range  of  annual
precipitation in my temperate state of Connecticut was 28 percent below to
38  above  the  mean.  And  during  the  most  recent  30  years,  annual
precipitation  fell 29  to 39 percent below the  mean in Bozeman,  Montana;
Columbia,  Missouri;  Pennsicola,  Florida;  Rockville,  Indiana;  and  Forks,
Washington, which has over a hundred inches a year.  It fell 74 to 87 percent
below in Childs, Arizona  and Indio, California.  So changes far greater than
the commonly specified  10 percent are regularly encountered.  The evidence
is not at all clear that the effect of greenhouse warming will be the increase
of climatic variability.
A fourth bit of conventional wisdom is that cutting forests  always increases
the CO2 in the air.  But mature forests fix no net CO2. Therefore, cutting for
lumber or firewood  and replacing with a rapidly growing stand or crop will
reduce COz concentration.  But when it is harvested for lumber or firewood,
it will again release  CO2 into the atmosphere.
A fifth bit of conventional wisdom that I have encountered very often is that
genetic engineering will save us.  It is premature to begin to design crops for
anticipated environments.  The logical procedure is to continually adapt crops
to the climate  as it evolves.  Depriving  conventional  agronomy of research
support  to  feed  anticipatory  research,  and  betting  all  our  chips  on  an
uncertain future, doesn't seem to be smart to me.
A final  conventional  generalization  is that the poor will  suffer most.  The
proposals  for stopping  the possible  warming may prove  costly  to the poor.
Some  very  explicit  and  careful  calculation  or  analysis  needs  to  be  made
before  we accept that statement.
Now,  let me turn to some issues that hang over the whole matter of climate
change.
The first one is "why have we failed to implement so many well-known  and
seemingly  sensible  suggestions?"  These  include  energy  efficiency,  water
efficiency and a very long list of others.  Let me read a statement from Helen
Ingram,  "Just as  surely  as  solutions  are  sought  for problems,  solutions  go
shopping  for  problems.  When  an  emerging  problem  lends  additional
credibility to an already developed policy proposal, the proposal is likely to
be  attached  to  the  problem."  The  climate  change  issue,  of  course,  is
attracting all  sorts of well-known  solutions.  It might be helpful  to ask why
they haven't been implemented.  If there are good reasons then let's not fill
up our reports with  them.
One  thing  that will  increase  the  possibility  of a  sustainable  agriculture  is
investment  in monitoring and  research.  We'll  surely  say  to do  that.  One
criterion  for  investment  is  the  net utility  of an  investment  relative  to  the45
effectiveness of the remedy.  But devoting more money to research without
any impact on the problem will decrease net utility.  Increasing the utility of
research is important for agriculture, and it is absolutely crucial for the good
name of research.
There are some very severe obstacles to interdisciplinary research.  Research
in  separate  disciplines  is  not wasted, but  I  don't  think  it  gets  directly  at
solutions.  Patrons who want  to get results from research on climate change
would  do well to reward rather than  discourage interdisciplinary  research.
How does a thoughtful individual factor in climate change?  Groups like ours
always recommend that the water system managers of American or the seed
corn producers  of American  need  to  consider  the implications  of climate
change.  Well, imagine them trying  to do that.  What would he  or she do?
One frequent response is to build in margins of safety.  It doesn't take many
brains to do that but it does cost money.  A real contribution would be to say
exactly  how  to  factor  in  climate  change.  "If  numerous  unmanageable
alternatives get  dumped into the deliberations, participants  may decide the
subject is too complex,  the problems too numerous, and the alternatives  too
overwhelming  and turn to more  manageable  issues."  So  I think there  is a
good  tactical  reason  for us  to  learn to sort  these proposals  and get rid  of
some of them.
A way around the hard job of sorting these things, of course, is to find three
or four that are so important that we don't have to think about anything else.
The important impacts of climate change are ones that have a highly elastic
response -- in the sense that elasticity is used in economics.  John Shaake has
found,  for  example,  that  the  elasticity  of  water  supply  for  a  change  of
precipitation on the east coast of the U.S. is about 2.  It rises to 4 and even
more in western  Texas.
Ruttan  What does that mean?
Waggoner  That means that if you get a  10 percent change in precipitation in Georgia,
you  get  a 20 percent  change  in runoff;  if you  get a  10 percent  change  of
precipitation in Texas, you get a 40 percent change in runoff.  So if you have
a very high elasticity like this then you're on to something very important in
climate  change.  It's  worth  concentrating  on.  The  other  thing  is that  the
system  is very non-linear.  Moist weather  makes  corn grow  until  a fungus
intervenes,  and then the plant dies.  Cool weather may be good for a crop
until it goes below 32, then the crop is killed.
This  is  what  makes  the  changes  in  the  extremes  so  important,  say  the
probability  of  drought  (Waggoner  1989)  below  a  certain  amount  of
precipitation.  That has a very high  elasticity.  If the mean changes by, for
example  10 percent, the probability of drought in the extreme may change by
40 percent.46
Gary Yohe (1990),  whom some of you know, has  shown how to make good
use of these non-linearities or thresholds.  Consider the issue of flooding over
a levee.  The sea level isn't important in itself, therefore, you concentrate  on
the time when the sea goes over the top of the dam or the levee.  So instead
of  a  frequency  distribution  of  sea  level  depth  in  let's  say  2020,  you
concentrate on a frequency distribution  of the time when the sea goes over
the  wall.  Thinking  in  that  way,  you  incorporate  things  about  rate,  you
incorporate  things  about  non-linearity,  and  I  think  it  is  an  advance  in
knowledge  for which Yohe is  to be praised.
Well, this ends my statement of the stipulations and the convention wisdom
as well as  my list of these great issues that I think hang  over everything.
Ruttan  Thanks, there must be a few people who will disagree with you.
Davis  Concerning conventional  wisdom  -- you were  challenging  the idea that the
changes  will be unprecedented.  And you're challenging them by giving the
range  of variance.  Shouldn't you  assume  that if the mean  annual  climate
gets warmer, the variance  envelope around the mean would  stay the same?
Waggoner  No, all I meant, Margaret, was that we often encounter changes bigger than
the  ones  that  we  envision  for  climate  change.  Then  when  we  make
statements  to  the effect that we've  never seen anything like  this before,  it
discredits  the effort.
Davis  I don't think it's irrelevant, though, because a severe drought that persists for
two years  has  a much  greater  effect than  if it  only  persists for one.  The
frequency of drought years becomes  critical for forest systems and, I should
think,  for  economic  systems  as  well.  I  don't  think  that  we  have  in  our
lifetimes  experienced  climates  such  as  we're  visualizing.  We  have  in  the
geological past.  But the natural vegetation in the past contained really very
different  distributions  of species.  During the last interglacial,  for instance,
sea levels and CO2 concentrations  suggest that the climate was warmer than
today's.  This suggests  that we may see really major  changes  in the natural
vegetation  given  a mean  temperature  which  is  higher  than what  we  now
experience.  I don't think that range of annual variability really suggests that
we've seen these  things before.  I think that range of annual variability fits
better with your statement that it is the extremes that are what are important.
I certainly agree with that.
Abrahamson  Of your stipulations the one I don't much like is the second one; that is, the
two degree warming and  10 percent degree in precipitation in 50 years.  You
have to be awful optimistic.  We'll have to be lucky on the scientific end, on
the uncertainty of the science, and we will have to be pretty vigorous in terms
of our policy  response  to decrease  emissions.  Both  of those  things would
have to happen.  It's possible but highly unlikely.47
Waggoner  I said it was a reasonable scenario.  But, in fact, my stipulation was that we're
not going to know what it is for a long time.  Within the possibilities  I think
it is a reasonable  scenario  to think about.
Abrahamson  I would at least  double  the  assumption  about the equilibrium  warming  to
which we are committed.
Clark  That's  a  little  high  then  for  the  presently  published  consensual  median
estimates.  But it's close enough.
Chen  Can I make one response to Margaret?  Jesse Ausubel's point on whether or
not this is precedent  or unprecedented,  was based partly on the CLIMPAX
(Climate Impacts,  Perception,  and Adjustment Experiment)  work (Karl and
Riebsame  1984),  a research  project  sponsored  by NSF,  which  did at least
look back at the historical record and look for large regions to see whether
there  would  have  been  significant  climate  changes  that had  persisted  for
some length of time.  There were examples from the midwest, I forget which
states,  where  there had been as much as a two-degree  change  in the mean
from  one  decade  to  the  next.  And  people  didn't  seem  to  notice  the
difference.
Rosenberg  I'm sure they noticed the difference.
Chen  No,  they really didn't.  There was nothing in the popular press.  There were
no expressions  of concern  about it being warmer this decade than the last.
Rosenberg  The really big  difference  was  between  the decade  of the  1930s  and  1940s.
And  people  surely  noticed  that  difference.  But  CLIMPAX  did  identify
limited areas in which other, less dramatic decadal anomalies in temperature
and rainfall occurred.  It may be that these weren't large enough changes  to
cause major impacts  on society.  They  may be why they didn't notice.
Clark  I think a way to sort out a lot of the confusion  is to note  that it is  not the
rate of change, per se, that's unprecedented  -- it is the combination of a high
rate of change sustained over a long period.  If you plot the paleo records  of
the last 160,000 years,  or paleo records of the last several  million years, the
combination  of rates  and  durations,  you  get a red  spectrum,  which  is  the
standard  distribution  of climate  type  noise,  showing  that the  biggest total
fluctuations  come from very slow, very long duration events.  You get a lot
of very large changes that only persist a very short time like noon to midnight
up at the other end of the spectrum.  What is  interesting about  the climate
change from greenhouse  scenarios is that the sort of changes  forecast up to
the present  have a fair amount of precedent in the historical  record.  But if
modest  rates  of change  are  continued  for another 30 or  40 years  into the
future, much  less accelerated,  you just get into an area of the rate/duration
space  where  there  are  no  historical  observations.  So  once  again,  the48
statement  that  it's  unprecedented  without  specifying  spatial  scale  and
combination of rates and durations, is a non-argument simply because you're
not specifying enough of the dimension to have it something that data could
refute.
Waggoner  That's  exactly  right.  You  have  made  my point  better  than  I  did.  I think
another  useful  concept  is  Yohe's  idea  of  looking  at  the  time  when  the
threshold has passed.  One more piece of conventional wisdom -- that should
be reduced to hypothesis  is that we will know the impact of a future climate
on the agriculture by making calculations using present crop varieties.  That's
the  dumb  plant  breeder's  assumption.  It should  be  eliminated  from  the
conventional  wisdom.
Abrahamson  I just had a question for you and also for you and also for the group.  When
you  said  variability  will  increase,  do  you  mean  interannual  variability  in
weather events?
Waggoner  We haven't calculated  that.  We don't know that.
Abrahamson  That's my impression.  There's no evidence  either way.
Waggoner  And yet people  will say variability will  go up, but there's  no basis  for that
statement.
Agricultural Impacts on Climate Change
Ruttan  I want to ask Bill Clark about one thing that seems to be falling through the
cracks.  We have talked quite a bit about the implications of environmental
change, both global and local on agriculture.  But we haven't put on the table
yet  very much  about  agriculture's  contribution  to  either the  global  or the
more location specific  environmental problems.  Bill has been heading up a
committee that is specifically charged with looking at some of those impacts.
Clark  Fair enough.  I had 32 seconds  warning on that one.  Vern is referring to a
committee  of  which  Margaret  Davis  is  also  a  member.  The  National
Academy of Science is trying to outline a research plan for the U.S. Global
Change  Program.  A group composed  of natural scientists,  plus a few of us
who once were natural scientists, went through an exercise in which we tried
to  focus  on  the  intersections  between  the  classic  disciplinary  areas  of
research.  The climatologists can define what climatologists want to do.  Even
the  ecologists  could  almost  define  what  ecologists  want  to  do.  But  the
difficulties in research planning have always been at the interfaces.  What do
the  climatologists  need  from  the  ecologists  to  get  on  with  their  work?
Research that the ecologists might well not do as part of their own internally49
driven agenda turns out to be essential for getting on with the climatology or
the atmospheric chemistry.
As part of that  exercise,  one  of the  questions  asked  was what  do  all  the
science disciplines,  climatology, earth system chemistry,  ecosystem dynamics,
and so on, need  to know  in terms  of the human forcing  functions  that are
pushing  perturbations  in the  global  geosphere/biosphere  system.  As  you
might  expect,  they  identified  a whole  set  of issues  that  had  to  do  with
industrial  and energy  emissions, which  are not primarily  our concern  here.
But their second big class of categories  was things that result from land  use
change in general and  agricultural  activity in particular.  And I guess what
you're  asking is  that I just run  down,  as  best as  I  can  recall  it, what  our
answers were.  There  will be a couple of categories.  The most  obvious  is
which  land  use  change  activities  are  resulting  in  emissions  of  chemicals,
primarily  gases,  that  contribute  to  changes  in climate  and/or  changes  in
tropospheric  chemistry.  (Those being two of the dominant global  linkages
now on the research agenda on global environmental change, which as noted
earlier, was heavily  dominated by atmospheric  chemistry  and climatology.)
The first thing one does  is to identify  the set of greenhouse  gases  and  ask
which of those are mediated by land use transformation activities  (Figure 3).
Carbon dioxide,  one of the major greenhouse  gases, is certainly  affected  by
land use changes, primarily through direct forest clearing;  that is, clearing of
high biomass  standing stock,  the combustion  of that material,  its release  to
the atmosphere, the plowing of soils and the oxidation of those soils resulting
in the release of carbon  dioxide.
A second is methane coming out of agricultural activities in two routes.  One of them  is  anaerobic  production  within  ruminants,  the  so-called  cow  fart
factor.  When I was an undergraduate,  I thought it was an interesting choice
of  words  --  the  most  interesting  human  contribution  to  the  planet's
atmospheric chemistry.  And indeed there is an interesting amount.  It turns
out not to be a big number relative to other numbers in the accounts, but it's
certainly been rising of late.  There are more  ruminants around than there
were  150 years  ago.
Almost certainly a large agriculturally-related  source is any land area that is
wet  enough  for  the anaerobic  route gives you  CH4 instead  of CO2. This
clearly happens  in rice cultivation,  and in other wetland-like  operations.  It
also happens in seasonally flooded areas and in very damp  soils.  One of the
great difficulties is that the carbon  evolution can switch between an aerobic
and an anaerobic pathway very rapidly.  It means that the emissions patterns
are extremely spotty.  You can be getting methane  out of a system one day
and be getting CO2 out the next  day.  So it's a very difficult thing to sample
or to understand the sources.  But it's equally clear that increases in irrigated
areas lead to increases in methane evolution unless those systems are simply
replacing  natural wetlands.50
As far as anyone can tell, there is no  ozone source out of agriculture  except
from internal  combustion  engines.  Nitrous  oxides, which  are  a significant
greenhouse  gas in that they  have  extremely  long  life  times,  come  out with
great high uncertainties at about 50 percent from fossil fuel combustion and
other industrial  combustion  processes.  The  other  50 percent  comes  from
biomass  burning,  soil  fertilization,  cultivation  of natural  soils  resulting  in
some  rather bizarre  chemical  pathways  that involve  N20.  The  difficulty  is
that these numbers are not well known.  N20 has been a very difficult gas to
sample.  It is well distributed because it has a very low atmospheric lifetime,
but  it  is  difficult  to  detect  at  the  extremely  low  levels  that  exist  in  the
troposphere.  Only  very  recently  have  sufficiently  robust  sampling
technologies  been put in place to begin to get a clear  picture.  But nitrous
oxide  is  certainly  going  up.  The  numbers  you  will  see  around  in  most
literature are now somewhat suspect because the portion attributed to fossil
fuel burning is in doubt.  But over the long run those nitrous oxide  sources
are  something  that  people wonder  a lot  about in  terms  of where  they're
coming from.
That  said, the  second  class  of major  chemical  issues  are  those that  result
primarily from biomass burning such as slash and burn or burning the waste
materials  in a cropland or a forestland after clearing or harvest.  These emit
a complex set of gases.  Some of them I've already mentioned,  but some  of
them  are  much  more  complicated  --  low  molecular  weight  hydrocarbons,
aerosols,  small particles, soot particles  and the like.  There is a fair amount
of sulfur in it.  You may have seen the recent public reports that some fairly
significant  acid  deposition  damages  were  being measured  in what  used  to
be  called  the  Ivory  Coast  of Africa,  far  away  from any  plausible  sets  of
industrial  sources.  They  were  apparently  traced  back  to  quite  extensive
burning  of vegetation.  A combination  of the moisture  conditions  and the
sulfur content  of vegetation were quite capable  of giving you sulfur aerosol
rain  downwind  from  it.  The  point  is  that  sulfur  deposition  has  been
appearing in places that nobody was expecting.
Other  effects  of  this  very  complex  chemistry  of  incomplete  biomass
combustion have been a whole set of photochemical smog-like phenomenon.
This  is  occurring  even  in  remote  areas.  You  get  some  very  bizarre  air
chemistry  that  can  stress  all  sorts  of things.  There  may  be  impacts  on
vegetation  and conceivably  eventually  impacts  on human health.  The next
major category is the water budgets of the earth; that is, the land-atmosphere
fluxing  of water,  turns  out to be very  strongly  mediated  by the vegetation
cover.  This  has been  one  of the  areas  left  out  of the  first  generation  of
global climate models.  The radical differences in the ability of the vegetation
surface  to pipe water  from the ground  into the atmosphere  between bare
land, a smooth field and  a forest or brushland  has been getting a lot  more
attention and is now being parameterized into the next generation of global
climate models.  So there's  a lot of research  now going on in that area that51
builds  on a long  tradition  of  agrometeorology  studies, but  have  not  until
recently received much attention to scaling them up to say scales of tens and
hundreds of kilometers.  Finally, I guess I merged into the last issue  --  the
surface properties themselves.  Obviously  land use  transformation  changes
surface properties  as they  affect  the fluxes of water.  They also  affect  the
incoming  solar  radiation  budget  --  different  degrees  of  reflectivity  and
different degrees  of wind scouring.
The natural science communities have been asking what can you tell us about
plausible  internally  consistent  patterns  or  scenarios  of  land  use
transformation as they affect these various transfer agents, chemicals, physical
balances, and  so on, over the next 50 to 100 years.  They're not looking for
predictions.  They're looking for sets of plausible reference scenarios.  What
would agriculture look like in terms of its methane emissions,  N20 emissions,
surface cover  changes and the like.  What would radical alternative patterns
of  agriculture,  these  appropriate  technology  or  sustainable  versions  or
whatever,  look like in terms of those transfer parameters.
Now,  that  is the agenda that  is being pushed.  The missing  agendas  tend to
be the ones that are not directly atmosphere and climate related.  They have
direct implications for the diversity issues I spoke of earlier and for the fluxes
of materials and chemicals  into the water system.  They are acknowledged,
in passing, in terms of the phosphorous budget and its involvement especially
with  carbon  sequestering  in the deep  ocean.  How much  carbon  and how
much phosphorous is being flushed down the major world river systems?  But
they are very much second tier concerns at the moment in the global change
program.
As far as our committee's work, we have simply bowed to a lack of demand
pull and  relegated  those  waterborne  and  direct  biotic effects  to  relatively
back-burner  status  simply  to  get  the  atmospheric  chemistry  and  surface
properties  questions answered  first.
Allen  I wanted to ask Bill two questions.  One that I didn't hear you mention was
the role of termites  in methane production and whether there  is, in fact,  a
large unaccounted portion of methane generation.  The second was a recent
article  in  Science  on the  contribution  of savannah  burning  to the  carbon
dioxide  budget of the earth.  They were both put forward as very significant
sources.
Clark  The contribution  of savannah  burning to the carbon dioxide budget doesn't
make sense to me.
Rosenberg  The paper,  as I recall,  indicated  the burning as contributing  to smoke and
haze.
Allen  Smoke  and haze rather than CO2?52
Clark  If you're trying to watch  short-scale  carbon  fluxes,  it does  matter.  And for
a whole range of these tropospheric chemistry issues, it matters tremendously.
But not the long-term  CO2 budget vis-a-vis climate change.
There is no question that most but not quite all termites and a whole bunch
of  other  creatures  do  produce  methane  in  their  guts.  They're  doing
anaerobic fermentation.  They don't have much choice in the matter.  There
was  several  years back  one  of these  elegant  little  exercises  where,  having
measured  the evolution  of methane  from  one  cubic  centimeter  of termite
land, you  then try  to figure out  the  scaling factor of how many such cubic
centimeters  were  there  in  the  universe.  There's  an  error  term  in  that
estimation.  Depending on which ends of the possible range you pick, you can
turn the world into  a methane planet or it becomes an insignificant  source.
The present view is that the methane budget is unbalanced.  The atmosphere
isn't getting rid of as much of it as it should be.  Something is happening at
land surface  that isn't the termites.  The termites  are in there  as a source
term  of unknown  size.  Most recently, some very elegant  isotopic  analyses
have  suggested that a larger fraction of the methane  is  of fossil fuel origin;
that is, coal mine surfaces, incomplete combustion, a whole bunch of things.
Very  old  carbon  is  now  being  combusted  incompletely  or  there  is  more
methane leakage from old carbon than had been thought to be the case.  The
atmosphere people said that couldn't possibly be true.  But I think right now
almost anyone who knows anything  about the methane  issue  can give you a
good argument  about why it goes one way  or another.
In the December issue of Biogeochemical  Cycles,3 Ralph Cicerone has done
an absolutely gorgeous  review of the topic from the view of laying  out the
constraints on the global methane budget -- what we know about the isotopic
measurements,  the known  sources, and the known sinks.  Instead of taking
a central  estimate  and putting  an  error  term on it,  he  comes  in from  the
outside and asks what is the space within which the right number has to fall.
It's a very clearly and systematically written piece, now somewhat superseded
by some of the new isotope analyses, but the structure holds up quite nicely.
Rawlins  Has dust from wind erosion been considered a contribution from agriculture?
Clark  It comes up any time you ask the question of mediators of mesoscale climate
over periods of months or years.  We clearly get transcontinental  movements
of significant  quantities  of dust.  I don't think the Reid Bryson  notion that
there  was  sufficient  mobilization  of  such  dusts  or  dust-like  aerosols  to
significantly increase  the reflectivity  of the atmosphere,  that is  increase the
albedo  and  not let  as  much  sunlight  in  as  expected  thus  pushing  us in  a
3To be completed.53
cooling direction,  has borne out.  It's not that it couldn't do it, it's just that
the masses involved  simply aren't there.
But I should say that the whole aerosols and dust issue, as many would  say,
has  been  given  very  short  shift  in  the  global  and  continental  scale
atmospheric chemistry arguments.  If we were around this table in Germany
or the Soviet Union right now instead  of in the United States, there would
be a lot more discussion about this and a lot more argument that a significant
fraction  of  some  of  the  tropospheric  chemistry  and  event  the  mesoscale
climate effects we're seeing  are due to such things.
Rawlins  Where do you see the research priorities in agriculture?  Where do you see
the important gaps that need to be filled?
Clark  One of the things that the committee has come out with is to say that we face
a very odd  situation in our  ability to talk  about internally  consistent  long-
term  scenarios  of human  activity  on  the  planet.  The  demographers  are
perfectly willing to give you hundred year scenarios.  The energy people are
perfectly  willing  to  give  you  hundred  year  scenarios.  And  despite  the
excesses  on  either  side,  I  think  most  people  in  the  environment  and
development  debate would  argue that  that's  a good thing.  Both  of those
fields have matured sufficiently that there is good  critical peer review.  One
can make  a distinction  between sloppy work  and solid work without falling
into the trap of believing  the numbers.  The odd thing is when you come to
agricultural  change in  particular  and  land use change  in general,  the  long
term studies go out to  2000 or 2010.  Most of them are static, for example,
an FAO carrying capacity study.  It has been virtually impossible to stimulate
work  on  the  principal  driving  forces  in  large  scale  persistent  land
transformation that would show up over scales of hundreds of kilometers and
tens of decades.  I'm not concerned about the high frequency back and forth
this year  and that between  grazing land  and cropland,  but the larger more
persistent  changes.  What are the varying  roles of demographics,  or prices,
of demand, and so forth?  What, if anything, can we say about the constraints
and the determinates under which  these patterns emerge,  especially as they
relate to some of the land use  transformations  that have shown to be most
important for the chemistry and climatology issues I've been discussing.
We need to challenge the agricultural economics community, because nobody
else seems even remotely placed to do the work.  You must have people who
are  dealing with  long-term  processes,  the  kind  of thing Vern  talks  about,
long-term technical substitutions, and long-term demographic transitions and
what they mean for these land use issues.  Try to challenge them by doing the
first cut, first draft global model of land use changes for five or ten decades
into the future.  The nice thing about that is that, of course, that the model
isn't  the  objective.  Identify  a  dozen  or  so  key  processes  that  are  the
determinates of transformation  and explore those using historical and cross
sectional  data  to  begin  to  get  a  debate  going  on  the  decade-to-decade54
changes.  That's where  real research gets done.  It's an area in which all sorts
of both  cross  sectional  and  historical  studies  have  shown  good  work  can
happen but hasn't been done.  Try to integrate that work then with changes
in major cropping zones.  That is the kind of task that I think would bring the
agricultural  development community and the global change natural  science
community together.  It would give them one place of common contact which
I think would be very good.
Rayner  As far as identifying  the important processes in long-term  land use  change,
my own institution at Oak Ridge National  Lab  is just starting a three-year
program of research  in that area.  We  would welcome  any suggestions  or
inputs.
Rosenberg  If you take the relative  size of RFF and the relative  size  of Oak Ridge, the
effort that we are beginning is about on the same scale.  We've agreed to do
a  one-year  survey  with  support  from  the  Japanese  Institute  for  Energy
Economics  on emissions  of non-CO2 biogenic  greenhouse  gases (CH4 and
N20).  To do this we will judge the validity of current estimates  of land use
change.  The validity  of methane  and nitrous oxide flux  measurements will
also be assessed.  We have not yet really started, but we're gearing up now
to do it.
Allen  You  didn't  mention  ammonium  relative  to  animal  units  and  the  use  of
anhydrous  ammonia as a fertilizer.  Are these significant to global climate?
Clark  It  isn't  a  climatically  active  gas  at  all.  It  has  a very  short  atmospheric
resident time --  a matter of days.  Its transport distances  as ammonium  are
not sufficient to get it involved in global change research.  Now, at mesoscale,
obviously there are places where it gets quite involved with nitrogen oxide or
nitrogen  acid deposition patterns through various chemical pathways.
Rayner  It's also important with respect to fertilizer manufacture.  One-third of all of
the  energy  use  in  the  U.S.  agriculture  is  in  ammonia  manufacture.  In
addition to the energy use in the manufacture you also have natural gas.  The
carbon  from  that  usually  is  in  some  kind  of urea  form.  When  that  is
subsequently released it contributes to atmospheric carbon.
Clark  Let me switch hats and stop talking about what the Academy's global change
committee is doing.  What I would hope this group would support is research
on how we are delivering nitrogen to the crops we want to grow.  What's the
difference  between the amount of nitrogen that the farmer applies  and the
amount that ends up in a crop.  That is a classic systems mass balance study
that needs to be  done  --  not at a global  scale, but certainly at a couple  of
hundred to thousand kilometer-on-edge  scale.  We should begin by looking
at the agricultural  nitrogen budgets from  a point of view of really what the
chemical  products  are, what's  going  into  the surface  water  system, what's55
going up into the atmosphere, what's going down deep, what's in the plants.
Rayner  Is  everybody  really  familiar  with  the  different  potencies  of  the  various
greenhouse  gases that Bill's been talking about?  I assume you were talking
there  about the weight of gas emitted, right?  You're not talking about the
relative contribution  to force and  effect?
Clark  True.  They have very different numbers, and CO2 is the weakest.  For what
it's worth, an analysis done by World Resources Institute looking at the next
30  to  40 years  of  forcing  of global  warming  attributes  13 percent  of that
forcing  to  agricultural  activities.  Within  that,  3 percent  is  attributed  to
carbon dioxide, 8 percent to methane, and 2 percent to nitrous oxide.  Those
would not be the numbers if we talked about volume  or weight emissions.
Rawlins  One of the reasons I asked you what you think agricultural research priorities
should be is that the figures for gaseous emissions from agriculture frequently
seem to be the residuals left over after the emissions from energy production
and industry have been estimated.  Do you think agriculture  should take the
responsibility  for assessing  these emissions?  One  of the weakest  numbers
seems to be the relationship between nitrogen fertilizer use and nitrous oxide
emission.  Do we know that this is the source?
Clark  No, we know that N20 comes, among other places, from nitrogen fertilizer.
You can do it in the laboratory and pick it up in the field.  It happens.  It's
a matter of how much of it happens, where and when.  I think that there is
a real  opportunity  for  the  agriculturally  based  research  community  to get
involved in this  in improving these  numbers.  What I think would probably
be a real lost opportunity would be if it retreated  off and said okay we'll do
this within our own community,  instead of moving in and playing an active
role in the existing cross-disciplinary effort that has been unable, with a very
few  exceptions,  to get  good  sustained  cooperation  out of the  agricultural
community.  What  it  means  is  they do  the best job as  they  can  with  the
collaboration  they've  been  able  to get.  And I  don't know  a single  group
doing  these  budgets  that  would  not be  delighted  to  have  very  substantial
interactions with the agricultural  research community.
A Food Systems Approach
Ruttan  I would now like  to turn to Bob Chen.
Chen  I will use a visual  crutch, partly because  I'm going  to go  over some  of the
points that were already raised.  I might as well do it visually.
Ruttan  Be sure and articulate  in a way that the people who read this, and may not
have your visuals in hand, can follow.56
Chen  I'll try.  First of all, I was at a meeting at NCAR a couple of weeks ago and
where  Bob  Dickinson,  our  climatologist,  made  the  following  comment:
"Climatologists  know a lot about the climate, but they also don't know a lot."
And that's reflected in the comments about how long it will take to have the
answers --  climatologists just need to do more research for 5 to 10 years and
we'll have all the answers.  Bob argued:  "No, we're not.  We're going to have
as many new uncertainties  coming up as we will solve in the next  10 years."
My view is  that in the  impacts  area we  really know  little and, in fact, we
know little  about how little we know.  The extreme  positions are based  on
very little hard knowledge.
If you look at a simple system in which there is an activity that you're worried
about, such as climatic change, it helps to think in terms of the principles we
learned in basic calculus.  There is a term, the total derivative, which is, say,
the change in agricultural  production that results from the activity you  are
concerned  about.  This  limited  variable  system  has  a  total  derivative
reflecting how the change  in the activity affects  the climate  (Figure 4).
There is also a partial derivative  reflecting what climate change, holding all
else equal, does to agricultural production.  There also is another term which
is of interest -- though maybe not to climatologists -- that captures the benefit
of  fossil  fuel  use  on  agricultural  production.  That  makes  up  the  total
derivative, so from a societal viewpoint we must also worry about the benefits
from fossil fuel use in agriculture.
Certainly  one important thing is that significantly  large negative  effects  on
agriculture  from  climate  change  must be  established  in order  for it to  be
important from a societal viewpoint.  If this function  is zero, then since the
effects are multiplicative, there's no net effect on agricultural production.  So
there is a need to establish that this is a large negative effect before you can
proceed  in saying  that this  somehow  outweighs  the benefits  of using  fossil
fuels in agriculture.
In my work at the World Hunger Program, we've kind of come up with two
approaches  to looking  at some of the impacts.  One, you might call a "food
systems"  approach.  Most  approaches  to  climate  impact  assessment  in
agriculture  have not taken a broad food systems  approach.  They've  really
only focused  on  single issues on the production  side,  such  as yield impacts,
effects  on  inputs,  some  attention  to  pests,  and  not  much  else.  Let  me
illustrate  with  a  diagram  that  I've  been  working  on  for  the  purpose  of
rethinking  the issue of food waste in the food system (Figure 5).
One of the first things you notice is that most of the things that Bill included
in his list are in my input list.  Clearly you have to worry about the effects on
inputs and not just land use and yields.  In Africa,  for example,  one  of the
major constraints on land use in agriculture is the occurrence  of waterborne57
diseases  that  prevent  human  occupation.  That's  something  that  will  be
responsive  to climate change.  It may therefore  be a different pathway for
affecting eventual food consumption.  It doesn't relate to the demand side at
all.  Energy use  is also  a big factor in agriculture.  Fertilizer  is basically  an
energy  use  issue.  It  was  mentioned  this  morning  that  if you  could  use
cellulose,  for  example,  to  feed  livestock,  that  would  introduce  a  new
component  into the food  system.  But another  issue  is the waste that goes
into feeding livestock.  If one could increase the efficiency of feed conversion,
it would probably far outweigh the effects of a 10 or 20 percent difference in
corn and soybean yield.
There  are lots of points of vulnerability  that I won't go into.  Certainly  one
interesting  one is the whole  issue of waterborne  disease.  There  is also  the
issue of disruption of the food system itself. In Africa, for example, 2 percent
of the population are  refugees  of some sort  or another,  and  there is  some
potential  for  that  to  increase  drastically.  That's  led  to  regional  and
sometimes  national  level  disruption  of the  social  infrastructure  that keeps
people  fed and housed.
A related  issue that was mentioned  earlier is temperature  and precipitation
effects.  Norm mentioned that people have looked at COz and salinity,  CO2 and  drought stress,  and CO2 and  other factors.  But what people  have  not
looked  at in any  great detail  is the whole set of cumulative  system  effects.
There have been few  synergistic studies of what happens to crops or forests
when there's  ozone, when there's air pollution, when there's a whole range
of climatic stress.
At lunch,  I asked  about insolation  effects  on yields.  Paul  Waggoner was
saying that there's probably an elasticity of one, that is a 10 percent increase
or  decrease  in  solar  radiation  over  the  growing  season  will  result  in  a
10 percent  increase  or decrease  in yield.  But you don't see  those kinds  of
estimates  worked  into  agricultural  impact  studies principally  because  the
modelers are not prepared to release results on insolation effects because the
cloud parameterizations  are so weak.
A  second  issue  that  has  not  been  addressed  to  any  great  degree  is  the
possible  connections  between  climate  change  and  some  of  the  other
environmental  changes.  They  may,  in  fact,  have  synergistic  effects.  In
addition,  there are parts of the system  that modelers  do not normally think
of.  I put in agricultural research  in that category.  Agricultural research  will
have large  consequences  for the  impact  of climate  change  on  agricultural
production.  But climatologists,  and others who have traditionally defined this
as a climate  problem, have generally ignored  agricultural research.
Finally, an alternative  to a foods systems approach is to think more in terms
of  existing  societal  relationships  and  how  things  like  food  shortage,
distribution  of  food  and  other  factors  interrelate.  This  diagram  is  too58
complicated to explain in detail, but it represents our current thinking of how
to  deal with  hunger.  Risk relationships  vary  at  different  levels  of spatial
aggregation.  Social relationships  become important because  the issue goes
beyond  capacity  to  produce  the  issue  of  access  to  food.  Greater  food
shortage  increases the numbers of people who have inadequate  access.  But
it  certainly  is  not a one-to-one  relationship.  Inadequate  access  can  occur
because of other factors  in society.  Even within the household,  individuals
have  different access  to food  and requirements.
This  kind  of framework  allows  you  to think  not  of flows  of calories,  but
rather  of  a hierarchy  of risk.  Changes  in  climate which  may  affect  food
shortage  may  also  have  some  other spin-off implications  as  its  effects  are
transmitted  through the system.  This gets to the issue of whether there  are
absolute winners or losers.  Maybe  there are no absolute winners or losers,
but certainly within a system in any particular region, there are going to be
relative winners or losers.  This may be more important to popular views of
the problem than the absolute level  of risk.
The  effects  of  climatic  change  may  well  occur  through  other  pathways,
perhaps  through  changes  in economic  relationships  within  society.  Policy
actions  may modify  economic  relationships  within  society  and  change  the
degree  to which, for  example, hunger persists  in a world  subject to climate
change and policies to prevent,  adapt or mitigate climate change.  This is still
preliminary, but it does provide  an alternative  way of thinking about these
impacts  that is  different  from the old "let's do  a scenario" and add  up the
costs and benefits.
Waggoner  I would like to ask Steve Rayner and Bob Chen if you people can tell us how
we can use some of these techniques to sort through the proposals for either
stopping  the  climate  change  or  adapting  to  it  to  see  which  is  or  is  not
reasonable.
Chen  Well, I think one issue is that, in my mind, the impact studies are so limited
that even if you think there may be some CO2 benefits, there is still a risk of
catastrophe.  That  suggests  a  more  conservative  strategy  in  terms  of
prevention.
Clark  A  simpler  and  stronger  answer  is  that  you  should  never  fund  a  single
additional impact study which has the dumb  farmer in it.  No study that is
looking  forward  50  years  and  does  not  incorporate  a  mechanism  for
behavioral  and technological  response, should ever be funded or considered
again,  period!  It simply  creates  a set  of numbers and  pictures  of a world
which  is inconceivable.
Ruttan  And you better go  a bit farther and rule out not only the dumb farmer, but
also the dumb plant breeder and the  dumb animal nutritionist.  We should
assume that the research system has some capacity to respond to the changes59
in the environment.  And if any body doesn't believe  that, I'll refer them to
Hayami and Ruttan on "induced innovation".
Clark  But the point is we do have enough of a tradition in assessment  and response
studies  for  multiple  decade  time  horizons.  It  is  not  even  a useful  first
approximation  to  do  the  study  as  though  those  responses  didn't  happen.
And yet 90 plus percent of the studies out there, even the best of them, are
systematically  biased  in  such  a  way  as  to  make  the  results  or  the
consequences  look much worse than they're going to be.
Rayner  I think it's important not to assume that the smart farmer or the smart plant
breeder is  necessarily going to make things better.  They  could make  them
a lot worse.
Rosenberg  I agree with your premise that the "dumb farmer" scenario is nonsense.  The
no-adaptation  assumption  is  silly.  However,  the  very  fact  that  so  many
studies  have used this assumption virtually requires those of us who want to
go  beyond  that  to  use  it  as  a  starting  point.  Policy  is,  after  all,  being
proposed in Congress and in international fora based on the results of studies
that have used  dumb farmer scenarios.
Crosson  In response  to Paul's question,  it seems to me that one area badly needing
economic research is this question of the gains from conservation.  Are these
technologies  to increase  efficiency  in energy  use  economically  viable  now.
If so, then the question economists always ask is why are they not being used.
My point is that if these gains in energy  efficiency are as large as asserted,
and are even potentially economically viable, then we need to know it.  We
need  to  answer  the  questions,  why  aren't  they  in  use.  They  would
undoubtedly  require  some  institutional  changes,  but  the  greater  those
institutional  changes, the greater the cost.  Institutional changes  don't come
cost free.  But if they are, in fact,  available at low cost, then all the problems
of the uncertainty about climate change becomes a non-problem because it's
only sufficient to show that there is some cost to not doing something  about
climate  change.  If we can  deal with that  at very  low cost, then it doesn't
make  any  difference  whether we  don't  have  good  estimates  of the  future
costs.  I've been arguing that the RFF people in energy ought to be paying
more attention  to the economics of the conservation strategy and the energy
efficiency strategies.
Rayner  I think you can push that  even further back to something  Steve was talking
about which  is  the question  of what  is  the starting point for doing  impact
analysis.  One  of the  concerns  that  I  have  is  the  extraordinary  degree  of
technological precision of the analysis in terms of material flows and emission
rates  combined  with very superficial  attention  to the institutional  structure
and its implications.60
The whole  question  of the introduction  of a dynamic  decision  maker  into
impact analysis which makes the comparative static analysis misleading in the
way that Steve indicated.  We've tended to rely too heavily on late 1960s and
early 1970s systems -- theoretical and flow -- modeling approaches and ignore
active choice making.  Until we can start to really integrate the active choice
making into our impact analyses,  we're  always  going to have  the problems
that Bill just said he would like  to see excluded from modeling.
Cheng  I want  to go back to the  comment  on the dumb  farmer  because  it's quite
clear that  in  a  modern  farming  operation  anyone  who  is  not  adapting  to
change is not going  to be a farmer very long.  It is the dumb  modeler who
makes such simplistic assumptions that worries me.  Should we even be using
equilibrium models for the problem we're dealing with?
Sonka  Paul,  you  asked  about  what  tools  and  techniques  that  exist  to  help  in
prioritization.  The  tools  and  techniques  used  in  the  studies  I  will  be
discussing were useful and they were cheap.  I'm struck with the odd choice
of words.  We distinguish between impact analysis,  and science.  I don't want
to sound defensive,  but we don't put that kind  of money into studying the
science  relevant  to impact analyses  that it deserves.  When  an issue comes
along you pull the old models off the shelf.
Waggoner  Perhaps the reason is that you haven't convinced  somebody that you can do
better.
Rosenberg  I have the answer, Paul.  First of all, there have been any number of studies
about  the  impacts  of a  climate  change  on  agriculture.  The  EPA  study
illustrates  the inadequacies  of the  dumb  farmer  assumption.  The  studies
show that yields go down.  Yields go down because heat units go up.  In the
plant growth models used, growth rate is determined by the accumulation  of
heat units.  Hence the plant runs out of time.  The crop stops dead because
it reaches its heat unit limit weeks  early so that the time  for accumulating
photosynthate  is curtailed.  In real life, farmers perceiving  a warming trend
and observing that crops  are maturing too early would begin to plant earlier
or otherwise  change their management  practices.
Ruttan  The plant breeders would increase the days of maturity from 100 to 110 days.
Jones  They already  have the varieties.  They would just pick  different months  to
plant.
Modeling  the Social  and Economics  Effects
Ruttan  I'm going  to shift  now to Steve  Sonka.  Steve, you've been  looking at  the
climate models.  We would like to get your perspective on what you think we
can learn from them and what we need to do.61
Sonka  What I've been looking at is the studies that have been trying to measure the
social  and  economic  effects  of  climate  change  on  agriculture.  About  six
months  or  so  ago,  the  Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and
Development  (OECD)  commissioned  me  to undertake  this review.  I was
asked  to  look  at  the  methodologies  that  were  being  used  to  assess  the
potential social  and economic  effects  of climate change on agriculture.
We  tried  to  do  three  things  in  the  study.  One  was  to  just  review  the
empirical studies to find out what has been done.  We were able to draw on
Martin  Parry's  work  at  IIASA  quite  a  bit.  The  second  objective  was  to
critically assess the methodologies  used in the studies and the third was  to
suggest improvements.
In another incarnation, I teach in the area of management.  And one of the
things that we talk a lot about  in management,  particularly  in the strategy
area,  is  that you  should  spend  some time  thinking  about whether  you  are
doing  the right  thing  as opposed  to spending  a lot of time thinking  about
whether you are doing things right.  The bottom line from my review of the
studies  is that we've been spending a lot of time worrying about the correct
way of doing the studies, but we haven't worried very much about whether
we are doing the right studies.  We  are not providing the information  that
societal decision makers can use to make these very, very difficult choices.
I'd  like  to take just a  few  minutes  to review what we  did, then talk about
where we think some of the key deficiencies  are and then relate them to our
discussions  this morning, particularly Bob  Chen's presentation.
One of the first things that I tried to do in doing this was to change the mind-
set from climate change as the primary issue.  From the viewpoint of society,
or of societal concerns, climate change is not the primary issue.  And I stress
that because  the studies  that  have  been done  have  almost  all  have taken
climate  change  as  the  central  issue.  As  we  thought  about  the  basis  for
society's concern about climate change,  it seemed to us food security was a
primary  issue.  Food  security  has  local,  national,  and  international
dimensions.  Furthermore,  the  dynamics  of food security  are probably  the
central  concern.
Furthermore, society is concerned about the production and consumption  of
food and the economics of that system.  Whether an area is a food-producing
area or not, food consumption is a major economic activity.  Climate change
has the  potential  for affecting  food  consumption  in ways  that  may  be  as
important  from an economic perspective  as its impact on food production.
A third societal issue is that of investment in agricultural infrastructures.  Our
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aspect of the issue of agricultural infrastructures.  We need to think about the
implications  for public and private investment in the infrastructure.
In our review, we looked at 19 empirical studies.  We looked at  17 different
characteristics.  I won't try to talk about them all here.  But they fit fairly
neatly into three categories.  The first relates to the source  of the climate
change  and how the  climate  change process  was being  modeled.  Harking
back  to some  of Norm's  comments,  almost  all were  generated  by  Global
Circulation Models.  That was the underlying  source  of the climate change
projections.
Probably most troubling to me were  two things:  one was the instantaneous
change approach used in some studies -- that all of a sudden we wake up and
the climate is different, nothing else is different, but the climate  is different.
From a societal  or from a policy maker's viewpoint, I think it is very hard to
understand  such a situation.  I don't mean understand  it in the intellectual
sense, but in the sense of what to do in  a bureaucratic  and political  sense.
That's  a very nebulous kind of information.
Probably  of more  concern, or at least as much  concern, is the very limited
analysis of the uncertainty  associated with the climate change process.  Every
one  of the reports goes  into great length talking about the uncertainties  of
climate change.  But when it comes time to do the modeling, they essentially
ignore uncertainty.  The analysis rarely goes beyond a little sensitivity analysis
--  typically rather  naive  and  not very  meaningful.  I  don't want  to be  too
critical  here.  I view the  methodologies  as evolving.  If I were doing these
studies I would probably have done the same thing over the last three to five
years.  Our criticism is directed toward how to conduct the next set of studies.
The  second  group  of  characteristics  we  looked  at  were  the  economic
modeling  issues.  The studies  did pretty nice jobs  in terms  of the  kinds  of
models  they  used  and  how  they  generated  coefficients.  They  did  what
reasonable  people  could  be  expected  to  do  given  the  small  amounts  of
resources  available  to do the studies.
That was  comforting  since  from  the viewpoint  of trying  to find  something
wrong,  we didn't  find  very  much.  But  what we  did find  was  what  Norm
referred to as the dumb farmer mentality.  Although I kind of object to that
characterization because I know, from growing up on an Iowa farm, that not
even the dumbest farmer would agree with the assumption that the climate
is going  to change  significantly but nothing  else will  change.  The reality  is
that if you're  concerned  about food  security,  climate  is  only  one  of many
things that will change  over the next half century.  One of the things that we
found  very  troubling  was  a  lack  of concern  about  other resources,  about
population  change,  or the  many  other  changes  that will  impinge  on  food63
security.  We should be looking at a world that is somewhat  more like  the
world that will actively exist in the middle of the next century.
The  third  set of things we  looked  at were  the  outcomes  that  the  analysts
attempted to quantify.  All  19 studies looked at agricultural production.  But
when  we  went  into  some  of  the  other  measures  such  as  environmental
impacts,  regional  shifts  in  production,  and  agricultural  profitability  and
employment,  we found  very  limited  coverage  and  sometimes  inconsistent
coverage.  I recall one  study that looked at environmental  impacts  using a
very micro-type focus -- modeling the impact on one hectare -- and then went
on  to  look  at  the  regional  economic  impacts  using  large  scale  regional
models.  It  may  be  not  too  bad  to  use  different  models  for  different
questions, but some of the assumptions  driving the two were not consistent.
The most important  deficiency, in our mind, was that food stocks were just
not talked  about  except  for one  USDA study that looked  at international
trade.  If food security is, in fact, what the policy maker is concerned about,
the possibility that the world may become  a very unpleasant place to live in
the  next  30-40 years  as  a  result  of  massive  levels  of  hunger  should  be
addressed.  But it was not addressed in the studies we reviewed.
We made three recommendations.  The first dealt with the geographic scope.
The studies that were done had tended to focus on the northern hemisphere
mid-latitudes to the exclusion,  or almost exclusion,  of Asia, Australia,  South
America,  Africa.  There's a whole lot of the world out there, that grows lots
of food, that was not analyzed.  Recommendation  2 dealt with non-climatic
demand  and  supply  factors.  Even  if  one  is  studying  Saskatchewan  the
investigator  ought to ask how the changes there relate to changes in the rest
of the world.  There is a rest of the world out there and a global marketing
system  is what ties it all together.  We can't predict what the world is going
to be like 40 years from now.  I'm not suggesting  that.  But I am suggesting
that  one  might  consider  how population  changes,  irrigation  development,
land use changes, and other important supply and demand factors will modify
the climate change  effects.
A third recommendation  then was  to shift our impact modeling  in order  to
make the results more useful as decision support systems rather than models.
I have in mind decision support  systems that can be used  in an interactive
manner.
In summary, there have  been a lot of good technical  analyses  done and we
have  done  a reasonably  good job  of answering  the wrong question!  When
you read the studies -- particularly the summaries of the studies -- the authors
then go to great detail to tell you why these results probably will not hold -
- that things aren't going to happen this way.  That is troubling.  It goes back
to not asking the right question when the analyses were  designed.64
The good  news,  I think,  is  that in the  discussion we  had at OECD two  or
three  months  ago  (that  Pierre  was  a  part  of),  we're  seeing  some  of  the
modeling emphasis starting to change.  Some work is now starting to look at
transient  climate  change  and the  process  by which  climate  change  can be
incorporated into social and  economic models.
One thing I would like to mention because I heard it at OECD two week ago
and again this morning is that the climate change is the problem.  Therefore,
we need to solve it, and let's not worry too much about modeling social  and
economic  interactions  because  they  will  be  huge  --  whatever  they  are.
Therefore, let's just worry about reducing emissions.  All we need to do is cut
back  on CO2 and  the rich  developed  nations  will  do  what  they  should be
doing anyway  --  not using as much fossil fuels --  and they'll adjust their life
styles.  I think we need to think more carefully about a scenario in which that
does not happen.  The rich countries,  even if there  are reductions  in CO2,
will fight to maintain their lifestyles and will do that in ways that may not be
very  socially  desirable.  If the  cost  of  cutting  emissions  is  increasing  the
likelihood of World War III, do we want to pay that cost?  I think those are
the kinds of issues that policy makers have to deal with.  And those massive
dislocations in the near term aren't just simple economic issues.  They're very
complex political,  social,  and  economic  issues that we  don't know  how  to
even think about intelligently.
Let me turn back  to the implications  of the studies I have reviewed.  If you
look at the studies critically and just ask, "What are they saying in terms of
impact?"  The  answer  almost  unanimously  is  climate  change  on  the
magnitude  expected over the next 50 years is not a problem for agriculture.
It  is just  not a  problem  for  production  agriculture.  I  disagree  with  that
conclusion, not because of the way the studies were done, but because I don't
think they're  asking the relevant questions.
Ruttan  I take it that there  are two  dimensions  to the transition problem.  One is
instability.  The second is the fact that it's dynamic in the sense of you're not
moving to an equilibrium.  Rather,  you  are moving  toward  an equilibrium
that may itself be very unstable.
Sonka  There  are  two  dimensions.  One  is  that  of heightened  instability.  There
seems  to be  a consensus  that global warming  will result in greater  climatic
instability.  Instability  is hard  on agricultural  institutions.  The  marketing
system,  the credit system, and the government  institutions just don't handle
instability very well.
Waggoner  Do  you  mean  variability  from  year  to  year,  is  that  what  you  mean  by
instability?
Sonka  Yes.65
Rawlins  But that's never incorporated  into the  scenarios.
Sonka  You mentioned a second aspect of the dynamics.  Realistically we don't know
what the equilibrium is toward which we are making a transition.  The people
involved  in policy are going to be making decisions, not about transition to
equilibrium,  but about the  direction of change.
Rosenberg  Even on the  subject of equilibrium, there's no reason to assume that it will
stabilize  at the CO2 equivalent doubling or at any other particular  level.
Chen  You  alluded  to  the  fact  that some  of the  19 studies were  very limited  in
resources.  Do you have a sense of the order of magnitude, in money or man
years,  spent  in those  climate  impact  studies?  Did  it include  the  Climate
Impact Assessment Program (CIAP) study, which is probably the largest, that
was conducted  in connection with the  SST  (Supersonic  Transport)  debate?
Sonka  No, it did not include  CIAP.
Chen  Do you have  a sense of the order of magnitude  of the rest of the studies?
I  know  how  much  was  spent  on  Martin  Parry's  study  at  IIASA  (the
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis) because I helped set it
up.  In two and one-half years, they spent a total of probably $250,000 -- not
including  some  of the  contributed  time  of the individual  researchers  and
individual members of the project.  The money that went into it was trivial
in comparison to the amount spent on some of the big international meetings
that have  been held in the last year or two.
Sonka  I  was  going  to  say  that  if  a  million  dollars  was  spent  on  the  studies  I
reviewed,  I would be amazed.
Rosenberg  I would think that EPA surely spent half a million for their studies.
Waggoner  But you're  considering  only the agricultural  impact studies?
Sonka  And only the social  and economic impacts  on agriculture.
Chen  It just makes a point that I'll try to make again later.  Very little has actually
been done in terms of real in-depth research.  This leaves a lot of room for
hand waving so that people  can say "Oh, there  are huge  negative  impacts."
And  you  turn  around  and  someone  else  is  saying,  "Oh,  the  benefits  are
wonderful."  This just reflects the vacuum  of in-depth studies that go much
beyond the  "back-of-the-envelope"  types of analysis.66
Ruttan  How would you  characterize  the level  of resources  that have  gone into the
physical  studies  as  compared  to  the  studies  that  deal  with  social  and
economic  impacts?
Chen  Several order of magnitude in difference.  It depends on where you draw the
line.  But even if you look only at climate models, the resources  have been
large.  I was just at a meeting where Bob Dickinson (of the National Center
for Atmospheric Research)  was saying, "There are only 40 people who really
know the models.  We don't have many resources and we don't have our own
Cray to run our models."  But you're still talking tens of millions of dollars
per year.  And that's just the climate models.  I think there's easily several
orders of magnitude  difference.  If you  look at the global  change research
budget that the administration talks  about, it is in the $500 million range.
Rosenberg  Bob raised a very interesting point about the complexity of nature.  He said
that sunshine and other factors need to be considered.  Most of the models
used  for  impact  studies  have  not  considered  enough  of  these  factors.
Generally temperature is increased,  say three degrees and stays that way day
and night, day after day, week after week.  But climate change involves more
than temperature.  For example, less precipitation means fewer clouds; fewer
clouds mean more sunshine; the humidity of the air changes,  the windiness
changes.  The  GCM's  do  not  provide  reliable  information  about  these
phenomena.
I want to point out part of the reason for an apparent "putdown" of impacts
research.  Many  impacts  studies  have  not  made  good  use  of  available
scientific  knowledge.  For  example,  in the  early  impact  studies,  modelers
equated  evapotranspiration  with  a change in temperature.  If temperature
goes up, evapotranspiration goes up.  This is correct, of course, unless other
factors  such  as sunshine,  windiness,  and humidity also  change.  Plants will
either be bigger  or smaller,  depending on what the climate  change does  to
them.  The  effect of CO2 on stomatal  regulation  must  also be considered.
When all of these factors are considered  a much broader range  of possible
evapotranspiration outcomes becomes evident.  We are trying to incorporate
knowledge of these phenomena in the impact  studies that we're now doing.
Ruttan  I  have  a sense that both economic  modeling  and  physical  modeling  suffer
from  a  common  problem.  The  problem  that  strikes  me  often  in  our
computable general  equilibrium  models  is that they're very  resistent to the
introduction  of  new  knowledge.  This  partly  because  of  mathematical
convenience  and partly because  the modelers  don't know that much about
what new knowledge  is available.  I get a sense when I hear people talking
about the physical  modeling that you have some  of those same problems  --
that we have  a lot more micro  information than we're able  to incorporate
in the models.67
Rosenberg  Yes.  I  think  that's  a problem  but one  that  time  and  patience  can  help.
When  studies  are  commissioned  in a hurry,  say,  to  meet  a  Congressional
mandate, models must be taken off the shelf because there  is no time to do
anything else.  But we have good information on the CO2 direct effects and
a  rich  agrometeorological  literature  is  available  to  people  who  want  to
construct  better  models.  The  permutations  can  reach  six  orders  of
magnitude.  The trick is to  select a limited range  of plausible  changes.
LOCAL AND REGIONAL RESOURCE AND  ENVIRONMENTAL  CHANGES
Environmental  Change in Eastern  Europe
Ruttan  I  now  turn  to  Zbignew  Bochniarz.  Zbig  has  been  concerned  about
environmental  policy in Eastern Europe and the USSR, a part of the world
where there are rather severe environmental  changes  underway.
Bochniarz  I speak about environmental change in Eastern Europe and the USSR from
the perspective  of an economist.  This is not always  easy for me, because I
grew  up  as  an economist  within  the "monoculture"  of a Marxist  economy
that  has  not  dealt  well  with  such  issues  as  economic  efficiency  or  the
environment.  There  are a lot  of common misunderstandings  when talking
about  socialist  countries.  Sometimes  these  countries  are  described  as
planned  economies.  However,  the  evidence  based  on  plan  fulfillment
contradicts  this  common  assumption.  It is  really true that they have  plans
and they spend  a lot of time  on planning  activities, but if you consider  the
implementation of plans  and usually their poor fulfillment, you might better
call them planning than planned  economies.
In one aspect at least,  these plans were very successful.  That is  in reaching
the  level of industrialization  of the Western  developed market  economies.
Unfortunately, this is not the level of industrialization as measured by wealth,
but  rather,  by pollution.  In  terms  of pollution  per  capital,  they  are  the
leaders among the developed countries.  Let me give some  examples.
According to a recent study by the Battelle Institute, 4 energy related carbon
emissions  from  Eastern  Europe  and  the  USSR  (called  also  CMEA  or
COMECON  countries) reached 26 percent of the global emissions in  1988.
The contribution of the OECD countries was about 49 percent.  What is very
interesting is the change of shares of these two blocks.  Thirty-five years ago
the planning economies contributed only 18 percent while OECD accounted
for  71  percent.  After  the  "oil  shock"  the  share  of  the  OECD  countries
dropped to about 57 percent, but the share of the CMEA countries rose to
4To be  completed.68
24  percent.  In  other  words,  the  data  shows  a  growing  contribution  of
COMECON to global warming.
What  are  the  major  reasons  for such  developments?  I would  divide  all
reasons into two groups:  objective and subjective (or man-made).  In the first
group  I should  specify two major factors  contributing  to growing  emissions
of carbon.  The first  is the natural  resource  base.  Most  of these  countries
based  their  industries  on  coal  (hard,  soft  or  lignite),  which  they  have
relatively  a lot, but which is less efficient than oil.  The second is the spatial
structure of the majority of the CMEA economies, which usually requires  a
long distance  transport of energy sources for industrial activities.
The second and even more important reason is related to the Stalinist model
of industrialization  with  its  priority  on  heavy  industry.  There  has  been
underpricing  of natural resources,  energy, and capital goods as well as a lack
of real incentives for economic  efficiency both at the macro microeconomic
levels.
One of the results of the Stalinist model is inefficient energy production and
consumption.  According to the Warsaw University  study  (Krawczyk  1987)
the CMEA energy intensity per GDP is presently  2.7  times higher  than  in
Western Europe.  In terms of particulate matter pollution (dust and fly ash),
the average pollution per $1000  of GDP was, for East European countries,
12.7 times that in the EEC countries.  Some  cynics in Eastern Europe asked
why should we be concerned  about  global warming  since we are increasing
the dust and this way decreasing sunshine!
In terms of SO2 (sulfur  dioxide)  and NOx (nitrogen oxides), the difference
between Eastern  and Western Europe is  not as dramatic.  But it is still 2.5
times higher per $1000  of GDP in Eastern Europe.
The pollution problems are not just a function of industrialization, but most
importantly, the very wasteful economic  system which was established there
along  with the  authoritarian  political system imposed  after World  War II.
This path of development  has resulted in three types  of crises  --  ecological,
economic, and political.  All of them need to be solved in order to put these
countries  on a path of sustainable development.
Let me present some data illustrating the seriousness of ecological crises.  In
Poland we have officially recognized 27 areas called areas of high ecological
risk (environmental hazard) inhabited by about 35 percent of the population.
Five of them are classified  officially as areas of ecological  disaster.  Due to
pollution and degradation of the environment, morbidity, and mortality rates
are significantly higher in these regions than in the rest of the country (in the
case  of respiratory  diseases  and lung  cancer  about 30 percent  higher).  In
addition to  these  areas  we  have  about  50  cities  that  are  environmentally
substandard.  These  include  about  50  percent  of  the  Polish  population.69
Fortunately, we have in Poland quite good environmental  statistics with full
access for everyone.  This is not the case of the most CMEA countries, where
either statistics  are poor (Rumania)  or the environmental  data  is  classified
(East  Germany).  According  to  dissident  sources  in  East  Germany  and
Czechoslovakia, the share of population living in environmentally  hazardous
(substandard)  areas  is about  60-70  percent.  In the  European  part  of the
Soviet Union it is about 50 percent.  When interpreting this data, one should
keep in mind that the environmental  standards are not, in general, as strict
in Eastern Europe  as in Western Europe, USA, or Japan.
There  is  a  clear  interaction  or  feedback  among  several  environmental
problems.  One  of them is  acid  rain,  or more  appropriately,  acidification.
This is closely related to energy policy and strategies of industrialization  and
hence, with global warming.  Despite the fact that there  are several  schools
of thought about the metabolism  of forest decline (at least  six according  to
the World Resources Institute), none  of the top experts neglects  the impact
of air pollution  and  acid rain on this phenomenon.  This  is  a very serious
issue in North and Central Europe, in the eastern part of North America, and
is currently emerging in the southern part of China.
In general, acid rain is associated with emissions of SO2 and NOx  (sulfur and
nitrogen  oxides), is a part of a larger problem of acidification.  Acid rain is
only  one  of  its  major  manifestations.  Acidic  compounds  can  also  be
deposited in snow, fog and dew.  They can also fall as dry particulates.  The
dry deposition usually takes place nearby the emission sources.  Despite the
fact that this phenomenon is not recognized as a global problem, the results
of these  emissions  can  occur  up  to  a  few  thousand  kilometers  from  the
emission sources (wet deposition).  According the WRI about two-thirds  of
total atmospheric  acidity is due to sulfur, and about one-third to nitrogen.
Acid  deposition in streams  and  lakes  and  in soil  and  forest,  as well  as  in
buildings  and technical infrastructure,  causes serious damages to ecosystem,
national economies, and human health.  Agriculture, fishery, and forestry are
among the first victims of acid deposition.  Corrosion of metal structures and
the dissolution of buildings and historical monuments are other examples of
the effects of acidification.  Let me give some data related to forest damage
from a recent study of the UN Economic Commission for Europe.  About 35
percent  of the  European  forest  area  has  been  damaged.  Estimates  for
individual  countries  are:  Czechoslovakia  (71  percent);  Greece  and United
Kingdom  (64  percent);  West  Germany  and  Estonia  (USSR)  (52 percent);
Norway, Denmark, Poland, Netherlands  (50-48 percent).
Lake  acidification  is also very  serious.  According  to the UN Report there
are  growing  numbers  of  strongly  acidified  lakes  --  in  Canada,  Sweden,
Finland,  and  USA.  In  Norway,  fish  were  depleted  completely  on  about
13,000  square kilometers.70
About 70-80 percent of Central and North European farmland is significantly
affected by acidification.  A meaningful increase in average  soil acidification
over the last 20-30 years was noted between 0.8-1.5  pH in this  region.  Soil
acidification  has  had  serious  consequences.  It  has  caused  crop  yields  to
decline in heavily affected  areas.  An even more serious effect is the release
of heavy metals  deposited  in soil  due to its acidification.  Released  in this
way heavy metals  such as lead, cadmium,  or mercury  are  moving either to
plants  or to groundwater  and  in this way  they  are  coming into the  human
food chain.
Soil and water acidification  depends  on its buffering  capacity.  It is in turn
related  to the  composition  of bedrock  and  surrounding vegetation,  forest-
soil,  hydrology,  and  land use.  In  Central  Europe the buffering  capacity  is
much higher than in Scandinavian countries.  For that reason they are more
vulnerable  to  acidification  than  Central  European  countries.  In  order to
increase buffering capacity and to decrease  acidification in lakes, forest and
soil  several  technologies  have  been  implemented.  The  most  popular  is
liming.  This is, however,  a very costly technology.  In the case of Poland, it
costs about $5  million per year.
More and  more visible deterioration  of the environment,  as well  as health
effects of pollution, has led to the emergence  of independent  environmental
organizations  in  Eastern  Europe  and  in  the  USSR  since  the  early  1980s.
They  are bringing environmental  issues to the public, lobbying for effective
environmental  protection policies and educating  their societies.  The oldest
organization in the CMEA  is  the  Polish Ecological  Club, which  I  had  the
honor  to  represent  at  the  United  Nations  annual  conference  of  Non-
governmental  Organizations  on Sustainable  Development  last September.
An interesting  question  was  asked during  this conference:  how would you
rank global warming  among the  major environmental  threats?  Only a few
representatives from developing countries, including Eastern Europe, ranked
it first.  It is not viewed  as a major issue in that region despite the fact that
the fact that the scientific committees are very concerned.  In these countries
problems  such  as  acid  rain,  water  and  air  pollution,  and  other  local
environmental  issues are of more concern.
The dramatic political changes going on this year throughout Eastern Europe,
together with deteriorating  economies, has produced a complete  distrust of
any kind of planning.  There is somewhat of an overreaction to past failures
and the  emergence  of belief that  only the  market  can  save  us  --  that the
market is good for everything.  I do not share this opinion.  It is obvious that
we  do not  need  the  kind of planning we  inherited  from the Soviet  Union.
We  need  to  rely  on market  as a  principal form  of regulation  of national
economy.  It will change  the behavior of the principal actors in the market.
However, I believe that we cannot leave environmental policy entirely to the
market.  We  need  state  regulations  --  environmental  standards  and  strict71
enforcement  systems.  We  also  need  a  kind  of  indicative  environment
planning in the area of market failure.
We  also  need  new  institutions  to  respond  to  the  global  environmental
challenge.  East European countries are far behind, in comparison, with their
Western counterparts in sound institutional design for the environment.  For
this  reason,  last  September,  I  organized  (in  Poland)  an  international
workshop  on  market  mechanisms  for  environmental  protection.  It  was
attended by representatives from most East European countries as well as by
top experts from the U.S. and Japan.  We prepared policy recommendations
on how to use  market-based  incentives  to protect  the environment  and to
promote  sustainable development.  There is, however, a basic precondition
for this instrument. They cannot propose solutions in emission trading within
a "bubble".  We are considering introduction of about  100 bubbles in Poland
over the next couple of years.  Similar approaches are  discussed now in the
Baltic  Republics of the  USSR.
Research  in Eastern  Europe  is  mostly focused  on the  scientific  aspects  of
global warming.  The social sciences  are still far behind.  I will organize  an
international  workshop  in  Poland  on  institutional  design  for  the  global
environmental challenge next fall.  This workshop will bring together leading
environmentalists  from both the  East and West.  So far there are about  20
people working  on this project.
We in Eastern Europe  need  more  collaborative  research  with the West  to
improve  our technologies,  especially  in the energy industry.  We would like
to reach  the Japanese  or Swedish  standards  of energy  efficiency.  Opening
the economies of Eastern Europe has created new conditions for technology
transfer, joint ventures and even direct investment.  It should help to change
the structure of our economies.  There is an urgent need of collaboration in
institutional  design  on a  country  as  well  as  a regional  or European  level.
There  is  a lot  of transboundary  pollution.  The  solutions will require  new
transnational institutions.  The role of planetary economy in global warming
and ozone depletion should make us more aware  of the need for successful
collaboration.  These  global  problems  cannot  be  resolved  without
involvement of Eastern Europe  and the USSR.  It is in our joint interest to
develop that kind of effective  collaboration.
Ruttan  Are there questions for Zbig?  It seems to me that it may be realistic to view
the eastern European experience as a model for what we are likely to see in
many parts of the developing world  over the next decade.
Bochniarz  If you value industrialization over the environment, you end up where we are
now.  This  is the point I tried to make  at the United Nations  conference.
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Bochniarz  We are just beginning.  We organized a conference and after the conference
we sent  recommendations  to the government.  Now there is a government
team  working  on it  in  Poland.  Probably  next year we  will  have  the  first
simple bubbles.  We are also thinking about expansion of the bubble concept.
In  the  Baltic  Republics  of  Estonia,  Lithuania  and  Latvia,  there  is  also
movement  in that direction.  The people  who established  the first bubbles
in the U.S. are involved.
Rawlins  What  is the bubble  concept?  I'm not familiar with that term.
Bochniarz  The bubble concept is one of the forms of emission trading.  The EPA sets
an ambient standard for a certain area as a ceiling.  This area creates in such
a way a kind of bubble.  All polluters within this area (under "bubble")  have
to  meet  the  standard  cutting  their  emissions.  For  some  of  them  this
reduction  of  emissions  is  cheaper  than  for  others.  They  can  also reduce
emissions  more  than required  by the  standard.  In this way they  can  earn
"emission credits," which in turn they can sell on the market or save for their
own future needs.  In order to use this concept, we in Eastern Europe must
first  introduce  and  respect  ambient  standards  and  appropriate  individual
emission permits.  On this base we can further develop  emission trading.
Crosson  Are levels of air pollution in some parts of Poland  now having measurable
effects  on public health?
Bochniarz  In the southern  parts  of Poland  measurable  effects  on public  health  were
observed.  These include higher rates of respiratory diseases, lead poisoning,
lung cancer,  circulatory  diseases, miscarriages,  infant mortality,  and others.
Crosson  Is  there  any  evidence  of  the  effects  on  economic  productivity  in  these
countries?
Bochniarz  There  are  several  estimates.  In general  the most conservative  estimate  is
that we are losing about 10 percent of our GDP per year from pollution and
environmental degradation.  Some studies suggest as high as 20 percent.  But
the most conservative and documented  losses were about  10 percent.
Ruttan  What  about simply a measure like number of lost days of work per year?
Bochniarz  We made  some estimates  in the middle of the  1980s.  Compared  with the
1970s,  air pollution and  absence  from work  caused by respiratory  diseases
increased  two-fold in  the  1980s.  For  this  reason, we  concluded  that there
was a strong relationship between those  two phenomena.  In real terms, we
expressed  those losses  as 28,561,000  days  or 188,503,000  working hours lost
due to respiratory diseases  caused by pollution.  That  amounts to 4.7  days
per person employed in state enterprises.73
Sonka  If significant  moneys  come  from western  Europe  for  investments  in  East
Germany  and  Poland,  for  example,  will  the  investment  and  associated
economic  activity  increase  the pollution  or will  the  efficiency  of the  new
plants offset the effect of  increased  economic  activity?
Bochniarz  A very good question!  First, you probably remember that during last spring
we conducted Roundtable talks between the opposition led by Solidarity and
the Government.  One of the small tables organized  at the Roundtable was
devoted to environmental problems.  Both sides reached an agreement in all
but one problem  --  nuclear  energy  --  which  is very promising.  Both sides
agreed  to  utilize  a  concept  of  sustainable  development  (in  Polish  eco-
development))  as the concept for harmonizing environmental and economic
goals.  This agreement stressed  the need to increase  dramatically economic
efficiency  as  a  way  of  reducing  pollution  as  well  as  to  achieve  better
utilization  of natural resources.  The marketization  of the  Polish economy
will  help  to  achieve  this  restructuring  which  will  lead  to  closing  many
inefficient  and polluting plants.  Since  the beginning of the  1980s  we have
closed several plants due, first of all, to a new independent (for the first time
in Eastern Europe) Polish Ecological Club and a very militant environmental
movement.  The best known case was closing the country's largest aluminum
plant in Skawina, which contributed about 50 percent of the total production.
In reference  to the topic of our consultations,  I would like to mention that
the Club also prepared  a concept  of "Ecological Agriculture"  --  an  organic
farm belt in the buffer zone for the National Parks in  1983.  Since that time
the  second  independent  environmental  organization  was  established  in
Hungary  (Danube  Circle,  1984).  Since  the  Chernobyl  disaster  and
proclamation  of  Gorbachev's  "glasnost",  environmental  organizations  are
mushrooming around  the USSR and Central Europe.
Ruttan  From a historical perspective, we are now in the third wave of environmental
concern since World War II.  The first wave was very much a concern about
materials  adequacy.  You will recall  the President's  Water  Resources  and
Materials  Resources  reports.  The  scarcity  issue was  largely resolved  by  a
technological response.  The second wave of concern the -- the environmental
crisis of about 20 years ago -- was largely about micro environmental spillover
effects.  The  prescription  that  came  out  of  that  was  to  internalize
externalities.  It was so cheap to pour residuals into the environment that we
used up whatever cheap  space was  available.  In this third wave  things are
much more transnational.  It's probably more transnational in the parts of the
world  where  countries  are  small  than  where  countries  are  large.  But  I
haven't  seen much  discussion  of the  institutional  innovations  that will  be
required  to deal with these transnational issues.  For any one national unit,
except  perhaps  the  very  largest  and  even  perhaps  for  them,  there  will
continue  to be a tremendous temptation to free ride.  I don't see very much
discussion  about how to design the international  regimes  that are going  to
have to be put in place to achieve  some compatibility between national and
global interests.74
Temperate Region  Soil  Erosion
Ruttan  Unless there's another burning question for Zbig, I think we'll turn to Pierre
Crosson for a discussion of the soil erosion issue.
Crosson  When  we  start  thinking  about  the  erosion  problem,  it's  essential  that  we
make  a  distinction  between  the  problem  in  the  United  States  and  the
problems in the developing  countries.  We now know quite  a bit about how
much  erosion is  occurring  in the  United  States, particularly  sheet  and  rill
erosion.  The estimates for wind erosion are less secure.  We now have three
different  sets  of estimates  of the  long-term  yield  effects  of sheet and  rill
erosion.  Despite what  we have  often  read  in the literature  on erosion,  it
wasn't until  1977 that we had any reasonably reliable estimates of how much
erosion was actually occurring on non-federal land in the United States.  In
1982, a second set of more comprehensive  estimates,  obtained from a much
broader sampling base, became  available.  Those two surveys, made in 1977
and 1982, constitute the base of data that people in the United States use in
assessing how much erosion is occurring and its productive  effects.
There are three studies of the productivity effects.  One was done by a set of
soil scientists here in the University of Minnesota under the direction of Bill
Larson  (Pierce,  Dowdy,  Larson  and  Graham  1984).  They  developed  a
Productivity Index model (the PI model) which looks at the effects of erosion
on  certain  critical  characteristics  of  a  soil.  As  erosion  occurs,  those
characteristics which  are most critical  to crop yields tend to be changed  on
most  soils in ways  that  are  adverse  to yield.  When  it's run over  various
periods  of time, typically 50 and  a hundred years,  the model shows that on
some  98 million acres  of cropland in the corn  belt where average  rates  of
erosion are in the neighborhood of nine tons per acre per year (which is well
in excess of what the SCS says is the maximum tolerable  amount), that  100
years  of erosion at present rates would  reduce yields by about 4 percent.
Another major study in this area was the EPIC model developed by USDA
people  at  ARS,  and  by economists  at  the  USDA soils  facility  at  Temple,
Texas (Crosson  1986).  EPIC has been run for crop producing  areas across
the  entire  country, not just  the midwest.  The  EPIC  results  show  that,  at
current rates  of erosion, at  the end  of 100  years  cropland  yields  would  be
about 3 percent less than they otherwise would be.
The third study was done at RFF (Crosson and Rosenberg  1989).  It was an
entirely different  approach.  We did a regression analysis of the relationship
between intercounty differences  in crop yields (the dependent variable) and
erosion, topsoil depth, and number of other independent variables for several
hundred  counties  in the corn belt and the northern plains.  We found  that75
there was  no  statistically  significant effect  of erosion on wheat  yields,  that
corn yields would be reduced about 5 percent, and that soybean yields would
be reduced  10 percent over a 100-year-period.
The significant thing to me about these three studies  is although they come
at the issue in quite different ways, they all show that the hundred year effect
of present rates of cropland erosion on crop yields is small -- on the order of,
say, 3  to  10 percent.  That's very small compared to the expected impact of
technological change  on yields  over the next hundred years.  Production or
productivity  losses on that order would, in effect, be lost in the noise.
Ruttan  It would be equivalent to about three years of normal productivity growth?
Crosson  Yes.  Now,  I have made some estimates taking the work that I did  and also
some work that USDA people  did with EPIC at Temple and estimated the
economic  costs of long-term  loss  of crop yields in the U.S.  The  effects, as
you might  expect, are very  small.
As far as the United States is concerned, the long-term effects of soil erosion,
at present rates, on the capacity  to produce agricultural  output is  trivial.  A
much  more  significant  erosion-related  problem  is the  off-site,  or  off-farm
damages.  These include the effects on water quality, particularly of sediment
after  it  leaves farmers'  fields.  These  turn  out  to  be at least  an  order  of
magnitude  greater than the economic costs of lost productivity.  In research
on erosion in the United States, there ought to be much more attention being
given to water quality issues relative  to the amount of attention being given
to productivity issues.
It is not surprising  that the on-farm damages  should be much less than the
off-site  damages.  Vern  made  some  reference  a  little  while  ago  to  the
externalization  of costs.  The loss of soil productivity is an internal cost  for
farmers.  The  farmer  bears  that  cost,  and  therefore  has  incentive  to  do
something  about  it where  it  significantly  affects  either  his  income  or  the
present value of his land.  He has no such incentive to deal with the off-site
damages.  Those are external  as far as he is  concerned.  They are internal,
of course, to the total society.  And the fact that those external damages are
almost  surely greater  than is  socially optimal is a reflection  of institutional
failure.
I earlier  distinguished  between  the erosion  problem in the U.S. and  in the
developing countries.  The contrast in our knowledge is startling.  Despite the
fact  that we  read  statements  about how  much erosion  is  occurring  in the
developing countries and what the productivity consequences  are, the fact is
that nobody really knows.  A recent article in the Journal of Soil and Water
Conservation  (Colacicco,  Osborne,  and  Alt  1989)  by  one  of  the  leading
people in this area, emphasized that we really don't have a clear idea of even76
how much erosion is  occurring  in developing  countries, let alone  what  the
productivity consequences  might be.
There  has also been some recent  work at the World Bank which  carefully
examines this twin issue of on-site productivity losses attributable to erosion
and the off-site damages in Indonesia.  The results are preliminary.  But they
suggest that the on-site  costs are, in fact, higher  than the off-site  costs.  It
seems to me that much more of this kind of research  is needed in places all
around the world where there is reason to believe that erosion is a significant
problem.  There  are areas  in the Himalayas,  in the mountainous  parts  of
Latin  America,  and  in  East  Africa  where  there  is  a  lot  of  anecdotal
information  suggesting  that,  not  only  is  erosion  high,  but  that  it  may  be
having  long-term  consequences  for productivity.  I'm not arguing  that the
situation in the United States is typical of what is happening elsewhere in the
world.  The point  I'm making  is that we  don't know  enough about what's
happening elsewhere in the world with respect to soil erosion to be able to
make well grounded statements  about the importance  of the problem, and
what we ought to do about it.  My own hunch is that, when such studies  are
finally done, they likely will show that, in most areas, the off-site damages  are
likely to be higher than those  on-site  damages.  It is important to  consider
that we need to know much more than we presently know about the erosion
problem in the developing  countries,  in order to be  able to  address issues
concerning  the  sustainability  and  enhancement  of agricultural  production
capacity.
There  was  a special  issue of Scientific  American  (Crosson  and  Rosenberg
1989)  in  September.  Norm  Rosenberg  and  I  had  an  article  suggesting
strategies for long-term agricultural  development.  The focus of that article
was on the emerging pressures on the natural resource base in response  to
rising demand  for food and  fiber over the  next several decades  -- well into
the  next century.  The  question we asked was  what  can  the community  of
people  that  are  concerned  do  in  order  to  accommodate  the increases  in
demand  and  relieve  the  pressures  on the  resource  base.  We  particularly
focused on land resources,  on water  resources, and on biological diversity.
We concluded that there will have to be a continuation of new technologies
which permit farmers  to respond  to rising  demand  for food  an fiber, in  a
manner that is consistent with environmental  and other social costs.  Some
of  the  institutions  are  now  in  place  for  developing  the  appropriate
technologies, and  are  relatively  well  established -- the national agricultural
research  institutions  and CGIAR system.  The more difficult  issue is  likely
to be  the development  of  the institutions  which would  correctly  signal the
emerging  stress  on  environmental  resources.  The  development  of  the
institutions needed to reflect the social scarcity  of those resources  would be
more difficult to develop, primarily because of the difficulties of establishing
property rights in water  and  in biological  diversity.  As a consequence,  we
concluded  that  the  institutional  challenge  or  the  challenge  to  develop77
appropriate  institutions, would be more difficult than meeting the challenge
of developing the appropriate  technologies.
I  was  also  impressed,  as  I  read  through  this  special  issue  of  Scientific
American,  how much weight was given in the other chapters  to the issue of
institutional design.  The design of institutions for managing our resources in
ways  that give proper weight  to the various social values  we place on those
resources, is  emerging as a key element in our thinking about development
processes and, in particular, about issues of sustainable development, not only
in agriculture, but also in the total economy.
Allen  Pierre,  each  time  I  go  to  Africa,  I  get  depressed  about  the  difficulty  of
bringing about the institutional changes needed to generate the appropriate
technology,  in  getting  that  technology  transferred  to  the  farmer,  and  in
creating  the right incentives.  I hope that maybe  my interpretation  of what
I'm seeing is totally off base.  I'm curious whether you gave any attention to
bringing  about the needed institutional  changes  in some of these countries
where population is growing at an explosive rate and the land resource base
is  degrading.
Crosson  My impression is that Africa is a worse case.  But there really has been some
rather  impressive progress  in other parts  of the developing  world.  As you
know, Africa emerged from colonialism later than these other areas.  There
was  systematic  discrimination  against  agriculture  pricing  policies,  in
investment  policies,  and in rural  education and infrastructure.
Ruttan  My  sense  is  that  it's  not  going  to  be  easy  to  generate  rapid  growth  in
agricultural  production  in  Africa.  In  the  European  and  Asian  cultural
systems, there is a sufficient similarity in property rights and family structure
to give us a good deal  of intuitive understanding  of how institutions  work.
My sense  is that, for  both  property  rights and  family  structure, which  are
closely related to each other, the system in much of Africa is so different that
it appears obscure to outsiders.  Furthermore,  the family structure was often
deliberately  obscured  by  the  local  people  during  the  period  of  colonial
development.
Rayner  Vern, if I can put my anthropological  hat on here, I would like  to disagree
with you.  It's not so much that the workings of the traditional African  land
tenure and kinship systems are obscured.  In the ethnographic literature, you
can find very good descriptions of them.  I think the problem is largely that
our institutional  arrangements  are not  directly  transferrable.  Nor  has  the
expertise on the working of those traditional land tenure and kinship systems
from the academic world of anthropologists been transferred to, or accepted
by,  the development  community.  Nowhere  is  this clearer  than in the land
tenure  issue.  Economists  have  gone  in  with  western  ethnocentric
assumptions,  such as:  "If you want to get people to plant trees you have to
give  them  tenure  of the land."  In some  of  those  systems  they  have  well78
developed  tenure  rights  to  the  standing  crops.  I  see  that  more  as  our
institutional failure.  It's not that the information doesn't exist in the West to
understand if there is a willingness to use it.  It's much more the dominance
of the Western  neoclassical  economics  that obscures  our understanding  of
institutional behavior.
Sanchez  Let's  backtrack  to  your  question,  Gene,  on  how  extensive  the  erosion
problems  are in the tropics.  Erosion is much more  severe in the semi-arid
regions,  the  areas where  the  land  is  bare  during  the  dry season  and  gets
torrential rains in the beginning  of the rainy season.  This includes most of
the  semi-arid  regions  of Africa  as  well as  some  highlands  areas.  Parts  of
Ecuador, in the Andes, are tumbling down visibly and grossly.  Erosion is less
of a problem where there is ground cover continuously  throughout the year,
as in much of the humid tropics.  That doesn't mean there's  no erosion.  But
it's certainly less of an issue.  We need to think in terms of having a ground
cover throughout the year.  It doesn't matter whether  it's weeds or tropical
forest.  It would make a difference  in erosion.
Rawlins  Pierre, have you looked at the positive impacts of sediment delivered to off-
site locations?  Many major river systems have very productive deltas that are
the  product  of  upland  erosion.  King,  in  his  book,  Farmers  for  Forty
Centuries,5 discusses  the  husbanding  of sediment  as a means  of enhancing
productivity  in  the  orient.  I  wonder  if  anyone  has  taken  a  systematic
approach to assessing the productivity of whole river basins and balanced the
decrease in productivity in eroding highland soils, where the climate may be
less desirable, with the increase in productivity in deltas  and river valleys.
Crosson  As  far as I know, it hasn't been done  on a river  basin  scale.  There was  a
little work done with the EPIC model to examine the effects of deposition on
productivity  on  different  types  of landscape.  They  found  that  it  makes
considerable  difference  when  you  take  deposition  into  account.  But  the
model simply  assumed  that increases  in  soil  depths because  of deposition
would  have had positive effects.  That is not necessarily correct if soil depth
is not limiting.  Bill Larson may  know more.
Larson  I have some comments.  I know about that study.  But let me first comment
on your  earlier  remarks.  The  3  to  10 percent  loss  in productivity  due  to
erosion just doesn't tell  the whole  story.  For about 25  percent  of the 400
million acres of cropland -- about a hundred million acres -- the losses would
be  on upwards  of  10  to  15 percent.  And  if you  take the  10  percent  most
erosive land, the losses would be in excess of 25 percent.  Now, it's that  10
percent that we have to concentrate  on.  If we lose 25  or more percent  of
productivity, that land's going to go  out of crop production.  And it should!
5To be completed.79
The conservation  reserve, and to some extent the cross  compliance,  should
be aimed at the land where sal losses are in the 10-15 percent  range.
While I agree with you that the NRI estimates of 1977 and 1982 are the very
best data on erosion we've ever had, they still leave a lot to be desired.  As
you know, the Universal Soil Loss Equation (USLE) gives us point estimates.
They don't take into account  the landscape  effect.  They don't take account
of deposition.  There's a lot of things that are not included.  They estimate
only sheet and rill  erosion, but not gully erosion.  There's also  a need for
more  careful  definition  of what  is  acceptable  or tolerable  and  what  isn't.
Much of what we accept is not much more  than folklore.  It's not based on
any real measurements.  It's  a committee  decision  that was  made 40 years
ago.  I was probably part of that committee.
Cross compliance is going to become a very big issue.  As you know, by 1991
or 1992, farmers who aren't complying with these acceptable limits, whatever
they are, won't be eligible for price support or deficiency payments.  A recent
study looked at the same farms that had been certified for compliance,  and
with little  or no change in practices,  the estimated amounts  of erosion are
far  different than had been predicted.  You  know, there's  something  odd
going on.  A lot of it depends on what goes into the soil loss equation.  A lot
of it depends on the erosion trends that we define as acceptable, and I don't
think we know.
I recently  reviewed a paper written by Harold Dregne  (YEAR???)  in which
he  tried to  review  all of what  he  considered  quantifiable  data  on erosion
from Africa.  And he only came up with 8 or 10 small studies.  Many of those
were for very limited physiographic  areas, so the conclusion must be that we
don't know.  You can go to Africa and you can see erosion everywhere, but
there's very little quantitative data.
Crosson  The numbers  I gave  on erosion induced productivity  losses in the U.S.  are
national average productivity losses.  They are meaningful numbers when the
question is how the  nation's  capacity  to produce  will be  affected  over  the
long-term by erosion.  I have  argued that the USDA programs really ought
to be focusing on areas where there's reason to believe those losses might be
high, but where  farmers may be not aware that over the long-term, they will
be  losing significant  amounts  of productivity.  Some  of the work  that you
(Larson) did indicates that the relationship between productivity loss and top
soil loss  is linear over a long stretch of top soil losses and then turns  down
sharply.  Farmers  are not likely  to know that.  They can be  moving  along
having  erosion  of 20  tons  per  acre  per  year,  and  suffering  little  or  no
productivity loss when, in fact, they may be nearing the edge of a cliff.  They
may have  no reason to know that they are  approaching  a threshold.  They
judge what the future might be by what their past experience  has been.  The
USDA would be well advised in its soil erosion productivity research  to be
focusing on those soils where it's believed that relationship  is non-linear.80
Chen  I  have  one  minor  point.  There  are  estimates  that  some  of the  flooding
problems in the lower Mississippi Delta are precisely because the erosion has
been reduced.  There is  a benefit  from sedimentation  in terms of keeping
existing deltas from suffering from local sea level rise.  Bill just related that
10  percent  of  the  land  suffers  from  a  25  percent  yield  decrease  due  to
erosion.  Is that 10 percent the  most productive  land or the most marginal
land?
Larson  The most marginal.
Chen  So in fact the proportional contribution to total agricultural production may
be a lot less than that?
Larson  Yes.  When you look  at a piece  of land in terms  of the  effect  of erosion,
you've  got to look at both its inherent productivity and the rate of damage.
The USDA has tended  to  only look at  the amount of erosion.  Some  very
deep soils can erode for a long time without much damage.  But it you have
only 20 inches  of soil over bedrock, you can't erode very long before you're
in trouble.  We've argued that you want to look at both of those things here
in Minnesota in our RIM program.  The USDA hasn't seen fit to follow our
lead.
Rawlins  We hope the new methodology being developed to replace the universal soil
loss equation (USLE) will not be used simply to calculate average annual soil
loss from erosion, and that the databases being put together to support it will
help  move  in  this  direction.  The  Water  Erosion  Prediction  Program6
(WEPP)  should  make  it  possible  to  make  risk  assessments,  taking  into
account weather  scenarios, soil and management factors at specific  sites.  If
WEPP is used simply to replace the USLE in calculating annual average soil
loss we will have failed  to achieve  our objective.
Clark  You've just indicated that, for the U.S., there are three different studies that
really give us a handle  on the  impacts of long-term  erosion on productivity.
Is there written down someplace what the minimal program,  in terms of time
and  resource  requirements,  would be  required  to get comparably  credible
estimates for a useful sampling of situations around the world?  I encounter
vast piles of material and new sets of equations coming out of FAO, UNEP,
and  even USDA.  I  have  been involved  in  extensive  efforts  to push  the
international geosphere/biosphere  program in the direction of incorporating,
a very large coordinated measurement  effort, directly relevant to the ability
of the world system to support people.  But I have yet  to see  an outline  of
the minimal requirements.  I believe that it is the sort of thing that the IGBP
program would  be  extremely  interested  in  having  because  they  are  being
6To be completed.81
beaten up all around the world for arguing self-indulgent pure science, with
no connection  to food security, agriculture,  human  health or anything  else.
They're  not willing  to leap  all the way  out into policy  research.  But  hard
physical  measurements guided  by theory is great.
Ruttan  Bill, what did it take to generate the data that you and Pierre used to analyze
the effects  of erosion on crop productivity?
Larson  To start with, it would  require a generalized  soil map of, say,  Africa along
with a topographic map and some kind of a weather data base.
Crosson  There  are two steps.  One  is the collection  of reasonably  accurate  erosion
data and the second  is  using those data in models  that tell you something
about the effects on productivity.  Those were both very expensive in the U.S.
I don't think it would have to be as expensive now.  With the EPIC model
the USDA can now cover  the entire  crop production  area of the country.
Ruttan  But doesn't that require  a lot of sites where you're actually collecting data?
Crosson  There were close  to  a million points in which data were  collected  in  1982.
The  1977 NRI was much less intensive --  about 300,000 data points, it came
to  essentially  the same  conclusions,  as  the much  larger  1982  study of the
productivity effects  of erosion.
Larson  Pierre, I think you could come up with a first approximation with much less
than  10,000  points.  But,  it  would  have  to  be  done  by  soil  scientists  or
engineers.  You would have to have the collaboration of someone who really
knew  the  soil  and  the  landscapes  in  the  country.  You  can't  do  it  in
Washington or St. Paul.  It could be done -- at a reasonable  cost, but with not
quite the accuracy of the U.S. analysis.
Clark  I would think that the one very specific notion I would like to see coming out
of this meeting,  is that there is an effort afoot for the global change  agendas
doing  a  next  generation  of soils  and  topographic  mapping,  and  climate
mapping  for the world,  with the wrong variables  to  be of any  use,  simply
because  the  input  from  the  soils  community  into  that  program  has  been
virtually zero.  A  small,  quick and  dirty working group  which would  flesh
out the proposal you just made would be very timely.  Half the countries of
the world are already flying under the sustainable development  banner.
Ruttan  What  about the big project at the University of Hawaii?  Doesn't it have  a
very large data base that  is relevant to this issue?
Sanchez  It's not  an erosion data base, it's a crops  simulation data base.  FAO has
done a map of soil degradation in Africa.  I personally think it's terrible, but
it may be quick and dirty enough for you and Bill.82
Larson  My experience  in Africa is limited, but erosion is everywhere.  You can see
it and recognize the seriousness  of the problem.  But it must be quantified
to get any credibility.  I do think that a program like Bill Clark was proposing
is needed.  We could  argue about the scale.  But some  precision is needed
to  give  it  credibility.  I  was  shocked  when  I  read  the  article  by  Harold
Dregne, who is a respected  soil scientist.  He could only come up with about
8  or  10  examples  of  reasonably  adequate  quantitative  measurements  of
erosion in all of Africa.
Bochniarz  We  have  been  told  many  times  that  the  U.S.  Soil  Conservation  Service
program could be used as a model for other countries.  What is your opinion,
Pierre  and  Bill,  about  the  U.S.  soil  conservation  program  in terms  of  its
impact  on  soil  erosion  and  soil  quality?  What  is  the  net  result  of  that
program?  Is it a model for other countries?  My second question is whether
there is adequate  data about desertification  in developing countries.  What
is the relationship between soil erosion and desertification?  To what extent
does  soil erosion contribute to desertification?
Larson  Let me respond to the question about the value of our research rather than
the SCS program.  A half a dozen different groups from different countries
have  tried  to  extend  and  use  our  Minnesota  model.  Actually, the  EPIC
model and the work at Temple  is even better.  So I think the answer to the
first question is that the research  could be  transferred.  I don't know much
about  the  desertification.  I  think that's  even  more  of a no-man's  land  in
terms  of reliable numbers.
Crosson  There  are  two  ways  of  looking  at  the  question,  whether  the  U.S.  Soil
Conservation Service could be a model.  As far as I know, there haven't been
any definitive estimates of how much difference the Soil Conservation Service
has  made  over  the  last  50  years  in  reducing  erosion  and  protecting  soil
productivity.  It can hardly be anything but positive, however.  There is less
erosion and less productivity  loss than you otherwise  would expect,  but the
question of net economic benefit is less clear.
But the second part of the response is that the effects could have been much
better.  That there has been a lot of waste  of Soil Conservation  effort, not
because  the  SCS was  indifferent  or wanted to do things that way, but they
were under constant Congressional pressure to put projects into areas where
there  was  no  significant  erosion  threat.  I  think  it  has  been  a  positive
difference,  but not nearly  as much  as it could have been.
Cheng  I wanted to share  a little observation that I made in the People's Republic
of China.  Even in the U.S., much of soil conservation policy is inconsistent
with  the economics  of farming.  For  many years,  there  was  a great  effort
going into reforestation to prevent soil erosion.  But during the last few years,
after the household incentive system was introduced, farmers suddenly found
that they don't have the time to continue the conservation practices.  Erosion83
problems  have  worsened.  China  had  been  conducting  a  nationwide  soil
survey  and  had  trained  people  down  to  the  township  level.  Tens  of
thousands of villagers and technicians were collecting soil samples and doing
analysis.  This was the Second General Soil Survey which began in  1983.  But
up to now, there  hasn't been a  single soil map generated  from those data.
And the data that were collected were not very useful for soil management.
It's too generalized.  So it's not going to be very easy, as Pedro pointed out,
to  get  a generalized  map  of Africa  or  a country  of comparable  size  like
China.  The effort in this country has taken many, many years.
Rawlins  I think we need  to follow up on Bill Clark's proposal.  The  databases are
being constructed  now.  Agriculture  needs  to have  an input  into the global
change  program to  answer some  of the  questions  being raised.  We  have
teams developing predictive technology for water and wind erosion composed
of  representatives  of  USDA  and  Interior  agencies.  These  teams  are
developing cooperative  agreements with groups in Brazil, Canada, Australia
and  Israel  to validate  these models  under  their conditions.  We would  be
more than happy to extend this network by cooperating with others to make
certain the appropriate data are collected to answer the important questions.
Herdt  I just want to make an observation on the discussion that we've been having
about  the  need  for  additional  research  or  information  gathering.
Governments  in  the  Third  World,  especially  in  Africa,  are  under  great
pressure.  I'm not sure how many of you saw  60 Minutes  last night.  A lot
of the shots were from Tanzania.  But the program started off with the news
that 40,000 children die every day in the Third World from a combination of
disease,  malnutrition,  lack  of  water,  and  so  many  other  things.  And
governments  in  the  Third  World  are  not  insensitive  to  disasters  of that
magnitude.  But  they are incapable  of addressing  it.  They're  incapable  of
preventing it.  That's just one illustration of the kinds of immediate pressures
that these governments  face.  Many of you have worked in the Third World
and you know that in every field  there are immediate  needs that push back
research,  especially  research  that has  a payoff in the far distant future.  In
soils-related  research,  there  is  a great  scarcity  of human  resources.  H.H.
mentioned  the  training  of  thousands  of people  in  China.  The  data was
collected, but you can't find  the results --  there has been no pay-off.
Ruttan  The number of developing countries with more than 50 people trained in the
agricultural sciences  is less than 25  countries.
Clark  But we also know that one of the surest ways  to increase that number  is to
build  training  into  an  apprenticeship  mode  around  solving  very  particular
problems that bridge the line between immediate relevance and basic science.
It is because this issue has a certain amount of substance to it, frankly much
more so than in many of the areas I see my natural science colleagues  trying
to cultivate  through  developing country collaboration,  that I push it a little
harder than I might otherwise.  It's irresponsible  to place demands  on that84
incredibly  scarce  resource  without  designing  the  effort  to  expanding  the
capacity to sustain the food resource base.
Tropical Region Soils Management
Ruttan  This morning we're going to continue with our discussion we began yesterday
afternoon on the micro-environmental  changes.  Our first presentation  is by
Pedro Sanchez.
Sanchez  I will switch gears a bit and talk about the humid tropics.  I want to focus  on
tropical deforestation  and possible  solutions.  One possibility of abatement
of  global  climate  change  is  to  reduce  tropical  deforestation.  A  lot  of
technology is sufficiently developed to be worthwhile testing.  This is an issue
that is not only related to global  change,  but also to other important issues
such as the preservation of biodiversity.  Reducing tropical deforestation  is
not only relevant  in terms of global  change,  but it's  also relevant  to many
other issues.  The  process  of deforestation  is very  complex.  Most of it is
population  and economics driven.  This  is illustrated in Figure 6.  The idea
here is to try to put together in one figure the causes and effects  of tropical
deforestation.
Herdt  You call this a Sanchezogram?
Sanchez  Horrendogram.  In the Third World,  the  driving forces,  shown on top, are
population  growth,  limited  fertility  and  land  tenure  inequities.  The
consequence  is  a landless rural population that is faced with three  choices.
One is to stagnate  in areas of high demographic  concentrations  such as the
Andean region, northeast Brazil, Java, and others.  A second is to migrate to
the urban centers.  In the case of Latin America, we have the dubious honor
of having  the  largest  cities  in the  world  already.  A third  alternative  is
migration into the humid tropics.  In the Andean highlands and in northeast
Brazil, agriculture  is being pushed into steeper and steeper areas, causing  a
lot  of erosion,  siltation  of reservoirs,  and  smaller  and  smaller  minifundia
every generation.  Those who migrate  burden the urban carrying  capacity.
This is  evident in the large cities in Latin America.  When I lived in Lima,
a city of six million people, half of them did not have  any sewage  services,
electricity or water.
The  ones  who  migrate  to  the  humid  tropics,  either  spontaneously  or
sponsored by government colonization projects, end up in a world that they
do not understand.  The peasant farmers  are not familiar with the shifting
cultivation systems used by the indigenous inhabitants.  They practice shifting
cultivation  in  a  non-sustainable  manner.  The  forest  fallow  periods  are
shortened  and the productivity  of the system declines.  In some  countries,
particularly  Brazil,  a  large  part  of  the  deforestation  is  caused  by  land
speculation.  Tax breaks and credit incentives  from the governments  induce85
large landowners or companies to clear land, partly for cattle production but
mainly for land speculation.  There are new laws now that are beginning to
slow things down.  In either case, the result is an unsustainable  agriculture
which results in economic  failure.  Most of the people who  migrate to the
cities thus exacerbating unemployment.  Traditional societies are disrupted.
The result is a cycle  of further deforestation, soil and land degradation, loss
in genetic diversity and an accelerated  greenhouse  effect.
What  can  be  done?  The  data  show  that  80  percent  of  the  tropical
deforestation  is  caused  by  non-traditional  shifting  cultivation  --  by  small
farmers  who clear  and burn a couple  of hectares  of land a year, mainly to
grow food.  The other 20 percent  is caused by land speculation, by logging,
by urban development, road construction and other unit works.  But the vast
majority of land clearing in the humid tropics is by small farms.  Are there
alternatives?  Many people believe that we can stop deforestation by making
it illegal  -- by outlawing shifting  cultivation.  Shifting cultivation  is illegal  in
many countries  -- in Indonesia, for example -- but that doesn't stop it.  Other
policies  include  producing  food  outside  the  humid  tropics  to  reduce  the
pressure on the humid tropics.  Consider, in Brazil, the now very productive
Cerrado  region  south  of the  Amazon.  Brazil  should  grow its  food  there
rather than in the Amazon.  But people are  still migrating  into the humid
tropics.  Sometimes migration is even supported by the government, as in the
transmigration programs in Indonesia.  Other people believe that you should
put a fence, so to speak,  around the tropical  forests, make  them into  huge
national parks, and not touch anything.  That is not realistic.  The national
parks  have to be defended.  It is  not possible  to stop people who want  to
clear forests to grow food.
Rawlins  But shifting cultivation does not leave the abandoned land in a permanently
cleared  state.  Don't the clearings  grow up to  forests when  the cultivators
leave?
Sanchez  Traditional shifting of cultivation, with low population densities, allows forest
to grow back over 20 or 30 years.  Even  so,  the forest  looses much  of its
genetic  diversity  during that  transition  because  when  it's  cut,  the  second
growth  is  not  as  diverse.  It has  also  lost a lot of the  carbon because  the
secondary  forest will never  grow to  the size of the primary  forest.  But  it
would  go back and have no long term detrimental  effects on soil quality or
soil erosion.  But the trouble is that, with high population pressures, farmers
cannot afford  to wait  even  15  or 20 years  to reclear.  When we got  to the
area where  I work on Peru, in the early  1970s, the fallow period was about
20 years.  Now the fallow period is about two to three years.  In its pristine
stage,  shifting  cultivation  is fine from  the ecological  point of view,  but the
cultivator  remains  in perpetual  poverty.  Other  alternatives  are  needed.
What  are  these  alternatives?  Are  there  alternative  technologies  that  are
viable?86
There are a lot of myths or misconceptions about the agronomic potential of
the humid tropics.  The soils  are  low in fertility.  But the statement that it
isn't possible to grow  crops continuously in those soils is incorrect.  It isn't
correct that clearing a piece of forest will turn soils into laterite or that they
will be so compacted that it becomes useless for agriculture.  This may occur
in about  3 percent of the soils.  Certainly not  97 percent.  It is  not correct
that most of the nutrient cycling that goes on between the forest and the soil
bypasses  the  soil.  Those  are wrong  assertions.  What has  been found  by
research is that sustainable  agriculture  is feasible.  The classic form of high
input agriculture which feeds the world, including the green revolution areas
in the tropics,  is technically feasible in many areas in the humid tropics.  It
may not always be logistically or economically feasible because the roads may
not be in place and the marketing infrastructure  may be absent.
Therefore,  a menu  of options  is needed  and has been developed.  I would
like  to  share  with you  a very  simple  landscape  model.  It  first  shows  the
heterogeneity of the humid tropical landscape.  There are beaches, low flood
plains,  and  high  flood  plains.  There  are  areas  that  flood  every  year,  or
perhaps once every  10 years.  There are high terraces with low fertility soils,
but  flat  and  relatively  easy  to  cultivate  technically.  There  are  also  low
fertility soils in hilly areas that are difficult to mechanize.  Finally, there are
mountains,  usually  with  young  soils.  A series  of options  that  have  been
developed  for  each  of  these  areas  that  are  very  sustainable.  The  most
obvious  one  is to grow paddy  rice,  as in southeast  Asia, in the  high  flood
plains  --  in  areas  water  can be  diverted  from the  river  or where  low  lift
pumps can be used.  Rice  is  consumed  in all of these  countries.  In Peru,
there has been great progress in paddy rice production in the Amazon, based
upon very  simple technologies  transferred from Asia,  combined with plant
breeding to adapt the varieties of local soil, pest and pathogens and to local
tastes  (Figure 7).
For the high flood plains that do not flood regularly, or for the high terraces
that  are  flat and  easily mechanizable,  continuous  cropping with  lime  and
fertilizer  inputs  is  feasible.  But  this  requires  a good  road  infrastructure,
accessibility  to market and a reliable credit system.  In general, the physical
and institutional infrastructure is underdeveloped  except in areas around the
large cities of the humid tropics.  Indeed, there are some large cities -- Belem
has about two million people, Manaos  is over a million people,  and Iquitos
is over a half a million people.  Although this system  is technically feasible,
it is economically viable only where the infrastructure exists.  For most areas,
it is not economically  feasible.  In such areas, a low input cropping system is
probably the best alternative.  The  idea is  instead  of changing  the soils  to
meet  the  plant  requirements  to  change  the  plants  to  produce  under
conditions  of soil acidity and low levels of fertilizer.  We have been able to
design such systems by finding varieties of key crops, rice and grain legumes,
that are productive  at low pH levels  -- that are perfectly happy at pH4 or so,
which is very acid.  By designing an improved slash and burn system, we have87
been  able to grow about seven crops  of rice and  cowpeas  in rotation over
about three years without any fertilizer  or lime.  And we had pretty decent
yields.  This has been done  by trying to capture  and  recycle  the nutrients.
We capture the nutrients from the slash and burn secondary forest, religiously
using all  the crop  residues.  This recycles  most  of the potassium.  After  a
while, the fertility of the soils does go down, simply because we are taking a
lot of nutrients out, such as phosphorus, in the form of crop harvest.  There's
no way we can totally put that back in the form of crop residues.  As fertility
goes down, weeds increase.  It is then time to abandon the field.  But instead
of letting it grow to a secondary  forest fallow,  we use acid  tolerant legume
fallows  such  as kudzu  that  cover  the ground  rapidly.  Kudzu  smothers  the
weeds and  after a year or  so you can slash  and burn it and start the circle
again.  But some fertilizer will be necessary to replace what has been lost by
crop removal.
The next stage is a transition to high input agriculture if in the meanwhile the
physical  and  institutional  infrastructure  has  developed.  Otherwise  the
transition may be to agroforestry systems.  The agroforestry systems are based
on the use of trees that are acid tolerant, that are well adapted to the region,
but  that can  produce  food  or  timber  or  some  other  marketable  product.
There  are  several  of  them  that  are  very  promising.  Most  of them  you
probably have not heard of.  But this is part of the beauty of the biodiversity
that exists in tropical forests.  Let me  give one example.  The  peach palm
(Bractis  gasipals)  is very well adapted  to acid soil  conditions.  Within  four
years, it starts  producing  fruits that look and  taste  like  sweet potato.  The
nice part of it  is that it can produce about  10 tons of fruit per hectare  per
year over a period of  15 or 20 years.  You don't have to plow.  It's  edible.
The local people like it.  It's also a good feed for monogastrics such as swine
and chickens.  It could replace  corn in feeding systems.  This palm is multi-
purpose.  You can  cut off the apical  stem and market it as a gourmet food
here  and  in Europe  as heart  of palm.  This  particular  palm regrows  after
cutting its stem, so you don't destroy the tree as in some other species that
are used to produce heart of palm.  Other fast growing trees can be used to
produce charcoal  or wood.  Many are  legumes, so they fix nitrogen.
Pastures  have  a bad reputation  in the Amazon.  They  deserve  it because
they're  poorly  managed  pastures  that have  been  introduced  mainly  from
temperate  Brazil.  The producers  there  use  no fertilization,  employ  poor
cattle management,  and  do  not incorporate  legumes  in the  pastures.  But
well-managed  pastures  which  use  acid  tolerant  grass  and  legume  species,
developed  mainly  by  the  International  Center  for  Tropical  Agricultural
(CIAT) in Colombia,  have proven to be very productive.
So there are a number of options.  Groups of researchers  involved in these
studies believe  that we're  probably  at  the  same stage  as  the  Asian green
revolution  was  in  the  late  1960s.  The  prototype  technology  is  there.  A
combination of these alternatives, when applied to areas that are undergoing88
intensive  deforestation  by  people  who  want  to  settle  and  produce  food
perhaps  slow  the deforestation,  given  the right policies.  It's  not  going  to
happen  unless  the  government  policies  support  these  more  sustainable
systems  and  discourage  shifting cultivation,  and other forms  of destructive
land use.
We calculated how many hectares can be saved from deforestation for every
hectare put into these different management options,.  In the case of flooded
rice, farmers  are able to grow about  11  tons per hectare per year of grain.
That's in two crops averaging about five and a half tons per hectare per crop.
Under shifting cultivation, where upland rice yields are one ton, you would
need  to cut  11  hectares  to produce  11  tons of rice.  For every  hectare  in
flooded rice, you could save about 11 hectares from additional deforestation.
The ratio in low-input cropping  systems is less.  But for every hectare that's
put into even the low input, sustainable  systems, you might be able to save
from 5 to  10 hectares  of forest  every year.
There are viable alternatives  to shifting cultivation.  Farmers don't shift and
cut forest because  it's fun.  Cutting a tropical  forest is extremely hard work.
It also means moving households,  or commuting by foot further and further
from their fields.  There may be real options that could  slow deforestation
if policies are developed  that would  encourage  sustainable systems.  About
eight  countries  account  for  over 80  percent  of the world's  humid  tropical
deforestation.  A program that concentrated  in those eight countries would
cover most of the problem areas.  I am not going to speculate how much this
would affect global warming.  In the last year, I've seen reports that tropical
deforestation  may  account  from as little  as  10 or as much as 25 percent  of
global warming.  The point is that something that can be done now.
Crosson  Could you tell us a little bit more, Pedro, about the policy changes that would
be necessary  in order for these systems to be adopted on a wide scale?
Sanchez  Some  of the policy changes  are quite  simple.  The Agrarian Bank in Peru
should pay the farmers for their rice at the time it is sold, rather than four
months afterwards.  With an inflation rate of 40 percent per month, farmers
are discouraged from growing rice if they can't get paid for the product when
it is marketed.  Others are more complex.  The transport infrastructure  has
to be  developed  to reduce  the cost of getting inputs, such as fertilizer,  into
the communities,  and getting the products out.  Also, there should be some
disincentives  against further land clearing.
Crosson  You  mentioned  that the  absence  of adequate  infrastructure  is  a  primary
impediment to adoption of high input systems.  Would you expect to see both
the high input and the low input systems expand if they provide the necessary
infrastructure?89
Sanchez  It depends on individual country or regional situations.  A country like Brazil
that can produce  plenty of food in the South probably  should  not provide
incentives  for  high  input  systems  in  their  Amazon.  It  would  be  more
appropriate  to  focus  on  some  of the  low  input  agroforestry  systems.  A
country like Peru that is deficient in basic food grains may want to encourage
rice  production.  The point is  that there  really is a wide  range  of options,
depending on the local ecological  and economic environment.
Rawlins  I  have  seen  claims  that  the  long  term harvest  of nuts  and  other  natural
products  from the natural forest would product a higher  return in the long
run  than  could  be  obtained  by  opening  the  land  for  pasture  or  crop
production.  Are there other economically viable but less destructive ways of
using the forest?
Sanchez  Very  few.  Natural  rubber  is  one.  But while  it may preserve  the forest, it
provides  no way to escape  from poverty  for the rubber tappers.  But if you
want  farmers  or gatherers  to stay where  they  are,  that's  one way to  do  it.
Selective cutting has been very disruptive.  In order to select and harvest the
few marketable  trees  per hectare  in humid  tropical  forests,  you  destroy  a
good  deal in the process.  Forest enrichment,  in which you cut swatches two
or  three  meters  wide  in the  forest,  and  plant  improved  species,  has  not
worked.  There's too much competition from the natural vegetation.  Pastures
under forests  have  been tried.  The pastures  are poor  and the forests  are
partly destroyed.  It may be better to leave the forest as it is.  If you want to
save the forest, don't touch it.  Do something else around it. From a forestry
point of view, a tropical  forest is a mess.  It's a horrible tangle  of hundreds
of different  species.  A production  forester  does not want  to  mess  around
with a humid tropical forest.  He would rather have a nice, well-planted, well-
spaced uniform stand of trees.  There are a few exceptions  like rattan, which
is a vine that can be used for baskets and furniture.  There are things like the
rosy  periwinkle,  a little  flower  discovered  in Madagascar,  that's used  as  a
base for chemotherapy.  But, you can't use a tropical forest and keep it as it
is.
Chen  I  read  something  about  using  iguanas  and  other  small  animals  for  food.
Could enough of them be raised to get a reasonable income from the meat?
Sanchez  Iguanas  are  from  the  semi-arid  areas.  But  there  are  also  a  lot of small
rodents in the rain forests that are delicious.  But, if you're going to produce
them commercially,  it will probably  mean raising them outside of the forest.
I think most animal scientists are not optimistic about the possibility of using
new animal species  on a large scale.  At the local level, however, they have
a place.
Rawlins  What  about  biomass  power  generation?  Species  mix  would  not  be  an
obstacle.90
Sanchez  No.  That could be another option.  You could have income from the forest
and replace it with fast growing biomass.  Inga species produces over  15 tons
of dry matter per hectare per year during its first three or four years.  The
oil palm, as I mentioned yesterday,  does produce  more oil per hectare per
year than any other crop.  You can put it directly into diesel engines.  There
are  other  species  of  palm  that  might  be  used  for  oil  production  in  the
Amazon.  We  may be able to harvest  the tropical forest for biomass, but I
hope we will not.  Biomass  can be grown better  elsewhere.  Also, keep  in
mind that the carbon accumulation in tropical forest may be as large as 200
tons  of carbon per  hectare.  Every  time  we  clear  a tropical  forest,  we're
releasing large quantities of CO2.
Waggoner  Would you repeat that?  200 tons of carbon per hectare in the standing crop
per year?
Sanchez  The range is probably between 50 and 250 tons of carbon per hectare.  In the
standing  crop  of a virgin  tropical  forest,  there  and in  equilibrium,  it's  not
growing.  It's just sitting there.  When it is cut and burned, most of it either
goes right into the atmosphere or decomposes  and  goes later.  It cannot be
recaptured.  Some soil organic carbon also decomposes after land clearing.
Rawlins  If you put the forest biomass through a power generator to replace fossil fuel,
you haven't lost it.
Waggoner  Then presumably it could be replaced with fast growing trees that would have
a positive  accumulation of carbon per year.
Davis  What he's saying is that it would be very hard to regenerate to that very high
original  level.
Sanchez  It could take 50 to a  100 years.
Rayner  The other problem, if you're looking  at this from an energy perspective,  is
where to locate the generator?  You're not going to locate  it near a forest
that will not be replacing. For biomass  energy to be economically  feasible,
it must be based on high intensity biomass production.  There's no other way
to  do  it  economically.  That  means  growing  closely  planted,  fast-growing
species.
Davis  Can the production systems you're talking about be used on present pastures?
Can you reclaim those present pastures?
Sanchez  Yes.  There are two or three ways.  One of them is to improve  the present
pastures  by planting  some  of the improved  species,  especially  legumes,  in
strips.  In small pastures, you go in and spread a little bit of rock phosphate
and  plant  legumes.  They  gradually  take  over  and  improve  the  pasture.
When  the  pasture  has been  degraded  badly,  you  can  burn  the  degraded91
pasture,  fertilize,  and  seed.  It  depends  on  the  nature  of  the  degraded
pastures.  A lot of pastures are degraded because they're infested with grasses
that animals don't use.  Others have been compacted or degraded physically
and chemically.  They require a different  type of renovation than ones that
are just degraded  in terms of weeds.
Davis  What are the economic and policy issues there?  Who owns these degraded
pastures?  Who controls them, who uses them, and what  happens to them?
Sanchez  Well, it varies from country to country, but most of it is owned by individuals.
The large scale pastures are often owned by absentee landlords.  They often
don't manage them well because they're just sitting there speculating on the
land  price.  The farmers  are in  the  50-100  hectare  range,  as  opposed  to
thousands  of  hectares  in  some  parts  of  Brazil.  These  small  units  are
interested  in improving their income.  You  can work with them.
Davis  But  in  Brazil  where  they've  cleared  forest  and  replaced  it with  pastures,
there's no way that a small farmer really has the capital to go in and reclaim
a pasture, is there?
Sanchez  The small  farmers  in  Brazil  have pastures.  In Rondonia, where  they may
have 50 to a 100 hectares, they are very interested  in having those pastures
become more productive.  There are low cost technologies that can be used
to gradually reclaim the pastures.  This is in contrast  to what  happened  in
eastern  Brazil  along  the  Belem-Brasilia  Highway,  where  so  much
deforestation took place about  10 years ago.  Huge pastures were developed
in that areas.  It's probably going to take  some government intervention  to
make those people  change.
Allen  Pedro, you didn't say  anything  about fish culture  or animal  culture  beyond
ruminants on pastures.  Are there  any other animal  systems that would be
useful if integrated  into the total systems you talked  about?
Sanchez  There are other possibilities  --  fish like tilapia.  Instead of having two crops
of rice a year, you could have  one rice  crop  and nine months  or so of fish
culture.  There  is  also  some  potential  for the water  buffalo  in this system.
The water buffalo eats low quality pastures that no self-respecting cow would
touch.  It is  the ideal  draft  animal in the humid  tropics.  They have  great
potential  in the humid tropics of South America.
Ruttan  Pedro,  realistically,  isn't the problem that,  until the infrastructure  comes in,
you  can't get the  stuff in and you  can't get the  stuff out without having  to
haul it on your shoulders?  But even  when the infrastructure  is  developed
and the more intensive system becomes economically viable, it will always be
a poor system.  The producers are not going to get rich, even if they work as
hard as  a Taiwanese  peasant.  It seems  to me that, given the pressures  of
people against the resource (and that's not going to stop), you're going to see92
continued opening up and destruction of the forest.  I find it very difficult to
believe that the governments of Brazil, Peru, Venezuela or central Africa are
going  to  be  able  to  stop  that  process,  given  their  limited  administrative
capacity  and  their political  structures.  As  you  know,  even the  Philippine
government  cannot keep peasants  from invading  the national park  on the
mountain right behind the International Rice Research  Institute.
Sanchez  That's  why I think  there will have  to be policy  intervention to  change  the
incentives.  I see very little  hope  in central  Africa at the moment.  But in
countries  like Peru, Brazil and Indonesia, changes  may be more feasible.
Rawlins  Reducing population pressure  must ultimately be the means  to reduce  the
exploitation of tropical  forests.
Clark  It's too  late.
Crosson  If systems you are working on are economically more attractive  to the small
farmers  than the  slash  and  burn system,  why don't they adopt this  system
rather than slash and burn?
Ruttan  In  the  areas  I've  looked  at,  infrastructure  is  a  major  barrier.  Just  ask
yourself, "How many kilometers do I have to carry a bag of fertilizer or a bag
of rice before its value becomes  zero?"  Not very far.  There has to be dense
infrastructure  to sustain intensive  agriculture.
Rayner  Surely  in a place  like  Rondonia, Vern  is  right.  A decade  and  a half ago
there were only four or five paved roads in the whole state.  Now if you look
at the aerial maps, at least two-thirds of the state is covered by a very regular
grid pattern of paved roads.  The pattern of deforestation has  followed  the
developments  of that road system very closely.
Sanchez  The area  in Rondonia affected by roads is still very small  -- no more than 5
percent of the state.  But you are  right that, where the roads  are,  is where
people  are.  They get a land grant of about a hundred  hectares.  Then the
question  is what  do  they  do  after  they  clear  and  cultivate  for a couple  of
years.
Soil  Fertility
Ruttan  Now  I  would  like  to  turn  to  Bob  Munson.  Bob  has  worried  about  soil
fertility for quite  a few years.
Munson  I  certainly  have  had  a  long-term  interest  in  soil  fertility.  I  started  out
working on nitrogen soil tests at Iowa State with George Stanford, and then
did my  Ph.D.  work  with John  Pesek.  At  that time,  we  were  working  on
nitrogen  soil  tests  and  trying  to figure  out  how to predict,  from  soil  tests,93
what you  should apply to the soil.  In the  1960s nitrogen became so cheap
that we proceeded to forget about what we knew.  Now in the  1980s, we've
come back to some of the same issues.  We are making nitrate soil tests and
coming up with better prediction as to the nitrogen rates that should be used
in terms of both crop response  and environmental  impact.
There  is still a great  deal that you can do with a pencil.  You don't always
need a computer.  Several years ago, a dealer asked me, as a consultant, to
come up with a prediction equation for the amount of nitrogen that should
be used on one of his customer's fields.  We had soil samples  to three feet
and  complete  soil  test  information.  He  asked  the  question:  how  much
nitrogen  do I need  to apply  to grow  150 bushels  of corn?  I reviewed  the
available data from Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota and Wisconsin.  The answer was
zero.  The  hand-harvested  check  on six different  hybrids  was  162  bushels.
On the combine check, it averaged  157.8 for six different hybrids.  He then
asked me how much nitrogen  do I need to apply to get  175 bushels of corn.
My estimate was  75 pounds.  He pulled  172 bushels  off of that check.  My
point is that we know a lot more than we're using.  The other point I would
like to make is that we don't get something for nothing.  Each crop has an
internal  nutrient  requirement.  That requirement  will vary some,  with the
maturity and variety, but it's an almost linear rate from about 60 bushels up
to over 300 plus bushels of corn.  It takes a certain amount of nutrients  to
grow a bushel of corn.
If you look at soybeans,  it's  a different  value but the crop  has an  internal
requirement  in order  to grow and produce  a bushel of grain.  The same is
true  for  wheat.  Phosphorous requirements  will  tend  to  be  more  variable
than nitrogen  and potassium.  The  other  thing  to remember  is that every
bushel of grain that  you take  from the  farm removes  a certain  amount  of
nutrients.  The amount that's taken off per bushel of grain is fairly constant
once you  get  up to  economic  yield  levels.  In terms  of efficiency  and  the
nutrients  we  apply  on different  soils, there's  much  greater  variation.  On
many of our more productive soils, we recover only about 50 percent of what
we apply.
In integrating that, it should be remembered  that we obtain that recovery by
differencing  the soil  organic matter which  will provide  a certain amount  of
nitrogen.  In many cases,  we tend to forget about that  amount of nitrogen
that's provided by the soil organic matter.  In southwestern Minnesota,  the
average 24-year yield on the control plots where no nitrogen was applied was
about 69 bushels per acre.  The yield ranged from zero to 141 bushels on that
plot.  There were good nitrogen  responses over time on those experiments.
It takes about  1.12 pounds  of nitrogen to produce a bushel of corn.  About
77 pounds of nitrogen per acre came from that soil year after year over this
24-year period.  Organic  matter is  about 5  percent nitrogen,  so to produce
that 69 bushels,  it took a little over  1,500 pounds of soil organic matter.  If
we take into account all of the nitrogen in the system, there's roughly 25 to94
30 percent that we cannot account for, even if we measure down all the way
to the ground water.  My earlier view, based on available research, was that
it had been lost to the air and not to ground water.  But we know that even
under the best conditions on those control plots, there's going to be nitrogen
that  gets  to  ground  water.  The  measurements  that  have  been  made  in
southern  Minnesota  on  unfertilized  lysimeter  plots,  show  that  the  water
coming out of the tile line is about  13 parts per million nitrate  nitrogen.  If
you put on a hundred pounds  of nitrogen and you increase  the yield up to
about  145  bushels, the water coming  out of the tile line had about 41 parts
per million  of nitrate nitrogen  in it.  My point  is that you  cannot  produce
crops without having some nitrate  nitrogen around.  If people  think that we
can grow a legume -- for instance, continuous soybeans -- and not have some
nitrate nitrogen  coming out of the system,  they're just kidding themselves.
There is a cost of growing crops and part of it is having nitrate nitrogen.  As
soon as we tilled our prairie soils and speeded up the decomposition process
and the release of nitrogen from the soil organic matter, we started to release
nitrate nitrogen into the environment.  And so no matter what we do, we're
going  to continue  to release some  nitrate into the environment.  The other
thing to remember  is basically the nitrogen  in the system is rate driven.  It
becomes very important to choose the right rate so that you grow the highest
yield you can and have as little nitrogen left in the system at the end of the
season as you possibly can.  Other things to remember are to use profitable
amounts of other nutrients and land use management that will optimize the
efficiency of the applied nitrogen.
Information Systems  for Soil  Management
Larson  My  thesis  this  morning  is  that  many  of  our  environmental  and  natural
resources  problems  could  be  eliminated  or  minimized  if we  used  better
geographic information systems.  I think we've all seen cases of bad land use
in agriculture,  forestry,  rangeland,  urban development,  waste disposal sites,
and others.  Today, of course, we pretty well understand the geology and the
macro geographies.  But we still don't recognize and take into account what
I call the micro spatial variabilities in soils and landscapes.  The micro spatial
variability is usually captured in our soil surveys.  The National Cooperative
Soil Survey has the goal of having the cropland  in the entire nation mapped
by  1992.  That's  a tremendous  job.  I  don't know what it costs  nationally,
but in Minnesota, the federal and state governments  spend about $4 million
a year on soil surveys.
In the past, the county soil surveys were usually reported in a thick document
with  a hundred  pages  of maps.  Most people  just won't use them because
they  were  too  complicated  and  cumbersome.  But  the modern maps  have95
been digitized and put on computers.  A farmer in Minnesota can walk into
our County Extension  Offices, and within 30 seconds we can  have the map
up on the screen and  start to tell him about the characteristics  of his land
and how to make interpretations  of the  soil survey.  In Minnesota,  we now
have about a third of our counties digitized.  Most other states aren't that far
along.  Some of them are a bit further.  It costs money but it makes the soil
survey a  usable  tool.  We  must  also  combine  the  soil  surveys  with  good
geographic information systems.  We in soils have made the soil surveys but
we have  not always  done  the landscape  mapping in enough detail to make
them as useful  as they might be.
Let me give you an example of what can be done.  Soils vary a great deal in
their  chemical  and  physical  characteristics.  Even  a  seemingly  uniform
landscape  often  has  great  differences.  The  public  only  sees  the  surface.
There's a lot of variation below the  surface.
Let me give you an example  of what can be done.  We took a 50-acre field
in southwest  Minnesota  that is  fairly typical  of the  glaciated  areas  of the
upper  midwest.  The published soil survey had  seven mapping units in that
50-acre  field.  Surface  texture varied  from loam  to clay  loam.  The  slopes
varied  from  about  0  to  10  percent.  We  went  to  our  published  crop
equivalent rating that indicates the potential for corn yields on each of those
seven mapping units.  The potential yield varied from 65 to  145  bushels  of
corn per  acre.  Any soil  scientist  knows  that you  have  to  match  fertilizer
inputs to the potential production  of that soil.  It would seem ridiculous to
fertilize that field in a uniform manner.  That 65 bushel soil does not have
the  same  response  to  nutrients  as  the  145.  Our  published  fertilizer
recommendations then would vary on those different mapping units from 40
to 150 pounds of nitrogen per acre per year on corn.
We have  recently developed  equipment that will  apply differential  rates  of
fertilizer as it goes across the field.  The equipment carries straight nitrogen,
straight phosphorus,  straight potassium,  and herbicides  in separate  bins.  It
can mix them on the go and apply different rates as it passes over the field.
These rates can be based on the soil survey, or it could be based on soil tests,
or on historical yield records.  The computer facilities  are in the cab  of the
machine to vary application rates as the machine goes down the field.  These
machines are made by a company here in Minneapolis and are commercially
available.
If you fertilize the 50-acre field  at the  150 pounds of nitrogen rate, which is
appropriate  for the best soil, which is probably about what a farmer would
do, then only about  10 percent of the field would be fertilized at the correct
rate.  But 77 percent  of that field would get 30 pounds more than would be
recommended,  7 percent would get 50 pounds more per acre, and 7 percent
would get  110 pounds per acre more.  Likewise,  these  seven mapping units
have a hydraulic  conductivity  that varies by about five-fold.  The absorption96
coefficient for the two pesticides  vary  about five-fold.  This  means that on
those seven mapping units, some of the herbicide recommendations would be
only half what they might be on others.
On this  150  acre field, using  the machine  that I described,  you  could save
about $8 an acre.  At the same  time, you would reduce  the leaching  of the
fertilizer into  the ground  waters.  I  calculated  that you  would  save  about
1,500 pounds  of nitrogen on the 50-acre  field.  And if you assumed that all
of that was  going  to  leach  into  ground  waters,  then it  would  account  for
about  10 parts  per million of  nitrate in the top  foot of the ground  water.
That  may  not  be  perfectly  accurate  but  it  does  give  you  an  order  of
magnitude.  I  also  calculate, using our model, that if erosion  continued  at
present rates on that field, at the end of a hundred years  some soils would
be  unchanged.  Others would  experience  about  a  12 percent  reduction  in
productive capacity.
My point is that we are now developing the information technology that will
help us achieve sustainable  agriculture.  We've  got to do a much better job
of matching the soil and the landscape  characteristics with the management
of our land, including nutrient use, pesticide applications, erosion control, and
others.  With modern digitized  soil surveys and modern  equipment,  we are
making progress.  The data isn't available  in many places.  But it seems to
me that's our charge for the future:  to develop the data bases, including soil
surveys, landscape  data, and weather  data bases.
I'm often asked if I picked an example  that's not typical.  I think that field
is reasonably typical.  When I was out in Idaho in the Paloose area a couple
of weeks ago, they were talking about what they called Catina management.
It  is  the same  thing  we're  talking about, but by a different  name.  Last
weekend  I was in South Carolina coastal plain, giving this same sort of talk.
I  asked Pat Hunt how many mapping units  he had in a 60-acre field  right
adjacent to the station.  He said 18  different  mapping units on this  coastal
plain  land  that  looked  as  flat  and  level  as  this  floor.  The  variability  I
described is normal.  In the future, we will benefit to take that variability into
account in our management systems.  We have the technology right now.  But
the data bases  are still underdeveloped.
Clark  Is  this  $8 an  acre  or so  you  thought you  could  save  figured with  current
market prices of the inputs?  Is that a big incentive relative to the investment
you have to make?  Let's assume the data base exists, so it's just the added
investment to be able to utilize the machine.  I have no feel for the scale.
Larson  It could  represent about  15-20 percent of the fertilizer  cost.
Ruttan  Another way  of thinking about  it is to ask how much would  it cost for  the
precision application.97
Larson  The  machine  is  a big  machine.  It's  not  very  practical  for  an  individual
farmer.  For custom application,  the charges  are about $2.50 an acre more
if the  rate  is  varied  as  compared  to  not  varying  the  rate.  The  $2.50  is
subtracted from the eight already.  The $8  is net.
Waggoner  Bob, you started out with the  example  of what  you did  on the  back of an
envelope.  I want to ask H.H. and Bill Larson about all this savings that you
were going to realize with these elaborate  machines.  Couldn't the gains be
realized without this intermediary  of the elaborate machine?
Cheng  I  think  it's  the principle  we're  trying  to  get  across.  The  point  about soil
variability must be understood.
Larson  I told someone  at the break,  Paul, that when I was  a boy in Nebraska  my
father used to put me on the manure spreader and say take it out and put it
on those eroded knobs.  That was farming by soil variability.  You can do it
by hand, you can do it a lot of different ways;  it doesn't  have  to have that
elaborate  machine.
Waggoner  Yes,  but  my  point  is  whether  the  machine  really  is  necessary.  By
concentrating  on  the machine  we  could  imply that  the principle  was  only
applicable to Europe and North America.
Rawlins  I  think  it  is  a  very  good  point.  We  always  need  to  distinguish  between
principles  and tools.  But there  are places where you simply must have the
machines to apply the principles.  Having sufficient nitrogen in the root zone
for highly productive  crops does not have  to result  in pollution if the right
management  is used.  In Florida some horticultural crops are grown with a
plastic  cover  to  protect  the  root  bed  from  leaching.  This  management
practice forces the water to infiltrate between the beds, leaving the nitrogen
intact.  We need to be smart enough to develop other management practices
that  decouple  water  and  chemical  transport.  But  application  of  these
practices  may require  specialized tools.
Larson  The company that manufactures this equipment has sold 40 or 50 all over the
world.
Clark  So at the moment,  if one simply conceives of the data base itself as a public
good that should be publicly funded, then one doesn't even have to add that
investment  cost  to  the  fertilizer  and  pesticide  prices  in  order  to  have  an
incentive that  is sizeable.
Larson  The  cost of establishing  the data base  is.  But there are  the water  quality
benefits as well as cost reductions.
Crosson  Not for the farmer, though, unless his own well is being contaminated.98
Larson  That's frequently what happens.  Our farmers  are also concerned  about the
environment.
Clark  I  think the key  is that if you can  make  money  on the issue  and  feel  good
about it to boot rather than having to impose a cost to do good, then it's just
all that much more of an incentive.
Crosson  Does  this  company  have  a  program  to  develop  the  yield  potential
information?  It would seem that there would be a market incentive.  Is there
any evidence that that's happening?
Larson  A  third  of  our  counties  have  the  data  for  the  whole  county  digitized.
Farmers  can get that from us or from  their county.  If the county  doesn't
have the data, the company will digitize the farm for a fee.  We  charge  the
counties for digitization because they use it for land tax assessments and lots
of other things besides farm management.  It costs about $35,000 for a county
to do  it.  That is  about  $1,200  for a  six mile square  township  --  practically
nothing.
Rawlins  I have been working with some commercial  companies  on the possibility of
developing  position  sensing  instrumentation  for  tractors  and  harvesters.
Experimental  harvesters  have  been  developed  that  can  measure  yield
continuously  as  they  move  through  the  field.  Combination  of these  two
technologies  would  make it possible  to develop highly detailed yield  maps.
Using last year's yield as a surrogate for soil productive capacity throughout
the field may be  a good  first approximation  for varying  the distribution  of
fertilizer  automatically  through computer control.
Position sensing would also provide guidance for machines to follow the same
track  each  time  through  the  field.  This  would  provide  the  means  for
implementing  Bill Larson's zonal tillage concept.  A compact traction zone
could provide all-weather  access to the field to apply chemicals or harvest in
a timely manner.  A specifically  tilled infiltration zone  could  provide  route
infiltration around the  root zone, decoupling water  and chemical transport.
Fertilizer and other chemicals  would be  applied only to the protected  root
zone, which is tilled to enhance  rooting.  All of the components  to practice
zonal farming  exist,  at least  at the  experimental  level.  Someone  needs to
take  the  responsibility  for  integrating  them  into  an  economically  viable
system.  The first customers  for these could be experimenters  who need to
put out yield  trials.  They  could  design the yield  trials  in their  computer,
program  the  seeder  or  fertilizer  applicator  to half the  application  rate  in
some  sites  and  double  it in others.  Then when  the field  is  harvested  the
computer could automatically calculate response functions from its numerical
yield map.
Ruttan  The one question I have is whether you have a device to protect the farmer
against the dumb  or the drunk machine operator?99
Rawlins  The machine should ideally be operating on auto pilot, but a dumb or drunk
operator on board could over ride it and create  havoc.
Bill,  it  seems  to  me that  last year's  yield  map may  actually  provide  finer
structure  for applying variable fertilizer  rates than the soil map.
Larson  Perhaps.  I  often  like  to  use  the  analogy of a dairyman.  A dairy  farmer
would  never  feed  every  cow  the  same  grain  ration.  He  feeds  the  cow
depending upon her milk response.  Similarly,  we've  got to feed  every soil
depending upon its response potential.
Munson  There are soil sampling devices that record  exactly where  the sample came
from.  When that  is  fed into the microchip,  it provides  the information  to
change the rates  of nutrients applied as the fertilizer spreader moves across
the field.
Cheng  You were talking about precision sensoring.  Right now it's done by laser, by
triangulation, and it's not too accurate.  But satellite technology  is coming on
stream  that will  let  us pin  point  the  application  of fertilizer  by computer
within  10-foot intervals.
Davis  I have  recently  attended  a forest  soils  conference  in which very  much  the
same philosophy was being proposed for managing a national forest to reduce
the inputs of herbicides.  The USFS was trying to develop soils maps which
would tell them the potential  of a site and then manage  the forest for what
would grow there anyway so that they could reduce the cost of herbicides and
other forms of management.
Ruttan  My wife  would  like  to make  sure  they  don't  spray when  she's  out  picking
blueberries.  Let me turn now to H.H. Cheng.
Cheng  Bill spoke of a number of the things that I had in mind.  But I would like to
pick up on a number of things discussed in the last couple of days, and clarify
a few points.
Yesterday I mentioned the adaptiveness  of farmers.  When we were talking
about dumb  farmer  models,  I made the  comment  that the problem  is the
dumb  modelers.  Even  those of us that grew  up on a farm  often  have  an
image of farming which is decades out of date.  For example, in many of our
global models, we tend to treat all crops as the same.  But even all corn is
not the same.  Some producers  use  as  many  as  10 different varieties  each
year.
When  I  was  still  in  Washington  State,  we  had  a  very  well-known  wheat
breeding program.  There's  one  breeder  who has been  quite  successful  in
breeding  winter  hardiness  into  wheat.  Yet  every  time  I  went  to  wheat100
growers  meetings,  I  would  find  the  farmers  using  varieties  from  Oregon
rather than from Washington.  The varieties are less winter hardy, but have
other characteristics  that are probably more desirable.  They were willing to
take that risk because  they were betting on the weather.  We had not had a
really hard winter since  1968.  They're willing to take these risks.  They are
much  more  adaptive  than our scientists, who just keep  on trying to breed
winter  hardiness  into  the wheat.  We  have the same problem with  a plant
pathologist.  He was always trying to identify varieties resistant to snow mold,
but we haven't had snow mold for 20 years.  We really need to think about
adaptiveness of our science and our scientists.
Let's move  on  to  a  few  other points.  I'd like  to clarify  something  about
methane gas.  I think we need to be careful in thinking that any time we find
waterlogged  or saturated  soils, that we will automatically produce  methane
gas.  Methane  is only reduced at the lowest redox levels.  There are a lot of
other  oxidized  species  in the  soil which  must first be reduced,  particularly
iron, manganese, and nitrate.  De-nitrification  is far more important.  Even
in rice fields we find, because of water movement, there is an oxidized zone
in the soil.  There are certain soils in the rice field that do produce methane.
But  we  have  to  be  very  careful  about  these  generalizations.  We  talked
yesterday  about  the  cadmium  in fertilizer.  We found  in California  and  in
Japan that cadmium is not a problem.
So I think these are  some of the things,  but perhaps one we have  not paid
enough attention to is the variability of soils.  In recent years, I've  traveled
quite extensively  trying to understand about wet soils.  They look beautiful
under their natural conditions.  If they are kept wet, there is good leaching
capacity and they generate very nice lush growth.  But as soon as they come
into  cultivation,  as  soon  as they  dry,  a  lot of their characteristics  change.
You have to be very careful in managing these soils.  We have  to recognize
that each soil has to be managed differently.  We may be able to reduce the
material inputs by increasing  our inputs of knowledge and information.  This
means  not  only  data  intensive,  but  also  analysis  intensive  systems.  The
problem with many  of the models  is that  there  is  no  way  to verify  them.
We've  worked  for  years  on  the  water  quality  models,  large  landscape
watershed  type models.  EPA has worked  for almost  20 years. Finally they
gave up because there was  no way to verify them because  of the variability.
So most of our modeling effort must become much more process  oriented,
rather than just regressing  the apparent cause  on effect.
But  let me just go  one point further.  What Bill has described  is only one
application.  In the soil survey information system, we have the data base not
only for agricultural production, but for water quality.  We are including data
on pesticides,  their leachability,  and their adsorption characteristics  in each
soil.  We  also  have decision making aids for wildlife  habitat, for recreation
purposes,  for building  constructions,  and  for a number  of other  purposes.
There's a whole list of information being gradually built into the system to101
make  the soil  survey information  useful,  not just for farming,  but for  total
management  of our soil resource.
Herdt  I wonder if everybody accepts your last proposition that, by going to a more
closely controlled use of inputs, you're  going to achieve  all the  social goals
as well as all the private  goals.
Cheng  The  economists  and  the  sociologists  are going  to have  to work  with  us to
answer that question.
Sanchez  I agree with H.H.  I think he is in a win-win situation.  If he can increase the
efficiency of inputs and decrease pollution, that is a lot to accomplish.  Isn't
this what sustainable  agriculture  means in the U.S. context?
Clark  It is at least moving towards sustainable agriculture.  I think the point it that
if  you  can  substitute  information  for  inputs,  that  has  very  positive
environmental  externalities.  The  information  is  less  polluting  than  the
pesticide or fertilizer that you displace.  You may still end up with too much
nitrogen  or too much  pesticide  drifting around  your  system.  But you have
made the next stage of the problem easier to address.
Larson  It's a big job to make all these surveys, digitize them, develop all the auxiliary
data bases and interpret it.  Software development  is  a big job.
Waggoner  Now you're beginning to say that perhaps  it's expensive.
Crosson  My understanding,  Bill, is that once the data is available,  then it is relatively
inexpensive  to make  that information and related  services  available to  the
farmer.  But it's  still not entirely clear  to me how the cost of collecting the
information in the first place should be handled.
Larson  The $8 that I quoted didn't cover any of that.
Crosson  When I refer to a win-win situation,  I interpret  that to mean that the costs
to the society of making these practices  available at the farm level are less
than their social  benefits  and that  the  cost to  the farmer  of adapting  the
practices  is less than the benefits he derives from them.
Chen  But  there are  gains  to society over  and  above those  to the farmer.  Thus,
society has to make the investment in order to get the returns.
Crosson  The  nice  thing about  win-win is  you  don't have  to do anything  other than
provide  the farmer information about the practices.  In his own interest, he
will adopt these practices,  so he wins and we win.  It may still be in society's
interest to do something to achieve these practices, even though it would not
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Rayner  In the report that we just completed  for DOE on policy options for private
sector responses  to climate  change, we actually  looked to the issue of smart
machinery,  and  suggested  that  two  things  at  least  would  be  important  in
compressing the market penetration time.  One would be some kind of public
invention support program to get the right devices developed.  An the other
was  some  public  expenditure  on  a  demonstration  program  for  the
technologies.
Cheng  The Minnesota  Legislative  Committee  on Resources has been funding  our
accelerated soil survey.  The state has just passed a new constitutional change
that will  create an environmental  trust fund which  will eventually  build up
to  a billion  dollar  base  so  that  we'll  have  somewhere  about  $50  or  $60
million every year to improve resource management.
Pests  and Pathogens
Ruttan  Let  me now turn to  Richard  Jones.  We've  talked about many things  that
have  implications  for  entomology.  Climate  change  is  going to  affect  the
things  he's  concerned  about.  And  what  he  does  about  the  things  he's
concerned with  is going to affect the environment.
Jones  Vern asked  me  to participate  in this  workshop  and  discuss  constraints  in
agriculture  in  the  next  century  as  it  relates  to  pests.  Although  I'm  an
entomologist,  I will  try to talk about pests  in general  --  insects,  weeds  and
diseases  --  because  these  are  three  significant  worldwide  constraints  to
agricultural production.  I'll try to talk about the  changes that I see coming
in the next  15  or 20 years that affect  the way we deal with these  three pest
types.
We  do,  as  most  of  you  know,  suffer  significant  losses  in  agricultural
production  due  to pests.  The  latest  estimate  is about  13  percent  of the
agricultural  production  is  lost just  to  insects.  When  you add  weeds  and
diseases to that, it would be considerably larger.  Insects, weeds and diseases
are constraints  on the types  of crops  we grow in certain parts of the world
and even  in certain parts of the United States.  And without pesticides,  for
example,  it would be almost  impossible to grow potatoes  in the Red River
Valley  or  lots  of  other  places  in  the  United  States.  Cotton  is  another
commodity that it would be very difficult to grow without pesticides.  These
are commodities  that are on the pesticide  treadmill.
What changes  do we  expect?  Many  of the changes will relate  to the costs
and benefits from pest control.  The farmer does a cost benefit analysis  to
make  the decision  whether  or not to use  a pesticide.  Social  cost benefit
calculations enter into public policy and regulatory decisions.  Now issues are
being added to the cost calculations.  These include greater attention to food103
safety  and  water  contamination.  The  question  is  how  to  incorporate  the
environmental  insult from the use of pesticides  in a manner that influences
farmers  decisions.  The  farmer  responds  primarily  in  terms  of perceived
change in profit.  This calculation differs around the world.  The cost-benefit
relationship in Africa is different  than in the United States.  The pesticides
which we have depended upon heavily for the last 30 or 40 years are under
increasing  pressure,  not only  because  of increased  costs,  but  also  due  to
increased  pest resistance.  Many  companies  are finding  their pest  control
business less profitable and one either considers cutting the R&D budget or
even getting out of the pesticide business.
Whether we like it or not, we are going to have to look for more alternatives
in  dealing with  our  pest  problems.  One  of the  alternatives  is  biological
control.  Certain types of biological  control can be less expensive, but many
will be more expensive.  Another is host-plant resistance.  A third is the use
of biocides-pathogens  that  perform  like  an  insecticide.  Integrated  pest
management  has been a concept that has been around for the last 25  or 30
years.  Adoption  has been slow because it is information and management
intensive.  For  example,  we  have  developed  economic  thresholds  and
recommend that farmers spray only when the populations reach a threshold.
But farmers tend to be reluctant to make the counts.  In certain parts of the
country,  and for certain crops  like  cotton,  consulting has  become  an active
business.  Consultants  do  these  weekly  counts.  But  it's  not  very  widely
adopted.  And  the  reason  I  mention  this  is  that  there  are  sociological
considerations  that  enter  into  the  farmers'  decisions.  They  like  a  simple
operation.
One of the things we've talked about is global warming and how that will that
affect pest problems.  It will affect weeds just about like it does other plants.
We can  expect increases in the range of certain weed  species.  In terms of
insects, two or three degrees centigrade change can affect the range of a pest
by several  hundred  miles.  In the  case of Minnesota,  if that happens,  that
means  that  probably  we'll have  another  half of a generation  per  year  of
European  corn  borer,  as  an  example.  It  will  increase  the  number  of
generations of an insect pest.  This will create an increased  demand for pest
control.
I don't know that anyone's really examined  the effects of an increased CO2
level.  At lower  oxygen  levels  the metabolism  is inhibited  because  insects
breathe  by  diffusion,  and  there's  an  oxygen-carbon  dioxide  ratio  that
determines their metabolic rate.  I would assume that if CO2 increases and
oxygen  stays  the  same,  then you  expect  metabolism  to  slow  somewhat  in
insects.  But  this  may  be  more  than  compensated  for  by  the  increased
temperature.
The fertilizer  effect  of increased  CO2 will  actually make  a more nutritious
plant.  This will be a plant more  desirable  to insects.  For example,  one  of104
the theories about  the spruce  budworm  outbreak  is  that it is  nutritionally
related.  So if you do get a fertilizer  effect of CO2,  then it could  have some
impact on insect populations  and outbreaks.
Moisture  is  an  important  factor  also.  It's  particularly  important  for
pathogens.  Increased  humidity  improves  the  conditions  for  pathogen
development and there would be more problems with plant diseases.  On the
other hand, lack of moisture creates a favorable environment for some insect
pests  like  spider  mites  and  grasshoppers.  During  the  last  three  years  in
Minnesota,  with  drought  and  above  average  temperatures,  both  of these
problems have increased  significantly.
One of the things that influences  the  severity  of pest problems  is that our
world is shrinking because of modern transportation.  We wind up with a lot
more  exotic  pests.  The pests that are causing  most of our problem in  the
United States are the exotic pests.  This is a problem that probably will get
worse instead of better.  I don't know how to deal with the problem because
it's not possible to effectively regulate movement of people and goods in and
out  of  countries.  However,  a  number  of  these  exotic  pests  are  good
candidates for  classical biological control.  If you go back to the country of
origin and collect the natural enemies, there's a good possibility that you can
reduce the equilibrium population  of the  exotic pests.  That's worked with a
number of exotic weeds and insect pests.
Biotechnology will have an impact on pests, particularly in the area of host
plant resistance.  We can expect to see great progress in transferring genes
that will provide resistance to plant specific pest species or to pathogens.  It's
not  a panacea,  however,  because  once  you  put  that  gene  in  the  plant  a
process of co-evolution  of pest and host will ensue.  An example  is the case
of wheat  and Hesian  fly.  It's been  going  on for  30 years.  We  have  to
continually  release  new  varieties  of wheat  to  maintain  resistance  to  the
Hesian  fly.  That  type  of thing  will continue  to  occur  as  biotechnology  is
applied,  only  the  types  of  resistance  will  be  a  little  bit  more  dramatic.
Progress has been limited thus far because there's only been a few different
suitable genes identified, such as the BT toxins, that are suitable for putting
into plants.  So far, they aren't tissue  specific,  so the toxin goes all over the
plant.  It remains  to be seen how acceptable  these toxins are gong to be in
the food chain.  That's a big issue that hasn't been resolved yet.  With our
increased concern regarding  toxic chemicals  in our food supply, it's likely to
become  a significant concern.
Another thing that I have concern about is property rights.  Using this type
of breeding  to  develop  resistant  plants  puts  the whole  ball game  into  the
hands of the seed companies.  This could cause the price of seed to become
more  expensive  -- a lot more expensive  if one  company has  a monopoly  on
a suitable gene.  This raises the question of who will develop these materials
and who  the property rights belong to.  In the past, universities  have been105
very heavily involved in crop breeding.  And the whole question of the role
of the public sector in developing and maintaining ownership of this genetic
material  is becoming a significant question.
Another issue affecting the pest problem is chemophobia.  That's the current
public perception of the danger of chemicals.  This is something that's going
to be with us for a long time.  We can expect to see more attention to how
synthetic  insecticides  or pesticides  compare to the natural pesticides  which
actually may be a lot more  carcinogenic  than the synthetic pesticides.  The
issue of the naturally occurring carcinogens that we eat regularly will receive
increased attention.  This is not just a scientific issue but a question of public
perception.  We  must be conservative  in the use  of our  pesticides,  but we
need to be realistic.  There's a public perception  of the danger  of some of
these chemicals that has little relationship to reality.
How changing agricultural  practices will affect pests, particularly  things like
reduced  tillage.  Rotations  for  the  most  part,  reduce  pest  populations.
Reduced tillage will probably result in increased pest populations, particularly
insects.  Fall surveys of European corn borer in counties in western Illinois
indicate over five borers per plant, which is higher than it's been since World
War II.  And that's  in  an  area of Illinois where  there  is  a lot of reduced
tillage.  One doesn't want to generalize from such an event combination,  but
it's an indication  of something that needs more investigation.
What  are  some  of the alternatives  to pesticides?  I've  mentioned  some  of
them -- classical  biological control; biologicals  that behave  like insecticides;
and host plant resistance.  Integrated pest management  will be more widely
used.  There's  always talk about big population reduction programs such as
the use of sterile males  as in the screwworm  control program.  People  are
still thinking about ways to pursue such techniques with other pests.  There
is currently a project going on to eradicate the boll weevil from the southeast.
It's making  some progress, but it is working against very powerful  forces of
natural selection.  Only a pest that is causing tremendous economic cost can
justify such large scale  expensive techniques.
I'd  like to mention a few more  things.  One  is habitat destruction,  such as
deforestation.  We think it's a big problem, but we don't really know how big
it is because we don't know what's there in terms of either insects or plants.
A big effort to really inventory what is there is needed.  We know a lot more
about our solar system than we know about the biology of our planet.  And
this is a big deficiency.  E. L. Wilson says it's more important  to be doing a
biological inventory  of the planet than the human genome project  because
the genome will still be here 30 years from now but these other genes will
not be.7 But  that kind  of biology  is not glamorous.  It involves  drudgery
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work, like the soil survey work.  It's hard to get funds to do it, but until we
do it, we won't even know what we're losing.
Another  issue  is the  relationships  between  pests,  health  and  agricultural
production  in  Third  World  countries.  The  battle  against  insect  vector
diseases  is being lost.  There  are more people  dying of malaria today than
there  ever  have been  --  a million a year in Africa.  DDT didn't eliminate
malaria  and  it  didn't  eliminate  mosquitoes.  But  it  did  eliminate  all  the
people  that were working  on malaria  and  mosquito vectors  (because  of a
perceived  lack of need).  Now we have very few medical  entomologists.  We
don't know what the impact  of this  million deaths a year on agriculture  in
Third World countries will be.
Ruttan  In  our  next  consultation,  which  we  have  scheduled  for June,  we  will  be
looking  at the  relationship between health  and agriculture.
Jones  One concern  is the declining  support for graduate training  and  research  in
the pest management disciplines.  We need to give greater attention to urban
entomology.  But  in  the  present  budget  climate,  any  increase  on  urban
problems will be at the expense  of agricultural  efforts.  Another  thought  is
how to use these constraints, for example, global warming as an opportunity
to make changes that we know need to be made.  One change that will make
agriculture  more  sustainable  is  diversification.  In  Enterprise,  Alabama,
there's a statue in the  city square  with a big boll weevil on top  of it.  The
status is a monument to the boll weevil because the boll weevil mandated the
diversification of agriculture in Alabama.  They diversified out of cotton and
into peanuts, cattle and some other things.
Abrahamson  Have you speculated  at all on the insect vectors and human parasitic diseases
that might affect Minnesota with a somewhat warmer climate?  For example,
why don't we have malaria  here any more?
Jones  Mostly because we  have eradicated  the breeding sites of the malaria vector
in the United States.  We have recently introduced into the United States the
Asian tiger  mosquito.  It's  a vector  for encephalitis.  It has  moved  as far
north as Chicago.  If it gets three to four degrees warmer, it could move into
Minnesota.  Lyme  Disease  could  turn  out  to  be  very  significant.  The
Minnesota Department of Health thinks we don't need to worry about it very
much, but the Wisconsin Department of Health is more concerned about it.
It's a tick borne  disease that, in its latter stages, can be very crippling.  But
it can be controlled with  antibiotics if caught early.  With warming, we can
expect to see  additional  diffusion of vectors  from the south  into the upper
midwest.  For example,  right now Heliothis  is a problem in sweet  corn  in
southern Minnesota  about one year out of five.  But if we go a few degrees
warmer it could be a problem four years out of five.107
Waggoner  IPM  is an  example  of  more  intensive  use  of information  that  has  been
around for a long time.  What can you learn from the experience with IPM?
Jones  Pesticides  are  used  heavily  in  cotton.  IPM  has  been successful  in cotton
because the cost of  insect control  is very high  -- up to $150 an acre.  When
we  came  along  with  additional  tools,  such  as  fall  stalk  destruction,  host
resistance, and economic  threshold measurements,  it was possible  to make
significant dollar savings.  I think we see less IPM in Minnesota because the
cost of insect control is less here than it is in cotton or some  other crops in
the south.  A soybean field in Minnesota is practically sterile, but in Missouri
the soybean field is  alive with insects and has to be sprayed.
Ruttan  My perception  of the  slow adoption of integrated  pest management  is that
IPM represented a political  compromise between agricultural entomologists
and ecologically-oriented entomologists.  They papered over their differences
with the IPM label, but the technology  really wasn't there.
Jones  That's  partly  correct.  It  was  a  concept  that  was  ahead  of its  time.  An
important  component  of pest  management  is  accurate  predictive  models.
We're still working to develop the predictive models for a lot of crops.  You
have to have  the data before you can feed it into the model.  The data has
been  expensive  to  obtain.  The  hope  of integrated  pest  management,  of
integrating all of the pest control  practices, has fallen short because  of lack
of information.  For example,  we're just  now running  trials  in potatoes  to
determine  the effects of water, verticilim  and leaf hoppers  to try to find out
what's causing something called potato early dying.  It's not due to the simple
effect  of any  one  of these,  but to some  combination  of events.  IPM  will
require data on the interactions  between these different pests.
Rawlins  I think that's an extremely important point.  It bears on your comment that
we will probably be moving toward more diversification in the future, which
will be more management  intensive.  One  reason the farmers have  gone to
monoculture  is that it  is less information  intensive.  You start diversifying,
particularly when you bring animals into the picture, and you have to develop
a whole new set of talents.  One of the challenges to research is to learn how
to  deal with complexity  and  to provide  the tools to  farmers  that will help
them to deal with that complexity.
Clark  I  don't  want  this  five-degree  temperature  change  number  to  become
established by repetition as common knowledge.  The current accepted view,
to  differ  somewhat  with  you,  Margaret,  is  that  if we're  concerned  with
summer temperatures,  which  are the ones  most  significant for most  of the
insect and  pathogen vectors in this part of the world,  we should be  talking
about smaller increases for  the 30 to 60 latitude band.108
Davis  I'm thinking of the projections  from the Manabe-Wetherald 8weather model
only.  But let me return to what I said earlier.  Just wait long enough and you
will get as much temperature  rise as you want.
Clark  All right.  But I really think that if you are careful to make clear that if you
wait long enough,  you can have very large temperature  increases.  But that
isn't a useful contribution in a management and policy orientation discussion.
How much by when is important.  We  should make  a mental footnote that
when we are discussing this worse case upper bound, whether we are talking
about it for  the middle of the next  century or some  time in the indefinite
future.  Five  degrees  isn't the  relevant  number  for most of the reference
points that have been implicit  in the  discussion around the table today.  It
may be  a thoroughly  defensible  number  for  certain  specified  times  in  the
distant future.
Davis  The problem is that whenever  you make a precise  estimate, then you  start
into this argument  about the accuracy of the models.  And it seemed to me
that we spent about an hour yesterday morning discussing the validity of the
models which  isn't something we can really deal with in this group.
Clark  But if your number had been a range of one to five degrees I would have no
quarrel.  But it's locking on a given number and sanctioning it by repetition
that is  dangerous.
Davis  You  have  suggested  two  degrees.  I don't think that's  helpful either.  The
range from one to five is okay.
Jones  A range of one to five can be a huge difference  in terms of impact on insect
populations.
Clark  That's  why the  strategy  that scientists  are now struggling  to put into place
should be one of dealing with uncertainty.
Davis  From a policy  point  of view,  it's  really  useful  to  know  that  there  is that
degree  of uncertainty.  What  the  argument  is about  is  how  expensive  the
warming is going to be relative to how much it will cost to do anything about
it.  It's really useful  to know that a two-degree  warming would cause  some
changes but nothing drastic.  A warming more than that, as far as insects are
concerned, can be really serious.  That's a very important distinction to make.
Clark  Absolutely.  I mean, if somebody could estimate the form of the relationship
between pest virulence  and temperature,  and  decide that the  curve has  a
large kink in it, that's the information the policy debate is madly looking for.
I don't think that science is going to support that sort of thing.  But certainly,
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any  subfield  that  can  come  up with  such  a relationship  will  be  doing  an
incredible  service in focusing the debate on a relevant issue.
Ruttan  It seems to me that an important generalization  comes out of the discussion
in this section.  Beginning about  25 years  ago, certain materials became so
cheap,  fertilizer,  for example,  that we used  the materials as substitutes  for
knowledge.  People were  expensive,  and we let the materials  substitute  for
them.  This took place in both crop nutrition and animal nutrition.  It seems to  me  that  what  we're  saying  now  is  that,  whether  you  think  of  it  as
knowledge intensive,  information intensive,  or management intensive, we're
in  a  situation  where  materials  again  become  expensive,  either  to  the
individual farmer or to society.  This is telling us that we should  substitute
knowledge  for resources  in some sense.  This is the general  principle.
Rawlins  I agree.
Ruttan  The second question  is, how do we get that knowledge  on the ground where
it  can  be  used.  And  it  seems  to  me  in  a society  where  people  are  very
expensive, it becomes economical to use machines to get the knowledge used.
In a society where  people are less expensive, or even cheap, you're going to
have to make a much stronger effort to get that knowledge into the hands of
people.  If everybody  is going to do it on the back of an envelope, they are
going  to  have  to  understand  the  principles.  Extension  programs  in
developing  countries  will have to go beyond teaching practices  to teaching
principles.  Unless you can teach the principles, then people are not going to
be able to do the calculations.
Rawlins  And that might be more costly.
Ruttan  That  kind of extension  is very  manpower  intensive.  In's the kind  that the
World Bank is trying to do with its Training and Visit system.  But extension
workers in developing  countries are very cheap.
Waggoner  The approach  you're talking about is  such a good idea --  why isn't it done?
What  is the experience?  Is  it getting done  or do we just keep  saying we
ought  to do it?
Ruttan  It's very controversial.  The  World Bank T &  V system  is very manpower
intensive.  Many  people  are  worried  about  whether  the  costs  will  be
sustainable when external support is no longer there.  It seems to me we are
talking  about  a  world  in  which  we're  going  to  have  to  be  information
intensive or farmers just aren't going  to be  able to get the productivity out
of the technology  that should  be available  to  them.  Unless  they  have the
schooling or the informal education that will enable them to understand  the
principles involved, the level of rural schooling in a wide range of countries  -
- from  Brazil  to Pakistan --  is  inexcusably  poor.  Until  they  do  something110
about under  investment  in the  schooling  of  rural people,  the productivity
inherent in the technology will be unrealized.
Cheng  I don't think we need to accuse others, because our own approach to teaching
farmers  is often too  simplistic.  For instance, just last week  I heard  a very
disturbing  thing  in  a  neighboring  state  about  nitrogen  recommendations.
Instead  of  teaching  principles,  they  are coming  out  with  a very  simplistic
guideline,  such  as if you have less than,  say,  2 percent  organic matter,  you
can apply fertilizer  up to 200 pounds per acre.  If it's 2 to 4  percent,  apply
160 pounds.  This totally ignores the environmental  impact.
Waggoner  But why are they doing such a thing?
Cheng  I'm asking  our extension  people  if we  are  doing the  same thing.  Are  we
falling in the same trap?  We need to raise these  questions  about our own
programs.
Rawlins  I  agree  that  our  society  is  going  to  have  to  be  more  knowledge  and
information  intensive  but all  of the  knowledge  and  all  of  the information
does  not need to be in the  farmer's head.
Ruttan  Some of it he  can buy.
RESPONSES  TO CLIMATE CHANGE
Nature  Myths and  Policy  Design
Ruttan  I have  asked Steve  Rayner  to think about the implications  of the  kinds  of
uncertainty  we face  in the environmental  and resource area for agricultural
research.  But I don't really know what he is going to talk about.
Rayner  In a way I feel that I'm a little bit of an anomaly at this  meeting.  I don't
have  the  background  in  agriculture  and  some  of  the  appropriate  allied
disciplines that are represented among most of the participants here.  In fact,
my initial training,  before anthropology,  was in philosophy and theology.  It
may  be  quite  appropriate,  however,  since  philosophy  and  theology  are
concerned with the problems of faith and reason.  I have faith that we could
see a 4-degree  temperature rise sometime in the next 100 years.  But reason
tells me that the climate models aren't sufficiently good to let us know if the
4 degrees  are Centigrade  or Fahrenheit  at the moment.
This kind of variation reminds me of the question that Vern asked yesterday
about the optimal  climate.  It reminded me  of a story I heard back when  I
was  a philosophy  student about  a young man who was charged to go home11l
over the weekend and write an essay on the topic, "How Do I Know I Exist".
He returned  on Monday looking very haggard, unshaven and worried,  and
said to his  professor,  "Professor,  you've  got to help  me,  I haven't  slept all
weekend.  I really worried  about it.  Do I exist?"  And the professor  said,
"Well, who wants to know?"
That's the question that we haven't  really asked yet.  Is climate  optimal for
what?  And resources for whom?  So I want to introduce the question of who
wants to know at this  stage, because in a sense, what  I'm proposing is  that,
having started with a topic entitled Resource and Environmental Constraints,
we're  really  adopting  a nature-centered  view  of the problem.  We  could
equally have developed  an anthropocentric view of the problem.  We could
have  started  out  asking what the institutions  are, what  are  their resources,
and how are they threatened  by change.  Resources  are recognized,  or not
recognized,  according  to  a  whole  variety  of  societal  and  institutional
variables.  One  man's  hazardous waste  or noxious  waste  could be another
person's valued resource,  depending  on whether it's piling up in a stable  or
whether  it's  spread  out  over  the  fields.  There's  clearly  some  locational
implications  involved.  There's  also  a question  of activities  and interests.
Where I dwell at the moment in east Tennessee, strip mining is an important
economic activity.  What you have been talking about in the past two days as
"top soil" is called "overburden" by the mining industry.  The terminology puts
a different complexion  on the nature of the resource.
One of the things that emerged over the last two days as the most important
resource constraints are the human resources of institutional information and
capacity, which are defined very differently.  Climate change, in fact, can be
viewed as a resource rather than as something that only impacts on resources.
Certainly  if  you're  in  the  tourist  industry,  climate  is  a  very  important
resource.
Anthropologists  like to tell stories.  I'm going to tell you about the Lele and
the Bushong, two tribes who live in what in now Zaire.  They live on either
side of the Kasai  River in Zaire.  The Bushong say that their summers are
terribly  hot and  difficult.  The Lele  describe  their summers  as being very
leisurely  and  pleasant.  The  standard  climatological  data  gathered  by  the
ethnographers  of these two tribes, doing their research simultaneously in the
1950s, indicates that such measures as temperature and rainfall were identical
on both sides of the river.  There was  no difference.  So what  caused them
to  perceive  climate  differently?  The  most  important  resource  in  both
societies (forgive me the sexist construction here) is women.  In anthropology,
kinship  is commonly  discussed in terms of the exchange  or competition for
women.  The other two relevant resources were raffia cloth and cattle.  The
Lele pay their bride wealth in raffia cloth, which  is gathered by women and
woven by men.  The Bushong pay bride wealth in cattle.  To get access to the
resource of women, you must possess  either raffia cloth or cattle.  Now, the
other  twist is  that the Lele  are polygamous  --  one man,  many wives.  The112
raffia  is  woven  by the  old  men  so  the  old  men  have  a monopoly  on  the
resource  of women.  So there's not really much young men can  do to get a
wife except wait until they're older.  So, in the summer, they sit around under
the palm trees drinking  palm wine and  enjoying the pleasant  climate.  The
Bushong, on the other hand are monogamous.  They pay their bride wealth
in  cattle.  So  a young  man  who  wants  to  get a  woman  works  very hard
through the summer trying  to increase  his herd size so that he can afford a
wife.
Ruttan  My knowledge of cattle breeding is somewhat limited, but I do wonder about
what activities the young men engaged in to increase the cattle numbers?
Rayner  I wouldn't touch that with a ten-foot pole!  But you can see how the incentive
structure and the functional activities cause the two societies to have different
views about what is  an optimal  climate.  I've used an exotic example  here.
But there are more familiar examples.  Energy efficiency  was not viewed  as
a resource by  utilities until very recently because of the emphases of utilities
on demand  expansion.  Now  that attention  has  shifted  to the  supply  side,
utilities  are  now actually  paying  energy  service  companies for the  avoided
costs of having to build new plants to generate  more electricity.  Efficiency
is now seen as a resource.  We've had a transition there in the perception of
what is  recognized as a resource.
There  are  at least three  distinctive  policy  responses  that  can  be  made  to
climatic  change.  Each  has  a moral component.  Each  is supported  by  a
distinctive  myth about the nature of resources.  The first policy response  is
the preventivist  approach.  Just say no to climate change.  And this view is
supported  by  a  naturalistic  philosophical  perspective  that  holds  that  it  is
morally wrong to mess with nature. The myth holds that nature is fragile and
that natural  resources are scarce.  Any slight perturbation will irretrievably
upset the balance  of nature.
There are some fascinating parallels here, with the religious right on the issue
of sex education and with the political left on the issue of civil defense.  The
religious right, at least in my part of the Bible belt, insists that we shouldn't
teach  kids  about  sex because  they'll be  encouraged  to experiment  with  it.
Similarly,  we  find  that  certain  groups  on the  political  left  argue  that we
shouldn't even talk about civil defense because this will encourage people to
accept the  dangerous  myth that nuclear  war is survivable.  We  are told by
hard line preventivists that we shouldn't be talking about adaptation because
this will encourage people in the notion that we can adapt to climate change.
We should be concentrating  on prevention.
The second approach is an adaptivist approach.  This approach is illustrated
very well by the people who erected the statue to the boll weevil.  It may be
no coincidence the town is known as Enterprise, Alabama.  They saw change
as an opportunity.  And just as the boll weevil presented an opportunity for113
the people of Enterprise to change their farming system, climate change may
well present  us  with opportunities  to recognize  new  resources  and  to  use
them in different ways.  Related to this position is the moral judgment that
it's  wrong  to  curtail  development.  For  example,  the  position  that  a
preventivist strategy will condemn the poor peoples  and the poor countries
of the world to a state of continued poverty or underdevelopment  is seen as
morally wrong.  The underlying  nature  myth perceives nature as robust.  It
does not become unbalanced  easily.
These two myths go very far back in American society.  It was represented
in the arguments  over the management of national forests at the turn of the
century.  More  recently,  though,  we've  had  the  sustainable  development
response.  This is a sort of a Hegalian synthesis of the classic dialectic.  The
notion  is  that  growth  should  be  controlled.  The  moral  imperative  is  to
preserve  choice for  future  generations.  There  is an  image  that nature  is
robust within limits.  A certain amount of perturbation can be tolerated, but
one has to be careful not to exceed the limits --  even though we don't know
what the limits are.  These myths  are of particular  importance  when we're
dealing with issues that are attended by extraordinarily high uncertainty, and
where  the  stakes are both high and  long term.  Three  types  of uncertainty
have been identified by people looking at these issues.  Technical  uncertainty
is what we are talking about when we look at the uncertainty bands around
an estimate  or a measurement.  And that very image gives the notion that
uncertainty is always reducible.  As one moves from bench science more into
the broader  environmental  realm,  we frequently  encounter methodological
uncertainty.  Do we even have the appropriate tools for modeling and dealing
with a problem?  Finally, there is epistemological uncertainty.  Epistemology
is the study of whether or not you have appropriate conceptions  for dealing
with a problem.  And clearly that's an issue which affects us in the kinds of
debates we've been having about the extent and nature of climate  change.
There  are  three  kinds  of  stakes  involved  --  local,  societal  and  global.
Different tools are appropriate  for dealing with them.  When you have low
stakes  and  merely  technical  uncertainty,  you pretty much  know  what  the
probabilities are.  However, when you move to methodological  uncertainty
and a medium  decision stakes, you're  moving into much more  uncertainty.
The probabilities are less tractable.  And here decisions  must be more in a
clinical  mode.  However, when we then get up into the area  of high stakes
and  epistemological  uncertainty,  we're  really  in a realm  of indeterminacy.
Very often,  as  in the  climate  area,  we  don't even  know what  the  signs  of
changes  will  be.  For  example,  there  is  still  considerable  debate  about
whether cloud cover is going to provide a positive or a negative feedback for
the climate system.
If you can't increase precision, what do you do?  You try to have  a prudent
response, analogous in some respects to insurance.  The catch here is that the
advocates  of the different  nature  myths  that I talked about  earlier  have  a114
different  approach  to  the  issue  of  prudence.  The  preventivists  focus  on
avoiding  the worst case  costs.  They are willing to spend  a lot  of money  in
insurance  that  may not  be  needed.  This  can  create  considerable  societal
discord.
I want to now try to distinguish between two types of resource impact that we
might want to consider in further research.  We have a project at Oak Ridge
where we're  doing a review  of the programs  that U.S./AID  has  in place  as
to whether they ameliorate or exacerbate the issue of climate change.  What
we have  tried to do  in a first cut was  to distinguish  two kinds  of resource
impacts.  The  long-term  secular  changes  and  the  sort  of  short-term
emergencies  that  are  likely  to  come  along  before  we  get  to  whatever
temperature  changes  may be  occurring  in the middle  of the next  century.
The interesting thing is that we're already seeing the cumulative  impacts  of
urbanization, transmigration, and others.  Our view is that it makes perfectly
good  sense  to  discuss  these  as  if they  were  problems  of  decision  under
uncertainty and possibly under risk.  We already have the tools to deal with
these problems.
The longer term issues are  likely to  fall in two areas.  One is the industrial
metabolism, particularly energy use.  The other will be land-use  change  on
a global scale.
We  spoke  yesterday  about  the  importance  of energy  conservation  in  the
United States.  Biomass is considered  by researchers  at Oak Ridge at least,
a  serious  contributor  to  the  very  long-term  reduction  of greenhouse  gas
emission.  By  the  year  2,000,  the  developing  countries  and  newly
industrialized  countries  will  contribute  more  to  CO2 emissions  than  the
industrial world (Figure  2).  We feel that biomass technology is going to be
very, very important for these developing countries if they are going to avoid
more intensive  use  of coal  --  the energy  equivalent  of heroin.  And  it may
also  be worth  our while  to  consider  whether  the  United  States  would  be
getting a bigger bang for its buck in terms of C02 reduction  by developing
and transferring  biomass  technologies  to developing countries.  We can try
to reduce our own emissions through accelerating replacement of the existing
plant  generating  stock  in  the  United  States.  But  we  really  need  to  be
thinking about the interaction of agricultural  and energy systems on a global
scale.  Unless we  get a serious handle  on the global emissions problems,  it
won't  make  much  difference  whether we  close  down our  coal  fired power
stations in  10 or the next 40 years.
Implementation  of a biomass  program raises the whole question  of market
failure.  We've  had a lot of research  on market failure in energy  efficiency
research.  Pierre  raised  the  issue  yesterday when  he  asked  why,  if energy
efficiency  technologies  are  available, they  aren't  being introduced.  We've
identified  several  reasons.  One  is  the  high  first  cost  problem.  Highly
efficient  compact  fluorescent  bulbs  are  available  that  can  replace115
incandescent lights, and considerable amounts of money and energy over the
life of the bulb.  They  cost $25.  When you  stop at the hardware  store  on
Saturday morning to replace a light bulb, you may not feel like splashing out
$25.
The  other  problem  is  the  split  incentive  problem.  The  people  who,  in
particular,  occupy commercial and industrial buildings are generally not the
owners,  and certainly were  not the builders.  Owners  and builders  have an
incentive to install the lowest first cost appliances into buildings, not the ones
that are most efficient to run over the life of the  building.
Let me now turn to the issue of land use transformation.  At Oak Ridge we
are trying to bring together a variety of people from the social  sciences and
from the biophysical sciences to work out integrated models of how resources
are perceived, used and transformed.  At the moment, we're simply trying to
develop  simple algebraic  models of the various parts  of the system.  We're
not at the point yet where we've developed  any computer simulations.  The
time  has  come  to  move  away  from  seeing  land  use  change  in traditional
social science  terms, or in traditional biophysical  terms.
In  closing  I  want  to  address  the  broader  issue  of  information  flows.
Yesterday  Vern  suggested  that  I  talk  about  international  policy.  The
traditional  model  of  international  relations  was  relationships  among
governments.  Nation  states would make  their  own decisions  according  to
their own national  political  cultures  and  agendas.  They  would then come
together  at the governmental  level, formulate  some kind  of consensus,  and
embody it in a treaty, which they would then be individually responsible  for
enforcing within whatever framework of international law applied.  This was
very  much  the  model  that  was  followed  in  the  attempt  to  ban  CFCs  in
aerosols.  The aerosol ban, one of the precursors  to the Montreal protocol,
failed.  It was  also  much  the model  for  the  negotiations  around  the U.N.
convention  on the  Law  of the  Sea, to  which  the  U.S.  eventually  did not
become  a signatory.  In this model,  it's  assumed  that the  decision makers
know what the national self-interest  is when they go into those negotiations.
The assumption is that the science is already pretty clear.
Now, there was a dispute between the E.C. countries,  U.S., Canada and the
Scandinavian  countries, over the science of CFC's and aerosols.  When this
dispute  is  described  in  the  United  States  it's usually  described  in  rather
cynical  terms  to  the  effect  that  the  Europeans  were  simply  interested  in
stepping  into  the  market  niche  that  the  Americans  might  vacate  through
decreasing  CFC production.  However,  if one  looks  at the  way  science  is
incorporated into governmental  decision making in different countries,  one
can  see  that,  in  fact,  a  lot  of the  disagreement  was  associated  with  the
problems  of how  the  different  societies  dealt with  uncertainty  in  science.
The  United  States  and  the  Scandinavian  countries  were  moving  towards
avoiding  the  worst-case  scenarios  whereas  the  European  Economic116
Community  countries  were  concentrating  much  more  on  avoiding  the
opportunity  costs.  Given  the  failure  of  the  aerosol  ban,  there  was  an
explosion of direct networking  among non-governmental  organizations  such
as scientific, technical and industrial groups across national boundaries.  We
had things like  the development  of the Council for Responsible  CFC Use.
American  environmentalists  went  to  talk  to  West  Germans  and  West
Germans  talked  to  the  United  Kingdom.  There  was  a proliferation  of
information  flows directly  across  national boundaries.  By the  time of the
Montreal meeting, a consensus on a course of action had already been agreed
on.  It was only necessary to go through the process of symbolic confirmation
--  which  is what the Montreal  protocol  amounts  to.  It's not the means  by
which we're going to reduce CFC emissions.  As an anthropologist, of course,
I think symbols are very important.  But if we were serious that the Montreal
protocol was going to have the effect of reducing CFC emissions, we couldn't
have  allowed the  Soviet Union  to become  signatories  and open new  CFC
factories -- which in fact we agreed to do.  But the people who were involved
were  smart  enough  to  recognize  that,  in  the  long  run,  it  is  much  more
important  to have the  Soviets involved,  even  symbolically,  than to  quibble
over the details.  I have described  this use of specific  kinds  of expertise  to
deal  with  global  problems  as  "thinking  globally  and  acting  locally".  My
colleague, Luther  Gerlach, who  is in the Anthropology Department here  at
Minnesota,  has pointed out  that the ability to think globally is itself a very
specific  kind  of local  knowledge  that  is  restricted  to  really  quite  a  small
community in the world.
Let me now turn to climate change.  The U.S. initially opposed participation
in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), until the Bellagio
meetings, at which the SCOPE project,  which is  one of those international
scientific  organizations,  first turned its attention  to policy issues.  The U.S.
and other governments  sensed that the lead was being taken by the World
Meteorological  Organization  rather than  being led by  governments.  The
Bellagio  reports  didn't have  government  fingerprints  on them.  They were
policy  documents without  government fingerprints.  Governments  felt they
had  to deal  themselves  back in.  An  Intergovernmental  Panel  on Climate
Change was formed that involved much of the expertise that was previously
involved  in direct interactions  across national boundaries.  That expertise is
now  being  redirected  back  into  the  more  traditional  model  of
intergovernmental  decision  making.  We  have  a  hybrid  between  the
traditional model  that I first  described and the polycentric model.
Now, the reason why I discussed  this example  is because  in the agricultural
area, we have a whole series of cross national institutions -- the Consultative
Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), and others -- which
are capable of collaboration across national boundaries without having to go
through  government  processes.  These  organizations  may  be  one  way  to
intervene in countries where the governments itself is very often a very large
part  of  the  problem.  Part  of  the  solution  is  the  development  of  non-117
governmental  organizations  in  developing  countries  with  which  direct
interaction  can  occur with our  non-governmental  organizations  to transfer
knowledge  and  transfer  technology  and  to  conceptualize  the  issues  in  a
manner that induces changes in policy.
Waggoner  What's  the value  of attempting to narrow the probabilities with  respect to
future  climates?
Rayner  One thing I didn't talk about was Coase  and Rawls  (1971).  Their problem
is,  "How  do  you  seek  a  fair  solution  to  a  problem,  such  as  the
intergenerational problem, where there are both winners and losers?"  Coase,
who  is  an  economist,  says  that the  way you  get  a fair  solution  is  that you
reduce the uncertainties to an absolute minimum so you know exactly who's
going to win by how much, and who's going to lose by how much.  You then
allow the participants to negotiate a redistribution in which either the losers
bribe the winners  not to win, or the winners  compensate  the losers for the
loss.  Rawls,  on  the other  hand,  argues  that  won't work  for  a variety  of
reasons, including the fact that you never have equal market power on both
sides.  Rawls  suggests that one way to get  a fair solution, particularly when
you  can't know who the winners  or  losers  are going  to be,  is  to ask  what
solution each player would  chose in the absence  of knowledge about which
side he or she will be on.  That gets you a fair outcome.
Waggoner  Does that mean shut down all the sources of CFC?
Ravner  It suggests that we don't pursue greater precision in scientific knowledge until
we figure out how it relates to the equity issues.  On the other hand, Coase
is saying that the scientific  knowledge must be very precise in order to have
an equitable solution.  The problem is that neither of these courses of action
are achievable.
Waggoner  But we are always faced with a choice of where we're going to put our chips
in allocating our science resources.
Rayner  I  would  pursue  the  Coasean  solution to  the  short-term  emergency  issues
where we do have enough  reasonably good information.  For the long-term
problems  in determining  issues, put the money into increasing institutional
and  societal  resiliency  so  that we  can  better respond  to  great certainty  as
more knowledge becomes available.  I suggest pursuing the Rawlsian strategy
for the latter category.
Chen  It seems to me that the CFC case is one where there is enough information
for most climatologists to agree that the change is coming.  This provides the
motivation to want to negotiate.  But there is not agreement on the regional
distribution.  There is, therefore, uncertainty  about winners and losers.  Do
you think that the disagreements  are about the science or because  of biases118
about winners  and  losers?  You don't have  any  cynical view  of why  some
people  are  claiming uncertainties, do you?
Rayner  I  don't  think  that  people  are  deliberately  and  cynically  manipulating
uncertainties,  giving their own views  an advantage.  But I do  think that we
have  these  underlying  myths  about  the  nature  of  nature  that  introduce
ideological  considerations into policy preferences.
Research  Resource  Allocation
Ruttan  I now want to turn to Steve  Rawlins and ask what we've learned about how
we should be using our research  resources.
Rawlins  I've been stimulated by Steve's discussion, particularly  the point that before
we  decide  what  to  do,  we  ought  to  think  about  who  needs  to  have  the
answers.  One  problem  agriculture  faces  is  that it  does not  have  a single
customer.  We had a very useful discussion yesterday by Steve Sonka on food
security.  It that the central issue agriculture should address?  If it is, it is the
consumers of food that we should be concerned  about.  Or is it the producer
and the profitability of his enterprise?  Or should we be concerned about the
environment  and the health of rural communities?
Ruttan  I would think that the decisions that we're thinking about that this discussion
would be  more  relevant  for  research  decision  making  at the  CGIAR,  the
USDA, the state experience  stations and the granting agencies.  I guess one
way I would ask the question is, given what we think we know about the next
20-40 years, and having some sense  about the uncertainties, how should we
change our research portfolio.  Part of that research portfolio might include
research to improve our knowledge  about the future.  It might also include
greater effort to monitor the changes so that we know what is happening, and
in what direction the changes are taking us.
Rawlins  So I guess maybe  my cynical response would be that you are suggesting that
we should be primarily concerned about ourselves.
Ruttan  No, we're concerned  about  the producers  and consumers  because  they put
the money in our pay check
Waggoner  The word portfolio is important.
Rawlins  Certainly that is true.  I suppose we could divide our multiple concerns into
two broad categories:  (a) the impacts of the environment on agriculture;  and
(b) the impact of agriculture  on the environment.  By environment I mean
everything  external to the agricultural  system, including political  and  social
as  well  as  physical,  chemical  and  biological  elements.  The  framework119
developed  by the IPCC provides a useful division of research responsibilities
--  science understanding, impacts assessment  and response strategies.  One
thing  is  clear.  Agricultural  research  needs to  interact with the rest  of the
scientific  community.
Looking  specifically  at  research  related  to  global  environmental  change
agriculture  has  contributions  to  make  in  all  three  IPCC  categories.  To
develop a more complete understanding of the system agriculture can make
better measurements  of biogeochemicial  fluxes  of greenhouse  gases  from
agriculture, contribute to a better understanding of the biosphere component
of the carbon cycle and bring our understanding of soil and hydrology to bear
on the inputs needed to improve GCMs.  In the area of impacts assessment
I was  intrigued  with  Steve's suggestion  for linking  the biophysical  land use
models  with  models  of  the  socio-economic  system.  Population  is  an
important driver in this system that can not be ignored.  If we deal only with
physics, chemistry and biology we'll fall short of coming up with answers that
are needed.  Only after we  understand  the system and its interactions,  and
the social and economic impacts of environmental  changes on the system can
we develop  rational response  strategies  and policies.  Unfortunately, much
of what we are  doing now is  not directed toward the ultimate  development
of policy.  We need to create these linkages.  Making an attempt to outline
policies  now will  help  reveal  the specific  knowledge  gaps  that need  to  be
filled.  Response  strategies  should  include both  strategies  to  help prevent
negative  environmental  changes  as well  as  strategies  adapt  to  changes  by
increasing the resiliency of agricultural production  systems.
Finally, we  need  be  aware  of the  critical  relationship  between  water  and
agricultural production.  Water is the lifeblood, and most frequently limiting
factor for agricultural production.  Not only is agriculture the largest user of
water, if you include forests and rangeland, it is one of the major sources of
water.  How these resources are managed  can have  a substantial impact on
the nation's water supply.
Ruttan  The water issue came up very strongly in our previous  consultation.  It came
up again in this one.  And in the consultation or health issues, it's going  to
come up again.  It's going to be a central  issue.
Rawlins  It  is  rapidly  becoming  the  most  limiting  environmental  variable  as  far  as
agricultural production  is concerned.
A third  research  priority  should  involve  the  design  of response  strategies.
They should include both prevention  and adaptation.  We ought to be very
seriously  concerned  about  developing  greater  resiliency  within  our  food
system.  As  information  is  becoming  more  intensive,  the  system  should
become more resilient.  Agricultural research also needs to be involved in the
design of strategies  to help prevent global warming.  A first step is to more
carefully  assess the impact of agricultural  systems  on the radioactive  gases120
that are being emitted from agriculture.  After we  need to assess it and to
measure  it,  we  need  to  develop  practices  that  will  minimize  emissions,
particularly methane and  carbon.  I think agriculture  has an opportunity to
be on the positive side of carbon flux by sequestering carbon.  I think there
are opportunities  through reduced  tillage  to increase  organic  matter in the
soil.  We must be involved because agriculture  occupies such a large part of
the land area.
Ruttan  Let me now turn to Gene Allen.
Allen  This  conference  is  a  good  example  of  driving  home  concerns  about
agriculture  and  the environment  that have  got to come  closer  together  on
both the input and the output side.
The concept of sustainable  agriculture will become increasingly important in
the decades ahead.  But it is not as widely accepted at this point as it should
be.  I've  used  the  example  of holistic  medicine  as  an  analogy.  Holistic
medicine is a very appropriate  concept in thinking about health. But it is not
an  acceptable  term  in the  health  professions,  because  in  the past,  it was
associated with quackery.  The concept  of sustainable  agriculture is not yet
that  contaminated.  But  it  was  promoted  originally  as  only  organic  or
chemically  free,  when  this  is  only  one  aspect  of it.  Other  terms  such  as
alternative  or  low  input  agriculture  have  been  used,  but  sustainability
captures  more  of the concept  at the  intuitive level.  An agriculture  that  is
sustainable  must  also  be  profitable.  If  we  can  accept  the  concept  of
sustainability, it can be used to provide  a philosophical foundation for our
research priorities.
I  think  the  other  thing  that  is  important  for  our  research  programs  to
recognize  is  that  there's  not just  one  kind  of land use  in Minnesota,  the
United  States,  or  in  the  world.  In  Minnesota,  for  example,  we  devote
approximately 20 million acres to cropland, 18 million acres to forestry, and
5  million acres to recreation  uses.  There  are  7 million  acres  of peatlands.
About  5  million  acres  are  in  multiple  use  --  forestry  and  recreation.
Agricultural  land uses  have  undergone  significant  change.  Land  used  for
crop production has declined in the Northeast.  But maize and soybeans have
moved north in the West and Northwest parts of the state.  The structure  of
agriculture is increasingly  bimodal.  We have both small farmers and large
commercial  farmers  whose  needs must  be  addressed.  The  distribution  is
more bimodal than it was 20  or 25 years ago.
When  one  also  considers  the  need  to  bring  together  the  agriculture,
environmental,  food safety, water quality, profitability,  and trade dimensions,
the  system  becomes  exceedingly  complex.  We  need  good  disciplinary
sciences.  But we have also got to go beyond the reductionist mode and learn
how to integrate our knowledge  and our technology.  One of the things I am
very excited about in the initiative for agriculture  research proposed by the121
NAS/NRC Board  of Agriculture,  is that 40 percent  of the  new funding  is
proposed to go to interdisciplinary teams.  We believe this is not only needed
for  applied  agricultural  research,  but  also  in  many  areas  that  have  been
funded primarily by single investigator disciplinary grants.
Another point that I want to make is about  my concern that politicians  are
making  decisions  about  science  without  the  needed  scientific  input.  A
problem  that  we  have  in  this  country,  at  least  in my  view,  is  that we're
thinking more locally and acting more locally.  We must bring to the general
populace  a  greater  understanding  of  some  of  the  scenarios  that  we're
discussing if we expect the politicians to change.  And just as an example, too
few of our undergraduates today are coming out of universities  without any
general sense of the issues that relate to food and hunger, natural resources
or the environment.
Ruttan  Thanks,  Gene.  I will  now go around the table  and see what  other people
would like to put on the agenda in terms of research priorities,  or what they
think should be highlighted  out of this day and a half.
Waggoner  We  must  learn  how  to  choose  amongst  the  possible  abatements  and
adaptions  Steve Sonka has  spoken  more clearly to than  anyone  else here.
Then we must find the obstacles that are stopping us from  doing the things
that we know how to do.  We must continuously develop and test and adapt
crops and systems outdoors.  We must quantify the effect of land use on the
parameters  of carbon and water exchange.  This is not only important as an
input to global circulation models, but it will also determine the limits that
can be put on agriculture  by those attempting  to slow the climate  change.
Rosenberg  In the article that Pierre and I did for Scientific American  (1989), we tried
to get a handle on the kinds of environmental  deterioration  that are caused
by agriculture  -- desertification,  salinization, and erosion, for example.  We
were both extremely frustrated by the poor quality of the data on which we
could  draw.  The  reliability  of the knowledge  base  on land  use  and  land
degradation  is woefully inadequate.  It seems to me that we have  to find  a
way  to improve  the way  we  characterize  and  document  the  magnitude  of
environmental problems.
Coming at it  from another side  is  the  International  Geosphere-Biosphere
Program.  I served  on the first IGBP  committee.  One  of the ideas that I
thought most useful at the time came to be called the Geosphere Biosphere
Observatory  --  a network of stations  where  important  observations  of land
change process could be made systematically  and over long periods of time.
Scientists in the developing countries could be enlisted to work on monitoring
of natural  resource  problems,  such as  erosion,  salinity,  and  desertification.
These are immediate problems that should be able to maintain the interest
of LDC governments.122
Chen  I want to follow up  on the interdisciplinary  research  issue.  It seems  to me
that there are three areas of concern.  One is the problem of working at the
natural  and social  science boundary.  The  second  is the  interface  between
climatology and agriculture.  I organized a meeting in February at IIASA on
the issue of using climate scenarios in impact studies.  There is a whole range
of issues here that really need a lot more technical work.  The third area is
the food security-hunger  nexus.  A systems  view will be very important for
determining  the constraints on sustainable  agriculture.
Allen  Do undergraduates  at your university have the option of taking a course  in
world hunger  as part of their general  education requirements?
Chen  We now offer an introductory course and one or two follow-up courses.  I've
been teaching a course on environmental  policy in the developing world that
relates to a lot of the issues here.
Rayner  I'm still not quite sure why it is that, in an institution like Oak Ridge, which
is predominately  engineering and  natural  sciences,  the social  sciences  also
seem to thrive.  But one of the things that I would like to emphasize  about
interdisciplinary  research  is  that  it  is  very  difficult.  We  have  found,  for
example, in our land-use project that you can talk with colleagues from other
disciplines, thinking you understand each other for several hours or days, then
suddenly discover that you've been talking past each other.  A lot of patience
is  required.  It is going  to be  a real  challenge  to the way in which  we  do
science, both in our laboratories  and our universities.
So as far as a research agenda is concerned, the issue of biomass for energy
would  be high up on my agenda.  And, as I've learned at this meeting from
Steve Rawlins, the issue of biomass for lignocellulose  food sources could be
very important.  It may be particularly important  for developing  countries;
even in this  country  as a source  of cattle feed.  Something  like  a hundred
million tons a year of grain in this country  is used feeding  livestock.
In the institutional area,  though, which is really the one in which I feel that
I have the most competence,  I think I would like to see a focus on resource
management.  Attention to the issue of market failure and institutional design
are also important.  We know, for example, how price support systems distort
markets.  We have seen in recent years a very strong emphasis on the private
sector  in  developing  countries.  Sometimes  this  has  been  productive,
sometimes  it  has  been  counterproductive.  There  has  been  failure  to
recognize  that  common  property  systems  that  are  capable  of  effectively
managing resources  do indeed exit in different parts of the world.  We are,
in fact,  in danger  of perpetrating  a  loss  of institutional  diversity.  In other
words, we're  losing a lot of the small-scale  institutions  that we  could learn
from to understand how to handle the big-scale problems better.  The second
in the three models of international decision I referred to earlier was actually123
derived  by  Luther  Gerlach  and  myself by  looking  at decision  making  in
African tribal societies.
Finally, I think that it makes perfectly good sense to develop policies that are
capable  of responding to the short-term local impacts  of climate  change.  I
am referring to issues like flooding,  refugees, epidemics,  and others.
Jones  I think  we  should  concentrate  efforts  on pesticide  alternatives.  This  is  a
simplistic approach to the water quality issue.  If you could just eliminate the
pesticides, then outside of nitrogen you've solved water quality problems.  Of
course, we can't do that overnight.  But I think we have to be careful with the
water  quality problem not to make another acid  rain case where you know
what needs to be done, but don't do it.
We  have  to  emphasize  integrated  management  approaches,  not  only
integrated pest management, but crop management programs.  There's a lot
going on in biology in the high tech area, but there's really been a decline  in
the nuts and bolts stuff.  Since  1971, the number of entomologists employed
by the state and federal level has  decreased  by 30 percent.  And that same
thing  is happening in the other biological fields.
Another area I would like  to make some comment about is the assumption
that Third World countries should implement environmental programs using
the same criteria we use in the United  States.  I'd like  to quote something
written by an entomologist, B.D. Walsh, in 1866.  "Let a man profess to have
discovered  some  new  patent  medicine  and people will  listen  to  him  with
attention and respect.  But tell them of any simple common sense plan based
upon scientific principles  and they will laugh you to scorn."9 Not a lot has
changed since  1866.  We are imposing our risk-benefit parameters on  Third
World countries when it is likely to be very difficult.
Bochniarz  We  now  need  social  science  research  to  be  more  concerned  about
understanding institutional diversity, particularly political institutions.  On the
question  of  regulation  and  deregulation,  we  need  to  introduce  an
international  perspective  that  draws  on  more  diverse  experience.  The
problem of internalizing  externalities  is perhaps largely unimportant.
Munson  One of the things  that we need  to do is  figure  out better  ways to increase
efficiencies in input use.  Water is becoming one of our most limiting factors
in our production system.  We need to take a much closer look at the water
use efficiency  of our various  crops  and how that interacts with  other input
use.
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Larson  And I agree with a lot that's already been said.  We need to inventory our
natural resources so that they can be identified on a spatially accurate basis
and then develop  data bases that characterize  these natural resource  units.
We  need  to  bring  these  data  bases  together  for  use  in  development,
management  and  impact  assessment.  This  is in contrast with the trial and
error method of research often used in agriculture.
Cheng  I think one of the  things we  need to do is  achieve  closer articulation of the
sciences with the social sciences and the humanities.  I was recently speaking
with someone  in the  humanities,  and  I  asked  him if he  ever thought  that
agriculture  is part of a culture.  Agriculture  is different in different countries
because culture is different.  And agriculture in turn has affected the culture.
His first reaction was  quite negative, but after we talked  a bit, he became
interested enough to want to incorporate the idea into a world culture course.
Steve's  comment about the decreasing institutional  diversity  reminds me  of
the experience a friend of mine, Jim Cook, had in China.  He went to China
in  1978  with the first plant pathology delegation.  When  he  came back he
said, "You know, the Chinese  are practicing integrated  pest management!"
That technology,  perhaps suited to that particular  agricultural  system, may
not be suited to our system.  During the 10 years I've been going to China,
I am worried  that increased  use of pesticides  has  almost totally eliminated
the  traditional  concept  of integrated  pest  management.  Another  area  of
technical  knowledge that was  almost lost was  crop rotation in this  country.
With the introduction  of chemical  inputs, we went  to continuous  corn  and
continuous wheat.  When we started  looking  back, we  found  that we have
been  misled  by  ourselves  because  the  yield  increases  have  masked  the
deterioration in soil quality.
Davis  There  are  two  new  sub-disciplines  that are  developing  within  the  field  of
ecology that are relevant to a lot of the discussions we've had here.  One  is
landscape  ecology.  The  other is  conservation  biology.  The  emergence  of
these fields have resulted in the formation of new scientific societies and new
journals.  There  are  new  courses  and  new  graduate  curricula.  Certainly
ecologists  are  concerned  with natural  landscapes,  but  they  recognize  that
landscape  is very  much  shaped  by human  activity.  Many  of the problems
we've been discussing here really fall within the purview of landscape ecology.
Similarly, human impacts are creating many of the problems in conservation
biology;  there  are  very  interesting  basic  scientific  issues  that  have  to  be
addressed in developing strategies  for conservation  of species.
The  need  for  basic  ecological  research  on  the  interface  between  human
impacts and natural impacts on the landscape  has resulted  in the formation
of a new journal called Ecological Applications., 1 which is trying to deal with
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the literature that falls in the area between applied biology and basic biology.
Much  of what we've  been  discussing  here  is  really  systems  or  ecosystems
research.  These new developing fields of landscape ecology and conservation
biology are evidence  that ecologists  are moving in your direction.  But  are
you  moving in our direction?  For instance,  I teach  a course  in ecosystem
ecology.  Faculty from Agriculture  come in as guest lecturers to present about
10 percent  of the lectures  in the  course.  I've  had  students  from  forestry,
wildlife, and fisheries, but I don't believe I have ever had a student from any
of the  agriculture  disciplines.  It  seems  to  me that  training  in  ecological
research is essential for students in agriculture.  Most students in ecology are
very much interested in problems  such as those we've been discussing here.
Some of my students, for instance, have taken a course in tropical agriculture.
I think we can easily establish better communication  than we have now.
Abrahamson  First, I want to thank Vern for  the meeting.  At least for me it's been very
valuable.  I've gotten a big kick out of it, in fact.  I agree with Steve Rawlins
on his  opening  comments,  that  agriculture  has not been  very  sensitive  to
environmental concerns.  I was pleased to hear that there is some sensitivity
that's developing, at least if this group is representative.  On the other hand,
I've been very  uneasy here.  I grew up on a Minnesota farm.  I remember
when the first tractors were bought and I helped bring home the first bag of
fertilizer.  Then I spent  nearly 20 years working as an applied physicist.  I
enjoy machines and technology, but when I sit here and hear this kind of high
tech agriculture talk, I get real nervous.  I just don't like management.  And
what  we're  talking  about  here  is  turning  the  whole  world  into  a  zoo.
Conservation biology is coming along just in time to study natural systems as
they go down the tube.
I clearly have a great deal of the preventivist theology that Steve described.
But the choice  is not between adapting and limiting.  If we're going to avoid
what  I think will  be really  catastrophic  changes  down  the line,  we have  to
limit emissions  of these gases and we have to do it vigorously.  That means
limiting  fossil  fuels  consumption  and  ending  deforestation.  Fossil  fuels
account for about 60 percent of the greenhouse gases.  We heard today that
deforestation  accounts  for someplace  between  10  and  25.  But also we've
got to adapt to or cope with those very large changes which are unavoidable.
Now, the costs of coping are very high.  Even though you can go a long way
with  technical  fixes,  it  will  not  be  enough.  It's  necessary  but  it's  not
sufficient.  The  required  changes  will  demand  true  grass  roots  political
support and public understanding to marshall these resources.  Norm, that's
why  I'm  an  advocate.  I  do  advocacy  because  I just  don't  see  any way  to
marshall the resources and political support to deal with these  issues unless
there  is  a  public  that  understands  the  implications  of  inaction  and  not
providing those resources.
Sanchez  I  thoroughly  enjoy  this  meeting,  particularly  the  broad  philosophical
perspective  provided  by Steve  Rayner.  By  all  means  we  should  get  away126
from the extremes of being too catastrophic or too utopian.  We need more
emphasis  on the abatement  technologies.  But abatement  technologies have
been around for some  time.  The question,  that Paul Waggoner  and Pierre
Crosson kept raising is how come technologies  are not utilized, has not been
answered.  We  should  focus more on the technologies  that have a win-win
potential,  that  both  increase  production  and  have  positive  environmental
gains.
My second point is that I'm just fascinated by the efforts to put some realistic
economic  values  on  environmental  costs.  The  problem  of internalizing
externalities calls  for some institutional innovations.
There were several very important observations made in the last several days.
H.H.  Cheng  observed  that  methane  emission  from  paddy rice  is  likely  to
occur only at very low redox potentials.  Most of the rice fields will not have
those  low redox  potentials.  What  is going  on?  The  people  who work  in
methane certainly should look at the  chemistry more carefully.  Bill Larson
comments that desertification  is reversible is very important.
Agronomists  and  other  agricultural  scientists  are  turning  to  ecology  in  a
serious  way.  At  my own  institution,  our  soil  scientists,  entomologists  and
foresters  are  taking  courses  in  ecosystems.  Conservation  biologists  are
learning about  soils, plant and animal science.  They are also learning.
Ruttan  I want to apologize  for keeping people so  long from their lunch.  But I do
appreciate people coming here for two days and engaging in this very intense
dialogue.  I have learned  a great deal.  I also want  to let Bob Herdt know
that we  appreciate  the  support  the  Rockefeller  Foundation  has  given  to
support  this effort.  It's been nice having you here.
ISSUES  AND  PRIORITIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
Ruttan  As we look even further into the next century,  there is a growing concern,  as
noted  earlier,  about  the  impact of a series  of resource  and environmental
constraints  that may seriously impinge  on our capacity to sustain growth  in
agricultural production.  One set of concerns  centers on the environmental
impacts  of  agricultural  intensification.  These  include  groundwater
contamination  from  plant  nutrients  and  pesticides,  soil  erosion  and
salinization,  the growing resistance  of insect pests and pathogens and weeds
to present methods of control, and the contribution of agricultural production
and land use changes to global climate change.  The second set of concerns
stems from the effects of industrial intensification on global climate change.
It  will  be  useful,  before  presenting  some  of  the  findings  of  the  second
consultation,  to  briefly  characterize  our  state  of knowledge  about  global
climate change.127
There can no longer be any question that the accumulation of carbon dioxide
(CO2)  and  other  greenhouse  gasses  --  principally  methane  (CH,),  nitrous
oxide (N 2O), and chlorofluorocarbons (CFC's) -- will set in motion a process
that will result in some rise in global average surface temperatures  over the
next 30-60 years.  There is substantial disagreement about whether warming
due to greenhouse  gasses has already been detected.  And there continues to
be great uncertainty about the increases in temperature that can be expected
to occur at any particular date or location in the future.
The bulk of carbon  dioxide  emissions  come  from fossil fuel  consumption.
Carbon  dioxide  accounts  for  roughly  half  of radiative  forcing  (Figure 3).
Biomass  burning,  cultivated  soils, natural  soils, and  fertilizers  account  for
close  to  half  of nitrous  oxide  emissions.  Most  of the  known  sources  of
methane  are  a  product  of  agricultural  activities  --  principally  enteric
fermentation in ruminant animals, release  of methane from rice production
and other  cultivated wetlands,  and biomass burning.  Estimates  of nitrous
oxide and methane  sources have a very fragile empirical base.  Nevertheless,
it appears that agriculture and related land use could account for somewhere
in the neighborhood  of 25 percent of radiative forcing.  On a regional basis
the  United  States  contributes  about  20 percent  and  western  and  easter
Europe  and  the  USSR  about  30 percent  of  radiative  forcing  by  all
greenhouse gasses.  In the near future contributions to radiative forcing from
the Third  World will exceed that of the OECD and what used to be called
the centrally planned economies.
During  the  consultation,  Steve  Rayner,  as  well  as  several  others,
characterized  the  alternative  policy  approaches  to  the  threat  of  global
warming  as preventivist and  adaptionist.  It seems  clear that a preventivist
approach  could involve about five policy options.  They include reduction in
fossil  fuel  use,  or  capture  of  CO2 emissions  at  the  point  of  fossil  fuel
combustion,  reduction in the intensity  of agricultural production, reduction
of  biomass  burning,  expansion  of  biomass  production,  and  energy
conservation.
The  simple  enumeration  of  these  policy  options  should  be  enough  to
introduce considerable  caution about assuming that radiative forcing will be
limited to anywhere near present levels.  Let me be more specific.  Fossil fuel
use  will  be  driven,  on the  demand  side,  largely  by  the  rate  of economic
growth in the Third World and by improvements  in energy efficiency in the
developed and the centrally planned  economies.  On the supply side it will
be  constrained  by  the  rate  at  which  alternative  energy  sources  will  be
substituted for fossil fuels.  Of these only energy efficiency and conservation
are likely to make any significant contribution over the next generation.  And
the  speed  with which  it will  occur  will  be  limited  by  the  pace  of capital
replacement.  Significant reversal of agricultural  intensification,  reduction in
biomass burning,  or increase in biomass absorption is unlikely to be realized
within the next generation.  The institutional infrastructure  or institutional128
resources  that would be required do  not exist  and will  not be put in place
rapidly  enough to make  a significant difference.
This  recapitulation  forces  me,  although  reluctantly,  into  adopting  an
adaptionist  approach  in  attempting  to  assess  the  implications  of  global
climate change for future agricultural research agendas.  It also forces me to
agree,  as Dean Abrahamson insisted during the consultation, that we will not
be able to rely solely on a technological  fix to the global warming problem.
The fixes, whether  driven by preventivist  or adaptionist  strategies, must be
both technological  and institutional.
In this context, an adaptionist strategy implies moving as rapidly as possible
to design and put in place the institutions needed to remove the constraints
that  intensification  of  agricultural  production  are  currently  imposing  on
sustainable  increases  in  agricultural  production.  Examples  would  include
(a)  the policies  and institutions needed  to rationalize water use in western
United  States and the Indus  Basin in Pakistan;  (b)  to manage  the use  and
development of coastal wetlands and shorelands to limit contemporary losses
to property  and human  life;  (c)  or to  deal with groundwater  management,
including the effect of pollution resulting from agricultural intensification, in
both developed and developing  countries.  If we are successful in designing
the institutions and implementing the policies needed to confront these and
other contemporary problems, we will be in a better position to respond  to
the  more  uncertain  changes  that will  emerge  as  a result  of future  global
climate change.
Let me now turn to some of the research implications that emerged from the
consultation.
1.0  A major research program on incentive compatible institutional design should
be initiated.  The first research priority is to initiate a large-scale  program of
research  on  the  design  of  institutions  capable  of  implementing  incentive
compatible  resource  management  policies  and  programs.  By  incentive
compatible institutions I mean institutions capable of achieving compatibility
between individual,  organizational,  and social objectives.  A major source of
the global warming and environmental  pollution problem is the direct result
of the  operation  of institutions  which  induce  behavior  by  individuals,  and
public  agencies  that are not compatible with societal  development  --  some
might  say  survival  --  goals.  In  the  absence  of  more  efficient  incentive
compatible  institutional  design,  the  transaction  costs  involved  in  ad  hoc
approaches  are likely to be enormous.
2.0  A serious  effort to develop alternative  land  use. farming  systems, and  food
systems scenarios  for the 21st century should be initiated.  A clearer picture
of the  demands  that  are likely  to  be  placed  on  agriculture  over  the  next
century and of the ways in which  agricultural systems might be able to meet
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present 5 billion level to the  10-20 billion range.  The demands that will be
placed  on agriculture  will  also depend  on the rate of growth of income  --
particularly in the poor countries where consumers  spend  a relatively large
share of income growth  on subsistence  --  food, clothing, and  housing.  The
resources and technology that will be used to increase agricultural production
by  a  multiple  of  3-6  will  depend  on  both  the  constraints  on  resource
availability that are likely to emerge and the rate of advance in knowledge.
Advances  in knowledge  can permit the substitution of more abundance  for
increasingly  scarce  resources  and  reduce  the  resource  constraints  on
commodity production.  Past  studies of potential climate  change effects  on
agriculture have given insufficient attention to adoptive change in non-climate
parameters.  But  application  of  advances  in  biological  and  chemical
technology, which substitute knowledge for land, and advances in mechanical
and engineering technology, which substitute knowledge for labor, have in the
past been driven by increasingly  favorable  access  to energy resources  --  by
declining prices of energy.  It is not unreasonable to anticipate that there will
be  strong incentive,  by the  early decades  of the  next  century,  to  improve
energy  efficiency  in  agricultural  production  and  utilization.  Particular
attention should be given to alternative  and competing uses  of land.  Land
use  transformation,  from  forest to  agriculture,  is presently  contributing  to
radiative forcing through release  of CO2 and methane into the atmosphere.
Conversion of low intensity agricultural systems to forest has been proposed
as  a method of absorbing CO2. There will  also be  increasing demands on
land use for watershed protection, and biomass energy production.
3.0  The  capacity  to  monitor  the  agricultural  sources  and  impacts  of
environmental  change  should  be  strengthened.  It  is a  matter  of serious
concern  that  only  in  the  last  decade  and  a  half  has  it  been  possible  to
estimate  the magnitude  and  productivity  effects  of soil  loss  in  the United
States.  Even rudimentary data on soil loss is almost completely unavailable
in most developing countries.  The same point holds, with even greater force,
for groundwater pollution, salinization,  species loss and others.  It is time to
design  the  elements  of  a  comprehensive  agriculturally  related  resource
monitoring system  and to establish priorities for implementation.  Data on
the  effects  of  environmental  change  on  the  health  of  individuals  and
communities  is even less adequate.  The monitoring effort should  include  a
major focus on the effects of environmental  change on human populations.
Lack of firm knowledge about the contribution of agricultural practices to the
methane  and  nitrous  oxide  sources  of greenhouse  forcing  was  mentioned
several  times during the  consultation.  Much  closer collaboration  between
production-oriented  agricultural  scientists,  ecological  trained  biological
scientists, and the physical  scientists that have been traditionally  concerned
with global climate change is essential.  This effort should be explicitly linked
with the monitoring efforts currently being pursued under the auspices  of the
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4.0  The  design  of  technologies  and  institutions  to  achieve  more  efficient
management  of surface  and groundwater resources will become  increasingly
important.  During  the  21st  Century  water  resources  will  become  an
increasingly  serious  constraint  on  agricultural  production.  Agricultural
production  is  a major  source  of decline  in the  quality of both ground  and
surface water.  Limited access  to clean and uncontaminated  water  supply is
a major source  of disease and poor health in many parts  of the developing
world and in the centrally planned economies.  Global climate change can be
expected to have a major differential impact on the water  availability, water
demand,  erosion,  salinization,  and  flooding.  The  development  and
introduction of technologies and management systems that enhance water use
efficiency  represents a high priority both because of short and intermediate
run constraints on water availability and the longer run possibility of seasonal
and geographical shifts in water availability.  The identification, breeding, and
introduction  of water  efficient crops for dryland  and saline environments  is
potentially an important  aspect of achieving greater water use efficiency.
5.0  The modeling  of the sources  and impacts  of climate change  must  become
more  sophisticated.  One  of  the  problems  with  both  the  physical  and
economic modeling efforts is that they have tended to be excessively resistant
to  advances  in  micro-level  knowledge  including  failure  to  take  into
consideration climate change response possibilities from agricultural research
and  the  response behavior  of decision  making units  such  as governments,
agricultural  producers, and consumers.
6.0  Research  on  environmentally  compatible  farming  systems  should  be
intensified.  In agriculture,  as  in  the  energy  field,  there  are  a number  of
technical  and institutional  innovations  that could  have  both  economic  and
environmental  benefits.  Among  the technical  possibilities  is the design  of
new "third" or "fourth" generation chemical, biorational,  and biological  pest
management  technologies.  Another  is the design of land use  technologies
and institutes  that will contribute  to reduction  of erosion,  salinization, and
groundwater  pollution.
7.0  Intermediate  efforts should be made to reform  agricultural  commodity  and
income  support  policies.  In  both  developed  and  developing  countries
producers  decisions  on  land  management,  farming  systems,  and  use  of
technical  inputs  (such  as  fertilizers  and  pesticides)  are  influenced  by
government interventions  such as price supports  and subsidies, programs  to
promote  or  limit  production,  and  tax  incentive  and  penalties.  It  is
increasingly  important  that  such  interventions  be  designed  to  take  into
account  the environmental  consequences  of decisions  by land  owners  and
producers induced by the interventions.
8.0  Alternative  food  systems  will  have  to  be  developed.  A  food-system
perspective should become  an organizing principle for improvements in the
performance  of existing  systems  and  for  the  design  of new  systems.  The131
agricultural science community should be prepared, by the second quarter of
the  next  century,  to  contribute  to  the  design  of  alternative  food  systems.
Many of these alternatives will include the use of plants other than the grain
crops that now account for a major share of world feed and food production.
Some  of  these  alternatives  will  involve  radical  changes  in  food  sources.
Rogoff and Rawlins have described one such system based on lignocellulose
--  both for animal production and human consumption.APPENDIXTablesTable 1.  Increases in annual average temperature for the region including Minnesota.
Temperature in degrees  Celsius  above the present.
Temperature Increase  by Year
Degrees  Celsius
2000  2030  2050-2070
Low scenario  0.6  1.4  1.9  - 2.4 Medium scenario  1.0  3.0  4.7  - 6.5 High scenario  1.3  4.8  7.5  - 10.4Table 2.  Base case values of various  climatic parameters.
I  --------------------. Year------------------------
Parameter  2000  2030  2050
Average annual temperature:  1  3  4-7
degrees  C above present average
Additional  frost-free  days/year  20-30  45-55
Decline  in heating degree  days  1300-2000  2000-3500
Increase  in cooling degree  days  250-400  500-1000
Weeks earlier for spring snow melt  2-3  3-4
Number of additional July  days  10-20  25-35
over 90oF
Twin Cities average  July temperature,  88  91
degrees  F
Average summer  soil moisture, percent  -25
change from present
Annual  minus summer precipitation,  +10
change from present
Summer precipitation, percent  -15
change from present
Drought  frequency  Increasing
Runoff  DecreasingTable 3.  Regional  scenarios for climatic change.
---------Temperature  Change---------
(as a multiple of global average)  Precipitation
Region  Summer  Winter  Change
High  latitudes  0.5x  to 0.7x  2.0x to 2.4x  Enhanced  in winter
(60-90  )
Mid latitudes  0.8x to  1.0x  1.2x to  1.4x  Possibly reduced  in
(30-600)  summer
Low latitudes  0.9x to 0.7x  0.9x to  0.7x  Enhanced  in places
(0-30,)  with  heavy  rainfall
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Figure 1.  Global temperature trend for the past century.
Source:  J. I. Hanson, A. Furg, S. Lebedeff,  D. Rind, R. Ruedz, G. Russell.
Prediction of  near  term climates evolution:  What  can we tell
decision-makers  now?  In J. Topping  (ed.) Proceedings  of  the  first
North American conference on preparing for  climate change  (Washington,






ri}\"  agi6M S  I  0
0z  i?  \  o  t 
.)  X  °  (  I0 
o  IIo  o  i  °o
0  /  o
(0  ill  --  S  0  0
/~~L  0
o  11  \^  Q *.  01  '  s
II  oc
m-
=  . I  I:  LOl,
C  3  w  *  Q1
<  OS  |0,
"0 
°
.^  L  g^S-  O  c  II-0 C  O  Co  Cm  - '
Fn  wU  q  1 Figure  3.  Contributions  to  Increases,  in  Radiative  Forcing  in  the  1990s
Tace  gases  Afirultur  a contributikn
25.6%e
(C3.14)  ,7^  Ptliz  r11.
/  bcrsl  llurnlg
_  5.  _2.6%
,  our  Ow.e  (  )  \  )
:  _'~\ |  i  i  . nl.-  ice  p8aaelt.
f^arbon  Oioxd  (C02) I  l3
0o  :  40%  13%
L&Md  use
,_  - ,  ~  ,  (d/O!wRtauO)
10%
O  troftutocwbOn  (CFC) 
Source:  John  Reilly  and Rhonda Bucklin,  "Climate Change and Agriculture,"  World
Agriculture Situation and  Outlook Report  (Washington, DC:  USDA/ERS,  WAS-55,
June 1989).Figure 4.  Linking fossil  fuel  use  and agricultural production.
+
Fossil Fuel Use  * Climate Change  --  Agricultural
in Agriculture  Production
Example of one activity (X), one environmental variable (Y), and one impact (Z).  The total
derivative  dZ represents  the net effect of a change in the activity  X on the impact Z.
dX
Through the chain rule, this total derivative is equal to the partial derivative aZ -- the direct
aX
effect  of a change in X on the impact Z, holding all else constant  -- plus the product of the
total derivative  dY --  the net effect of a change in the activity X on the environmental
dX
variable Y  --  and the partial derivative  aZ --  the effect of changes in Y on Z, holding
aY
all else constant.  In other words, dZ  =  aZ  +  aZ dY.
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Minneapolis,  MN  55455
(612)  625-1102Invitation Letteri  UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA  Department  of Agricultural  and Applied  Economics
|I1  TWIN CITIES  231  Classroom  Office Building
1994  Buford Avenue
St. Paul,  Minnesota  55108
August 18,  1989
Dr. Pedro A. Sanchez
Department of  Soil Science
North Carolina State University
Raleigh, NC  27650
Dear  Pedro,
The purpose  of this  letter is  to  invite your participation in a small
"consultation"  to discuss  the question of  "Resource and Environmental
Constraints on Sustainable Growth in Agricultural Production."
Let me provide you with a brief background on the  consultation.  During
the  last year, Robert Herdt of the Rockefeller Foundation and I have held
several conversations on  the leading issues  for agriculture and rural
development as we move  into the  21st century.  We have decided to
organize a series  of informal consultations with a limited number of
knowledgeable individuals about several  issues  that we believe will be
important.
The  first of these consultations was held in mid-July on "Biological and
Technical  Constraints on Crop and Animal Productivity."  The second
consultation will be on the  issue of "Resource and Environmental
Constraints  on Sustainable Growth in Agricultural Production."  The
meeting will be held here at  the University of Minnesota on November 27-
28.
In most developing countries,  it will be necessary to  achieve sustained
growth in agricultural production in  the 3-5 percent range  at least to
the first quarter of  the next century.  There is  growing concern about
the impact of the  series of resource  and environmental constraints  that
may seriously impinge on the capacity to sustain growth in agricultural
production in this range.
One concern is with a set of changes  largely associated with increasingly
intensive agricultural production practices.  This  includes
(a) waterlogging and salinization in irrigated areas;  (b)  contamination
from plant nutrients and pesticides;  and (c) growing resistance  of
insects, pests,  and pathogens to present methods  of control.  A second
set of concerns  relates  to  the extension of agriculture  into more fragile
environments.  These  include soil  erosion, desertification,  and the
potential climate change resulting from deforestation in humid and sub-
humid tropics.  The  third set of concerns stems  from the  impact of
TDr. Pedro A. Sanchez
August 18,  1989
Page 2
industrialization on environmental changes resulting from the  impact of
the intensification of industrialization on climate change.  These
include  the effects of atmospheric contaminants  such as  acid rain, global
warming, destruction of the  ozone  layer, and others.
The objective of the consultation will be  to explore with a small group
of knowledgeable people  the  implications of  the micro-level and macro-
level environmental changes referred to above for resource allocation in
agricultural research.  One of the results of the consultation will be  to
identify the priorities among the several  issues  referred to above and
sketch out an agenda for a conference that might explore the  issues  in
greater depth.
We hope very much that you will be  able  to accept  this  invitation.  Those
who have been invited include:
Dean Abrahamson  University of Minnesota
Zbigniew Bochniarz  University of Minnesota  (Visiting
Professor)
William Clark  John F. Kennedy  School of Public Affairs,
Harvard University
Pierre  Crosson  Resources  for the Future
Suzanna B. Hecht  University of California
Robert Herdt  Rockefeller Foundation
William Larson  University of Minnesota
Martin Parry  IIASA and University of Birmingham
Steve Rayner  Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Norman Rosenberg  Resources for  the Future
The project will be able to  take  care of your airline ticket and other
expenses  incurred in your participation in  the  consultation.  It would be
helpful  if I could have your response within the next  few weeks.  Please
give me a call either at my office  (612-625-4701) or at my home  (612-644-
9570)  if you have any questions.
Si  r  ely y6urs,
Ve  on  .R  tan
Regents Professor
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